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WORLD DEMOCRACY

MANY of the difficulties and troubles in the history of mankind have originated in the misunderstanding of some phenomena and in the subsequent misinterpretation of them.

We speak about the aims of mankind in slogans like: 'no more wars'; we say we want international co-operation although others prefer isolation and still others want totalitarian nationalism; we think we will preserve our democracy, so different in aspect from the British democracy and also different from that in Scandinavia, but there are others who ask for socialism and still others who would have communism; we claim of fighting for free enterprise and private initiative, while others seek their happiness in planned and controlled economy; some of us support a full sovereignty for each nation, but others are willing to abandon some part of sovereignty in an era of international co-operation, which is to replace the old age of balance of power policy. To some, freedom of speech and Press are the highest goods for which to fight. To others a censored public opinion and secret policies are preferable.

There are very few who do not forget in the fever and excitement of mankind's eternal struggle that all these ideas, so often disputed over, are not really the aims of mankind. They are only some of the multifarious ways and means proposed to reach man's aim, the aim of giving to all an opportunity to enjoy life. Prerequisites for this final aim are health, economic and social welfare, and a certain degree of culture in a world of elementary justice, based upon the high morals and fair play, which are the foundation of any justice, and any divine and human law. These bases for law were called by the Romans *bonos mores* and *bona fides*, and they are supported and completed in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence by the 'common sense' theory.

All these ideas are, of course, very flexible; no equalization of aims nor of their ways and means is possible in the variety of needs and desires of different peoples or nations. The Spartans enjoyed their life in physical tenacity and efficiency; Athenians were happy through fine arts, literature, and good wine from Samos. Eskimos see their freedom from want and their test of civilization in a good stove, Costa Ricans in a refrigerator. These great differences in the understanding of what constitutes civilization and welfare, combined with differences in the dynamic potentialities of cultural development, cause a perpetual oscillation between extremes.

Even if we assume that all are agreed about the final aim — which is neither easy nor certain — the greatest variance is to be found in points of view on the ways and means of achieving this aim. If we further assume the goodwill of those representing the particular methods, we must not forget that, beyond their own convictions, it is no less important to convince others. There is a

psychological aspect which cannot be disregarded. With origins in different kinds of thought and feeling, caused by differing circumstances in geography, history, actual culture, and predilections, what is for one obvious is for another too complex to be understood.

The problems are complex but, even presuming a general goodwill, to obtain a resultant of different opinions which could represent common sense, we must first convince all people. This is not an easy procedure. It is certain, however, that in order to reach the outskirts of life happiness for man we must secure sensitivity and understanding for common aims, for common methods of work, and for a common basis of that work. It is a truism, therefore, to state that without co-operation on a national and international scale we shall never achieve what we are seeking to accomplish. Fortunately, people have a stronger social instinct to co-operate and to work through a joint action than they have ability and inclination to divide efforts and work alone in the world. Thus, with the disastrous lessons which we have learned twice over in one generation, we are now more than ever determined on a course of co-operation internationally.

This determination should be a stimulus to those now actively engaged in working towards international co-operation. However, there is one thing to be born constantly in mind — co-operation can never be accomplished without some sacrifices of individuality, both physical and intellectual.

The conference at Dumbarton Oaks cannot be considered as a final solution. It is much more a preliminary step, a first meeting of the founders of an international, spiritual, political, and social enterprise, an enterprise with a manifold programme and multiplex functions. These founders are following the empirical method of history, believing that, to consider an agreement, they must work in peace. Peace cannot arise from the emotions excited by wars. First there must be a cooling-off period. The *Pax Romana* and the *Trouga Dei* were both stages of peace, one guaranteed by the Roman Empire and the other by the Church; whoever broke with these systems of peace lost all rights and was considered a criminal.

If the delegates at Dumbarton Oaks were interested in making this first, preliminary step, the results of their conference are to be understood as the outlines of a *Trouga Dei* after World War II. In this guise the conference must be welcomed by all who wish to advance the cause of international co-operation.

Unfortunately, however, the majority of reactions reflected in many publications offer only criticism and indicate dissatisfaction. Instead of trying to encourage both those powers taking part and those not active in the conference, most writers look only for weak spots in the structure, without mentioning the fundamental advantages of the whole idea and its accomplishments. While criticism is good, it is helpful only if it leads to a constructive idea; otherwise it is destructive. We surely must be aware that perfect ideas and perfect achievements of them do not exist. Just as it is easier to reach the peak by a roundabout way, it will be far simpler to solve the great problems, which must be solved if mankind is to be happy, indirectly rather than by a straight and direct path. In order to reach the long-range goal we must first reach the aims of several shorter-range programmes, always keeping in mind the final aim.

The basic method in any system of co-operation is to create machinery for securing co-operation in a legitimate way, to establish provisions for peace and the means to enforce these provisions if necessary. For centuries this method has been understood in private dealings of people of one community. Comprehension of it brought the development of private law inside of particular communities far earlier than the growth of private international law, although even the latter developed earlier than the political international law, which should regulate the actions of states. Indeed, no legal branch is so neglected as the codification of the international political law, despite the interdependence of states to-day, brought through the technical developments of the last decades. To-day, the world is bound so closely together that one can reach the most distant spots in fifty hours and news events are known to all a few seconds after they occur.

This physical interdependence faces emotions of international distrust, for to-day the possibilities of nations being outsmarted are definitely greater than in the past, when distances could not be covered in such short time. In order to clear up this atmosphere of international suspicion we must establish a material and formal code of co-operation. Yet it is difficult for one nation to abandon these suspicions after the tragic experiences of past centuries, without definite knowledge of what to expect in another nation's behaviour. Nevertheless, if some rules of mutual attitudes in international co-operation were established and both parties were to oblige themselves to observe the code, much of this distrust between nations should disappear. Moreover, the code would be backed by international force to secure its enforcement against any state which might attempt to break it. Thus both the need and possibility of using imperialistic methods and adopting the balance of power systems and policies of isolationism and nationalism would end.

To imagine that the whole work of achieving for the greatest part of mankind an opportunity to enjoy life can be accomplished by one or two conferences or in one or two years would be not realistic indeed. Instead, the process must and probably will be one of more than one or two generations.

A constitution for the world has to be drafted and adopted for use. Here the greatest difficulty will be found in deciding what the term constitution means and just what should be secured by such a constitution. A constitution is a law guaranteeing to the people of a community the rights they hold of the government ruling them and also defining their rights in dealing with each other. The struggle to secure a constitution and such an understanding of rights, a phenomenon seen early in the development of the European culture, is seldom discoverable in the political life of the other old continents. In Asia and Africa religious doctrines, now obsolete, took the place of the constitutional development. Nowhere in Asia and Africa do we find any struggle of the population to gain a constitution based on the right of the masses to influence their rulers; the rulers, in order to explain their absolute position, shaped a fiction of their descent from gods. Recent constitutional movements in Asia and Africa are results of the European influence and are accordingly far behind European understanding and maturity.

Establishing a constitution for all nations of the world would mean a rapid elevation of politically unaware and unprepared people to the political maturity

of the more progressive states. This elevation takes time, and none should expect that we can secure it in another Dumbarton Oaks or Teheran conference. However, in the meantime, something must be done to find an exit from the vicious circle in which man has involved himself. Something should be done to teach some nations to undertake a way of life which will lead them to understanding of the importance of constitutions and their meaning for both states and their populations. Education is, of course, a process of generations leading to culture which becomes a social consciousness of the cultural part of mankind. To secure meanwhile the co-operation of all nations, some must be directed to this higher way by indoctrination which, if necessary, should be forced upon them.

States and their populations must be brought to a certain preliminary stage of culture, a stage of, let us call it, civilization in an intellectual, social, and political sense, which may be still far away from the true culture. Civilization is an external symptom, given from the outside by someone else; culture is a higher, more mature, and more valuable degree of development, based upon the own desire of man to elevate himself to a higher degree and level of morality and ethics. Nations exist which have outstandingly high morals and a sense of humanity, but which have a small degree of civilization; those nations are cultural. On the other hand there are highly civilized peoples who wash themselves five times daily, bathe seven times weekly, neither spit on the floor nor throw papers on the street, live in beautiful, clean cities and homes, and in general have all the external symptoms of elevation above the average, but who are less cultural, less moral, and less human than the previous uncivilized peoples. The correct ratio of both culture and civilization can seldom be found.

We shall bring the different levels of political and social understanding and culture to one pattern, a pattern of a world constitution guaranteeing economic and social welfare and the opportunity of enjoyment of life to all peoples in a world of security based upon justice. The history of the two world wars shows that mankind is off the path to culture. The world was brought into this situation by unusually strong forces, which worked for decades and generations to bring mankind into another course of history and culture. These forces did not hesitate to destroy everything which stood in their way; they tried to reach their final goal by eliminating one after another the obstacles which blocked their continuous drive on their own way, a drive which was backward on the route of human development. Facing these developments, states tried to avoid the danger by an isolationism based on the knowledge of their own wealth, high culture, and great potentialities of vast territories, resources, developments of techniques, invention, and intellect; but in a short time they realized that isolationism, whether splendid, Monroe, or socialistic, was impossible because of the economic interdependence of the world and because of the danger of the challenge of unknown extent, directed against these states by a pernicious ingenuity in a world-wide complot.

These states have now arrived at the eve of an historical decision which will recognize that their very existence depends upon the co-operation of all peoples around the world, whether rich, big, dynamic, and strong through their ingenuity and skill — or small, weak, and poor. If they attempt to join in

co-operation they strive, not because they are large in size and wealth, but because they are enlightened through this recognition. The other nations which shall join them must for their part realize that the leadership of these three great states is necessary not because it is the will of the three great states to govern others, but rather because they alone are competent to assume the responsibility for the decision of bringing the tragically derailed world back again on the track leading to a new era of culture and welfare. It is necessary because these three have both the intention and the power to accomplish this re-routing of man's efforts.

Manifestly, this is the real background and the explanation of the recent conference.

Without doubt, mankind now waits on the verge of historical events. How strong our own decision will be depends largely on our ability to see clearly the aim toward which we drive, on our unanimity of agreement about the plan, on a correct choice of sequence, on our co-ordination of the ways and means, and on their perfect performance.

The principles of our aims were outlined in the Atlantic Charter and approved by all the United Nations. The technique and plan of their achievement were agreed upon in Teheran. These aims are based on the conception of a World Democracy of States, in itself revolutionary for international politics. The situation is similar to one, if a cone rotating on its apex and ever vainly seeking to attain an equilibrium by rotation, should be inverted to its broad base, the normal static position of a cone. Despite the physical simplicity of the conception it is revolutionary. The history of the past few centuries has seen but one kind of settlement for international affairs, the balance of power, to promote imperialistic ambitions. Adjustment of the balance through secret alliances provoked counter-alliances and resulted in wars. Carried farther, this international system often led to the hegemony limited by the stage of advancement of technical means of communication and warfare. Through and because of recent technical development the idea of single state hegemony has been carried by the Axis to the ultimate attempt at world domination. The only remedy found for the disease of world conquest was the common resistance of those states endangered by it. The simplicity of this idea of common effort is the source of its great strength. Yet it was still difficult to convince the average citizen of the nations opposing the Axis of the rightness of even this simple idea, so long accustomed was he to thinking and acting oppositely.

Two methods for accomplishing important changes exist. By one we could strive to complete a maximum programme, intending to reach our final aim at once in the shortest possible period, without regarding the costs and sacrifices required. By the other method we could attempt a step-by-step movement, achieving at each step the optimum gain possible considering contemporary circumstances. The first is the method of revolution; the second, evolution.

Any great conception requires time to be understood by the common man; many new and revolutionary ideas in science, art, and music have failed and their originators have been defeated because the common man could not yet understand them. Such temporary failure was the fate of Copernicus and

Galileo, of Leonardo da Vinci and Burne-Jones, of Beethoven and Brahms; so it has been with all reformers in literature from Sophocles, through Shakespeare to Dostoevski; so it was with all religious reformers; and thus it is now with Einstein, Shostakovich, and Picasso. Perhaps these men are geniuses; we cannot yet make our decision as average people, because aside of very few, who understand them or who think that they understand them, we — the average people — do not understand them. They were generations ahead of their contemporaries, for their ideas were great and their discoveries revolutionary. They were all, as perhaps those we question to-day are, pioneers of great new principles in their fields. Their principles were defeated not only because of jealousy and opposing interest, but because they were, and the contemporaneous may be to-day, misunderstood by the masses. However, in the geniality of any great idea lies its power and immortality, and if truly genial the idea survives even if its originator died defeated before his idea won the approval of the common man and proved to be immortal because of its geniality.

The conception of international co-operation based on world democracy is in some aspects not new. The great axiom of mankind's co-operation as a basis of mankind's development is found in the Bible saga of the tower of Babel. The failure of the idea proved that the social instinct of man, which inspired the construction of the tower, cannot be comprehended in his agglomeration in one region but rather in his dispersion throughout the world, and in the co-operation of scattered peoples regardless of the degrees of strength, size, or wealth. For all these peoples are members of mankind and citizens of this globe. Thousands of years have-already passed and perhaps many years will still go by, before the human brain and conscience receive and digest this simple axiom. At any rate, the process has so far been an evolutionary one; even the theory of the balance of power was a subconsciously derived, but imperfect, organization of the several inspired by their social instincts of agglomeration against the one or more endangering the rest. It may be that this system was a departure from the normal approach to the final great aim of world co-operation, but perhaps it was a necessary stage in order to direct man by a roundabout means into the correct channels of human development. Indeed, it may occasionally be useful to show the urgency of a problem and the right way of its solution by proving its necessity and plausibility through a paradoxical reverse.

For about fifty years some political thinkers have realized that through preservation of peace we can near the higher goal of prosperity by means of world co-operation instead of by force and war. They have their monuments in the achievements of the Hague conference in 1899, reaffirmed in 1907. The most important phase of this progress was the foundation of the Permanent Court of Justice in the Hague. Before widespread conviction, that large-scale co-operation between peoples is both necessary and within man's ability to achieve, becomes possible, it is necessary to start with at least a partial performance of arbitration of disputes. In reality the League of Nations did not fail. It was a useful stepping-stone towards world co-operation, and proved through its failure to prevent wars that any such organization must be based

upon a democratic system of voting and adaptation of resolutions; unanimity is in its very spirit undemocratic. The give and take of democracy demands some limitation of the individual point of view; the necessity for unanimity may result in a deadlock of members, each insisting on his own view and each refusing to fit himself into the common purpose by sacrificing a part of his own interest.

Moreover, the League by its own lack of success also proved that without power to execute decisions no co-operation on world-vital problems is possible. In these two respects the merit of the League of Nations lies in its so-called failure.

There was still another mistake made in the League, which could too easily be repeated to-day. This error was caused by confusion in three ideas and in the expressions for those ideas: nation, society, and state.

A nation should be understood as a group of people with a similar culture, language, history, and habits. It does not necessarily mean a group living on the territory of one state. We have great groups of emigrants from all European and Asiatic nations who have lived for generations in other countries, particularly in the United States, enjoying a new citizenship and its civil rights, but still feeling themselves nationals of the country of their ethnographic descent. On the other hand, there also exist nations without a territory, as a symbol of a sovereign state. Let us call them by the term used in the canonical law, as nations of *nullius diocessos*. There are many examples of such nations in history: the Czechs, after the annexation of their land by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; the Armenians; the Druses; the Poles, who were divided among three empires at the close of the eighteenth century; the Jews, who have lasted for two thousand years though dispersed throughout the world, etc.

A society is to be understood as a group of people having a common purpose, living in one or more communities, without regard for citizenship or nationality, together with other societies inside of one or more consolidated nations or states, such as rural and urban societies, religious societies (most extreme case is the caste system in India), economic societies (workers versus manufacturers), and many others which can differ with extreme antagonism, while remaining within the same state or nation.

A state is a legal creation of the political law and is defined as the execution of the sovereign power over a limited territory. Three factors are needed for the existence of a state: the executing power (in a democratic system the legislative power is granted to the population, which may, of course, consist of different nations and societies); a geographically closed territory in which the national and social aspects of inhabitants are not necessarily the most important problems; and the political sovereignty. It is this last factor which may now be limited in a world organization.

Those definitions indicate that the nationalistic basis as a criterion for setting up states, adopted by Woodrow Wilson, was an error and could not pass the test of time. It is wrong because a state cannot contain all the members of a nation, and each state based on the nationalistic principle unnecessarily invites the dangerous problem of minorities. But the state as a creation of the political law, is the chief subject of the international law, and the only subject of any scheme of world-wide co-operation.

Those distinctions may not be so apparent or important to Americans, for the United States' population is made up of many peoples from different nations, and all who obtain their United States' citizenship are part of the American nation, no matter what is their national origin. Nevertheless, in other countries the national principle has been misinterpreted and has grown to the extreme nationalism, covering imperialistic designs and causing world-wide disasters.

The term 'nation' appears again in the name of the new world organization, probably because of the confusion which would arise from calling the new organization the 'United States'. However, it would be advisable to change the name so that the term 'state' is included in the title, e.g. 'Interstate World Organization' or something similar.

The delegates at Dumbarton Oaks tried in their proposals to eliminate the chief faults, which were the principle of unanimity and lack of enforcement, which so weakened the League. In their suggestions they paid more attention to the problem of security than to the problem of universal welfare. In considering the sequence of the steps toward the final aim, they are using an inductive method; while the projected system has provisions for both social and economic welfare, it places these objectives as secondary to the attainment of security. Clearly the delegates from the three founding nations are convinced that no economic or social welfare is possible before security is reached, and their plans should be considered with this conviction in mind.

Already the preliminary draft for the new organization issued by the Dumbarton Oaks conference reveals the three main functions: legislative, judicial, and administrative.

The legislative power should reside with the General Assembly of representatives from all member states and its two special committees, the economic and social councils, which each consists of delegates from eighteen nations.

The judicial function should be performed by a world court of justice, created to handle any dispute arising in the community of states.

The administrative power should be concentrated in the Secretariat under its chief executive, the General Secretary, who is appointed by the General Assembly.

This natural division between three functions is marred by the effort to place the security question above all other problems, and by the delegation of the greatest authority and jurisdiction, in particular also the legislative one, to the Security Council.

The reasons for this distortion of the functional division become clear when we remember that the whole effort has resulted from the disaster of wars and has now as its first aim the insurance of peace, so that this young organization need not be handicapped in its development by the constant danger of aggression or internal disturbances in member states. Thus, the police force, in normal conditions only a sub-division of the administration, is the first consideration of the whole organization. The pre-eminence of the police arm should only last through a period of transition of not more than, e.g. a quarter of a century; of course, if the change will be possible sooner this should be ended earlier and, the moment conditions permit, its importance should be diminished and the

normal state of three chief functions and divisions restored. It is apparent that as long as we remain uncertain of some states' political maturity and of their will to democratic co-operation through a world constitution, we must entrust this constitution to guardianship by a controlling force.

Authority to wield force in order to maintain peace must be granted to those states which were strong enough to resist the greatest organized menace of aggression in history, to those states which were ready to use their strength in defence of human rights, to those states which are proving that they have the economic sinews to carry their effort to victory. The prospect of a three-starred constellation of great powers alarmed some for they feared that it meant another complot to dominate the world. In their fears they have greatly exaggerated the case; these 'great power' provisions are made for a transition period and they assign to the only states able to accomplish the difficult task of that period. Furthermore, the three great states declared their goodwill and their intention to proceed according to the interest of all 'peace loving nations'. Some may not choose to believe these declarations; they should realize that, despite its imperfections, the route the great powers have taken is the only possible route.

This is the explanation of the construction proposed at Dumbarton Oaks.

While it is difficult to predict the future of this world organization, some analysis of probable developments is possible.

As stated previously, the source of power in a democracy is the legislative body. In the world organization that body will be the General Assembly, together with its councils and committees, of which more probably will be added. The first task for this main body is the establishment of the code of international law governing the international organization. The states must decide that if they are to abandon a part of their independence of decisions and action they must, however, first know what rules are to govern the organization to which they surrender sovereignty. The founders have already proclaimed that human rights must be respected, but their declaration can easily be misinterpreted and disregarded if it is not supported by a material and a formal code providing for adjustments, operation, and procedure within the organization.

This first task of code-making presents the first difficulty, for differences of opinion exist among the United Nations. European continental countries are accustomed to strict, detailed codification. Their law codes derive mainly from those of Rome, which were prepared by the foremost lawyers of the Justinian's period, and have since been improved during centuries of legal development on the continent. If European tradition of law is followed in the international code, almost all political questions, which are the most dangerous in international disputes and lead always to wars, could be reduced to specific legal disputes, which will be judged by the court of justice, with its members chosen from the best lawyers of all nations. Such a code would represent the maximum achievement possible, because the continental law system leaves only a small margin for determination by the court, on ground of common sense, good faith, and fair morals. Such a system would be the most advantageous in a world filled with discrepancies of legal opinions caused by varying histories, economies, cultures, needs, locations, and even different intellectual developments.

On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon law remains satisfied in stating principles, leaving a broad margin of free interpretation and decision up to the judge. It is impossible to explore here the differences between the two conceptions of law and the reasons for their origin; the important fact is that the two schools of legal thought do exist. It is true, however, that there is a great justification for a strict codification of the international law. If detailed codes developed in Europe because of diversified levels of circumstances in which peoples are living in European conditions and cultures, a precise system would appear even more needed in a world of still more diversified conditions and standards of life. The judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice will represent different systems of legal theory and what will seem to one of them natural and perfectly obvious will seem foreign to another with a different cultural background. Considerable difficulties in uniform interpretation of the international law can arise if too much is left to the discretion of judges.

A detailed codification of international law need not create a hard and stiff system; rather it should create a stable one, which at any time may be adjusted, if necessary, by the assembly either of its own volition or at the suggestions of the world court of justice.

Whatever is decided about the degree of detail in law, it is of primary importance that the international court be accorded authority to act in all cases. Its jurisdiction and the acceptance of its decision should be compulsory, and force should be available to back it up. Non-compulsory jurisdiction would mean that states would submit their disputes only when they could expect a favourable decision. The authority of the court would then be a highly problematical matter.

The necessity of a compulsory jurisdiction does not imply that every type of negotiation, mediation, world conference, commissions, conciliation, or extrajudicial arbitration ought to be replaced by decisions of the international court. On the contrary, every dispute which can possibly be settled by these extrajudicial means ought never to come before the court; in particular, economic and social disputes should be settled without court aid. It is only cases, where no means of reaching agreement by extrajudicial ways exists, which should be decided by the international court of justice.

Once the general outlines of jurisdictional division are agreed upon and the General Assembly has begun the task of codification, we are in sight of establishment of a code of international law, which will make legal cases out of war-provoking political disputes. With such a code we will be able to ignore the mask of sovereignty and nationalism, which are usually employed to frustrate reasonable settlement of the disputes. They will be submitted to a world court whose verdict will be enforced by the Security Council as one of its administrative functions. For the best possible code the experience of the judges of the world court should be utilized. But though they may even prepare the whole code as a suggestion for the General Assembly, the final determination of the code is constitutionally up to the legislative branch.

Detailed analysis of the proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks brings to light several objections. In the formation of certain principles the delegates appear to have a negative approach. For example: Chapter II, Article 3, calls for

settlement of disputes 'in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered'. Article 4 contains the equally negative expression: 'in any manner inconsistent with the purposes.' A code ought to provide positive, not negative, definitions.

Therefore it is suggested that the above principles should be restated as follows: 'In case of a dispute each party has the right to seek a settlement by the means described in Chapter VIII, Section A.3 (negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration) or other peaceful means of its own choice. If these means are tried and still no settlement is reached, each party should give notice of the dispute to the Secretariat of the United Nations, delivering full information about the background of the dispute and the means previously employed to settle the case peacefully, as well as the suggested solutions. The Secretariat will acknowledge receipt of the report. The states, which are parties to the dispute, must not use any kind of force against the other party; should they use force they will be declared aggressors regardless of their substantial rights in the dispute and the Interstate World Organization will employ the necessary force to suppress the aggressor and to restore the *status quo*. After this is accomplished the primary dispute will be considered by the International Court of Justice.'

Provision for military sanction in restoring peace is included, because a law without the backing of sanctions is no law at all. The parties to the dispute must know what to expect if they break the peace and the principal plan for action must be set up beforehand, so that the Security Council and General Assembly will not be handicapped when the time for action comes by having to consider and discuss the procedure.

Since the proposals of Dumbarton Oaks have limited the purpose of the world organization by emphasizing the function of keeping the peace, it is certainly essential that the means of performing this function be at least definitely determined. In fact, the success or failure of the whole institution hinges on its ability to preserve this procedure. Nothing will diminish the authority of the organization more than its lack of a clear decision and speedy action, and nothing can make the aggressor nation more arrogant than a divided opinion among the members of the league. The would-be aggressor must be assured that he will lose his gamble if he counts upon split opinion in the rest of the world.

In order to inspire confidence in its fairness and impartiality, the organization itself must be bound by law, and its principles must be handled absolutely and not relatively. Otherwise it will be difficult to avoid the sort of misinterpretation or fictional provocation exhibited, e.g. in the Manchurian and Ethiopian affairs. We must not again risk permitting nations to assume that their dispute is not an international problem but only an attempt to settle a neighbourly incident caused by a drunken soldier.

As for the question of non-members of the organization, the last paragraph of Chapter II contains a rule referring to those who have not joined the international organization, but is limited to the case of action by them against the international peace. This rule is insufficient. The four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter are the basis for the world organization, and the Dumbarton Oaks conference and its proposals provide in Chapter II, Section A.1, that the duty of the organization is 'to promote respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms'. Therefore the organization should take steps to stop any action by non-member states which might jeopardize these principles within their own countries.

Non-member states are not deprived of duties because of their non-participation, however; their only loss is of rights. Since the organization is intended to be world-wide and will eventually include all states, those not yet members of the world community ought to adapt their ways to conform with the world constitution, even if they do not enjoy the privileges of membership. A man living in a country where he is not a citizen, may not have the right to vote or hold office, but must adapt his conduct to the law of the state of his residence.

Provision for the needed expansion of the system might be made by adding to the end of Chapter II, last paragraph: 'and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms.' Once this is understood it becomes apparent that limitations of state sovereignty must also apply to non-member states or else they will be better off than members in this respect.

Gaps exist too in the suggestions of the Dumbarton Oaks delegates on the problem of membership in the world organization. In any institution of public utility it is essential that the institution be obliged to make contracts with those with whom it would deal; such master contracts contain the general conditions of the transaction, in particular also who can be admitted to make a contract.

The United Nations organization is a public utility institution in the world sense. But the general conditions for admission are defined in Chapter III a 'love of peace'. Love is a sentiment, an emotion, and it is a highly flexible and relative idea, understanding and interpretation of which depends very much on temperament, intellect, culture, sensitiveness, and on many other circumstances and conditions. 'No word in the whole world's vocabulary is so misinterpreted, misunderstood, misleading, and misused as love. While impressive when used in a general, high-sounding declaration, 'love' as a legal definition is a misconception. Evidently the paragraph about the membership should be restated for example as follows: 'The Interstate World Organization is a world-wide organization open to all states which declare their intention to belong to and observe its rules, and which prove that their constitutions, laws, and actual behaviour towards all their citizens, inhabitants, and other states conform with the constitution, spirit, principles, and purposes of the Interstate World Organization.'

In addition to the above, amendments in some constitutions might have to be made before states could be admitted to membership. The possibility of requiring changes in national constitutions and law ought to be recognized now. Paragraphs containing something similar to those which follow should be added:

1. Amendments of national constitutions will be required on all topics vital to future co-operation. In practical terms this will mean the adoption by all nations of a constitutional amendment saying that they will abandon war and will settle all their disputes before the forum of the Interstate World Organization.
2. Insertion of paragraphs in criminal codes will be required, that every citizen who joins any army commits a crime and is to be punished as criminal.

(The only exception in constitution and in criminal code will be made for wars and armies established by the international organization to prevent or end an aggression or to enforce the decision of the organization.)

3. International political and private law will be adapted to meet the new conditions of the world-wide co-operative system and will be put into effect. The adjustments to be made will cause a change in the principle and definition of the sovereignty, because of the super-sovereignty of the international organization, similar to the adjustment of the States to the sovereignty of the Federal Constitution and Government in the United States.

The present character of the General Assembly is assumed to be a transitional one, designed for the period when it will be necessary to keep the world security by force. Even considering this transitional nature and the relation of the assembly to the Security Council on the question of the use of force, the meaning of Article 6 and Article 7 of Chapter V, Section B, is not clear. In these paragraphs the political, economic, and social fields are dealt with. The General Assembly is granted only the right to initiate studies and to make recommendations to adjust dangerous situations through the means of other agencies. (Delegates probably had in mind agencies already existing at Princeton University and the International Labour Office in Montreal.) Chapter IX, Sections A, B, C, D, bear out this interpretation.

It is understandable that during the transition period the Security Council should not be under the control of the legislative body, but the departure from the normal situation of specialized committees, which should be subordinated to the legislature, in the case of the economic and social fields seems irrational and confusing. If the Assembly may only make recommendations, who is empowered to make the final decision? This lack to fix responsibility is evidenced again in Section C of Chapter IX, entitled: 'Functions and Powers of the Economic and Social Council', which declares that these councils are to submit recommendations to the General Assembly. Apparently, the intention here was to give the power of the final decision to the Assembly; if so, the matter of authority ought to be clarified as follows:

'The General Assembly should authorize particular councils to undertake studies in political, economic, social, and other fields; these councils shall report the results of their research to the General Assembly. The General Assembly is empowered to co-ordinate the different councils under its supervision, to decide on their suggestions, and to take action to realize them.' (For the time being 'after securing the agreement of the Security Council' should be added.)

In Chapter IX, Section B, the last sentence should be changed to read: 'Decisions on recommendations be determined by a simple majority vote of those present and voting.'

In Section C an addition should be made to read: 'The Economic and Social Council report all their activities to the General Assembly which is empowered to make decisions on reported problems and to take action.' (The temporary addition of consent of the Security Council during the transition period should be made again here.)

It is to be assumed that the remaining economic and social organs of the old League of Nations will become a part of the new world organization in the form of councils as provided in Chapter IX.

Amending certain paragraphs in a charter is obviously not the most satisfactory method for correction if such vital problems, as a world organization, are involved. Complete rewriting of the whole charter would be more suitable, if the world organization is to have a consolidated structural design of a political institution of world importance and validity, and is to combine with this main structure the necessary accommodation for exceptional needs during the transitional period. As it is now written the charter will cause much confusion and conflict in authority, which could be prevented, if it were more clearly stated.

The above remarks do not pretend to enumerate and exhaust all problems; many other questions exist already and many will yet arise. All these problems cannot be settled exclusively by plain politicians. Scientists and experts in jurisprudence, international law, political and social science, international relations, and economists must co-operate with the leaders of international politics. They all must be people who possess a wide horizon of thinking and feeling, international understanding, background, training, and intellect; they must have the willingness to act in accordance with the common sense and not for narrow-minded local or private interest; they should be dependable and conscious of their great world mission and historical responsibility, but not vainglorious and presumptuous; with an understanding of justice and human needs and wants; free from small backyard and cheap street politics, unfair tricks, and any mental reservations; elevated above jealousy and personal ambitions; and with consciousness that we are now at the turning point of history and we must decide either to shape a new world, a new era, and a new world citizenship for all people, or to go down in disaster.

The problems are complex but not insoluble. They are not too complex to be forged out, if we exercise goodwill and fair play. The greatest difficulty will lie in finding the needed number of peoples for a staff, who have the vital qualifications of brain, heart, and character combined. If we do not succeed in the selection of this team, we shall fail in the final achievement.

TADEUSZ B. SPITZER

[Dr. Spitzer has intimated his willingness to write his impressions of the San Francisco Conference for the LONDON QUARTERLY AND HOLBORN REVIEW. We look forward to his next article.—EDITOR.]

'INTERESTINGNESS'

IT is more important that a proposition should be interesting than that 'it should be true' (Whitehead, *Progress and Reality*, Pt. III, Ch. vi, Sec. 2; *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 313). 'It remains true that the importance of a proposition lies in its interest.' 'This statement', Whitehead proceeds, 'is almost a tautology. For the energy of operation of a proposition is an occasion of experience in its interest, and is its importance.' The above affirmation, Professor Stace said recently,¹ produced in him a sudden thrill, a sense of illumination, of the opening of new vistas, 'such as one associates with Keats's opening of *Chapman's Homer*'. 'Whitehead', adds Professor Stace, 'does not elaborate on his remark.' On the contrary, he turns at once to the conditions of the truth of propositions; 'notions of actualities, suppositions about things' were of little import to him; and then he turns to truth itself.

A proposition is true when the nexus which is its logical subject does in reality exemplify the pattern which is the predicate of the proposition.' We may find truth in a myth, a tribal dance, or a court ceremonial; but 'the blunt truth that we require is its conformal correspondence of clear and distinct appearance to Reality'. It is not everyone who would feel a thrill as of the rise of a new planet before his gaze on reading this sentence. Some would prefer to turn to the truth of a tangle in Neaera's hair. But is it therefore unimportant? Whitehead allows that a true proposition is more apt to be interesting and 'more apt to be successful' (is this a temporary concession to pragmatism?) 'than a false one, just as the contemplation of truth has an interest of its own'. Yet he reminds us that 'it is an erroneous moral platitude that it is necessarily good to know the truth'; though, as a platitude, this proposition, whether true or false, will presumably be of little interest to anyone.

Still, it is advisable here to watch our step. When we speak of importance in this context, do we mean the importance of the truth, or of knowing the truth? And — importance to whom? To the casual reader, or the trained investigator, whose business it is to use all the sum of human knowledge about his own department? Professor Stace goes on, 'a truth is not valuable because it is true, but only because, or if, it is interesting'. It is doubtful whether Whitehead would have identified importance, in this cheerful way, with value; still more, whether he would have agreed that, as Professor Stace interprets him, the only reason why we ought to prefer true ideas to false ones is that 'true ideas happen to tickle our intellectual palates; more than false ones do'. What if it should happen that they do not? And whatever Whitehead's remark means, it does not mean, as Professor Stace interprets it to mean, 'that the importance of truth is only that it adds to interest'.

No one will deny that 'most people generally value originality in a philosopher or in any writer'. We like to find ourselves saying 'Fancy that! I never thought of that before'. Such a claim, however, might make both William James and F. C. S. Schiller somewhat uncomfortable. But it may find an ally where it little expected. S. A. Alexander seems to be enunciating Professor Stace's view when he says that 'the truth of the true is a relational character, a tertiary quality of value . . . experienced as the pleasure of satisfaction of disinterested

¹ See *Philosophy*, November 1944.

curiosity' (*Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 234). But surely curiosity is too narrow a term to describe either the impulse of the investigator or even of Pandora's restless fingers.

Bosanquet was not thinking more of the philosopher than of the student of science when he described how the visions of cosmic unity postulated by science, and of truth (for is not science the means to the formulation of truth?), and of goodness, are reinforced by the aesthetic experience, as it gives us a 'new world which is the old world at its best' (*Contemporary Philosophers*, i, p. 51). 'Value', says Bosanquet (*Principle of Individuality and Value*), 'is satisfactoriness; and this rests in the experience of completeness. . . . Things can only be valued aright when valued in their whole nature, and that they can only have in the complete being to which they belong'. This will remind some of the Christian's *cri du cœur*: 'Our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee.' Others will find themselves led back, possibly by way of General Smuts's Holism, to Whitehead and his impressive and characteristic doctrine of the Pattern. This is not easy to express in language outside Whitehead's peculiar dialect; but when he says that 'there is a truth relation when we see two composite facts participate on the same pattern', or 'when one and the same identical pattern can be abstracted from them both' (*Adventures*, p. 310), he is really (whatever else he is doing) explaining why 'the contemplation of truth has an interest of its own'; the interest felt by all to whom the great pattern designer has said, 'a whole I planned; see all, nor be afraid'.

Professor Stace will perhaps complain that to go as far as this is to leave him behind. He is not thinking of the philosopher, or the mystic, or the astronomer, or the physicist, impelled by a wild hope of reaching the vision of the *totum simul*. He is dealing with good, simple fellows like you and me, who, in their secret hearts, would rather write an interesting book than a true one; and who, when asked why they prefer true ideas to false ones (if they really do, which seems doubtful), will reply that true ideas are more interesting than ideas which are known to be false, or that what we value in truth is its 'interestingness'. Professor Stace says that these two are the same thing; but this is hardly correct. In the first, there is a difference in my attitude to a proposition which, as far as my knowledge goes, may be true or false, but which I cannot call true, and a proposition which I know to be false. My interest in the statement that the moon is possibly inhabited, is very different from my interest, if I could have any, in the statement that the moon is made of green cheese. The first reason, then, should be stated in the form, ideas that are or may be true are more interesting than those we know to be false; but this does not help us at all to answer Professor Stace's question.

The second answer may be true; but it is equally or more true that we may also value truth for other qualities than 'interestingness'. And neither of these statements means the same as the statement that a true proposition tends to have more of the quality of interestingness than a false one. If, to quote Whitehead's sentence once more, the importance of truth is that it adds to interest, there must be something in truth itself which can arouse interest; but if there are some truths which are merely platitudinous and uninteresting, the truths that succeed in interesting us must do so by something other than their truth, and Whitehead's dictum appears to be false.

We are warned off the question of the 'objectivity of interest'. We are warned off several other questions: e.g. whether 'interestingness' is a matter of degree, or is either present or absent in every proposition; whether it is the single quality or value which forms our judgement on occasions of experience; or exists, as Professor Stace elsewhere hints, as a fourth value by the side of truth, beauty, and goodness. Professor Stace, indeed, would go so far as to substitute the value of interestingness for the value of truth, doubting whether truth can be called a value at all; or, as he puts it almost immediately afterwards, interestingness has the same value to concepts as beauty has to precepts. But there is a more important question: what meaning is to be attached to the term interest? It would appear, indeed, to be the quality which arouses our curiosity. More than this; when we are interested the mind becomes excited and absorbed, as contrasted with the state of boredom when there is a settling down of the faculties into at least relative unhappiness.

Are we then interested, pleasurably excited, by the strange and new, and bored and dulled by the familiar? That is far too sweeping an assertion. The strange and arresting may rouse an interest that is the reverse of pleasurable. It may daunt and terrify. We should never use the term for anything which clearly lay outside all our powers, like a question on logarithms to a schoolboy who had not mastered quadratics, or a weird and ghostly cry in the night. Most Englishmen find it more interesting to discuss games which they understand, like cricket, than others of which they know little or nothing, say baseball or pelota. A man will love the songs his mother taught him, but will take no interest in the music of Java or ancient Greece. It may be replied, 'That is because these rouse no curiosity in him'. Exactly, but why do they fail to do so? They are unfamiliar — too unfamiliar, he would say. Clearly, novelty does not necessarily march with curiosity, or curiosity with interest.

What is more striking is the fact that it is just as impossible to label things interesting and uninteresting in themselves as to label them good and bad. Professor Stace, indeed, seems to be aware of this when he says that 'the law of gravitation is, at least to many minds, extremely interesting'. This implies that there are some minds to which it is not. Which are these? He can hardly mean that the law of gravitation is to most minds novel, and therefore interesting, but not to all. Nevertheless, it is quite clearly not the case that the same objects or concepts are universally and necessarily interesting. What we have to ask is why different individuals are attracted by this object or by that, and why the same individual at successive periods of his life is attracted by objects so different from one another. For if the importance of truth lies in its power of arousing interest, truths will be of supreme importance to some people which to others will not be worth the raising of an eyelid.

A moment's thought will surely make it clear that 'interestingness', the power to excite eager and pleasurable attention, can only be predicated of propositions, not of truths. A truth, indeed, can only mean a proposition which is held, by its announcer or hearer, to stand the test of truth as such, Whitehead's test or some other. The number of such truths, for most intelligent people, is practically unlimited; so is the number of falsehoods. Yet most intelligent people are also aware that many of the most important of these 'truths', outside the realm of mathematics, are only true 'as far as we know'. Most of the

propositions which I myself was taught at school to revere as the great truths of science, are now outmoded theories, and the interest of the so-called laws of modern physics or biochemistry or psychotherapy does not lie in their truth or their novelty. Whether they are true we can have no idea; on the other hand, we can discuss them again and again; we none of us believe that they will last, as they are now formulated, for more than a generation. 'One never knows.' Perhaps the greatest discoverer is the man who can bring his mind to such familiar things as a falling apple, a walk along the corridor of a railway train, or a log floating down a swollen river. But these are not truths; they are rather what Whitehead would call occasions.

'Interestingness' is related to the personal and individual. It cannot properly be said to be a quality possessed by either objects, experiences, or even propositions in themselves. What is extremely interesting to the philosopher may be dullness itself to his small nephew; the result of an international Rugby match, the only thing worth talking about to an undergraduate, may be meaningless to his tutor. Curiosity, classed long ago as an instinct by Macdougall, leads the investigator to the most diverse fields. If it bids us, like the young Clerk-Maxwell, to find out 'the particular hang of a thing', the choice of the 'thing' will depend on Clerk-Maxwell himself. The Nigerian sunset which fills the traveller with delight and wonder will pass unnoticed by his native servant. Doughty has remarked that the Arab, who has no eye for the loveliness of the lilies of the field, will notice with eagerness every plant by the roadside that has any nutritive or medicinal value. It is not every scholar who is equally interested in classics and mathematics; and many an administrator to whom Latin and Greek were sheer weariness has become an enthusiastic adept at a vernacular.

It is, however, needless to multiply instances of what everyone is well acquainted with; nor can we close the matter with a shrug of the shoulders and a careless *de gustibus*. If the importance of a truth, or an error, lies in the fact that it is interesting, that is, that it is of interest to some, though not to others, we must ask for the reason — what is it that rouses in me, or in my neighbour, this pleasurable excitement? The immediate answers are numerous: novelty, what Minto called 'the bias of happy exercise', the pleasure of successful activity, the hope of some physical satisfaction or economic gain. But is it possible to get behind all this? Is there anything in common, not indeed to all the qualities which arouse interest in things (that question is really unmeaning), but to the various interested attitudes which individuals display?

The word interest, as we have often observed to our cost, is used vaguely enough. Yet we often forget that we habitually attach two very different meanings to it, according as we say 'this interests me', or 'this is to my interest'; the one, perhaps, of a newly discovered drawing by an Italian artist, a brilliant performance on the golf course, or a theory about the documents of the Old Testament; the other of a commercial policy or a change of attitude to a political rival or scheme. Here some help would seem to be offered by etymology. The Latin phrase, *interest illius*, means, it makes a difference to him, it concerns him, it affects, for good or evil, for hope or fear, his well-being; it occasions a change in his situation which makes a certain course of action, pursuit or flight, investigation or avoidance, seem worth while.

This single consideration is enough to take us a long way beyond the vague

and (to speak truth) unscientific use of the term 'interesting'. When we say that a proposition is interesting to us, we mean that it affects us; it does not merely leave us cold or apathetic. But it may affect us for a score of different reasons: because it is true and we delight to affirm it against all comers, like the law of gravitation previously mentioned, or the doctrine of the Trinity; because it is false and we wish to convince everyone of its falsehood, like the flatness of the earth or the ideality of Shakespeare and Bacon; because it suggests an escape from fear or pain, like a description of penicillin, or outlines some pleasurable line of action or attractive fantasy, like an erotic picture or a new theory which may be truth or nonsense, but which sets us examining it. If truth adds to the 'interestingness' of the proposition, it is because we feel that we are dealing with something that has actually entered our environment for better or worse, and not with 'a dream when one awaketh'. There is little difference, psychologically, between our reaction to 'this is true and don't forget it' and 'this may be true, so take care'. But whether a proposition is believed to be true or not, universally or only by some, its 'interest' and its 'importance', for the persons confronted by it, are practically indistinguishable. It matters to me, it is important, it is interesting, perhaps painfully so, if it leads me, my nature and nurture being such as they are, to action which I should not otherwise have taken, even if that action is only the blissful occupation of contemplation.

The result of all this would seem to be to leave us in a worse case than before. We began with the 'importance' to a proposition of being interesting, and with the function of truth to add to this interest. We end with the recognition that interest and importance are interest and importance to individuals, and that the truth of a proposition may be regarded as relatively or absolutely unimportant, and even unattainable. Final truth, except in the realm of mathematics, lies beyond our reach; and there are modern mathematicians who would tell us, like Bertrand Russell, that 'mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true'. As for the students of physics, aesthetics, and religion, they can never get rid of the label of the provisional. It seems as impossible to be certain whether the wave theory or the particle theory is the more adequate account of the facts of physics as to decide whether Beethoven or Brahms is the greater musician, or whether God is to be regarded as responsible for evil. But we need not fear that for this reason mankind will give up the quest for truth, or that we shall cease to regard truth, like scientific knowledge, as universally valid. To say 'this proposition is true for me', unlike 'this proposition is interesting or important for me', is a contradiction in terms. Not everyone would echo Clough's robust assertion:

It fortifies my soul to know
That though I perish, truth is so;

nor, perhaps, subscribe to Keats's identification of beauty and truth. Some might accuse both writers of expressing merely their individual conviction. Yet no one will accuse Whitehead, in his chapter on Truth in *Adventures*, of bidding truth surrender its place in the triad of values to 'interestingness'; nor, like Bradley, does he give up Reality to Appearance. If appearances are inseparable from the functionings of the individual body, there would seem to be an

'attuning' between those bodies and their environment, the 'external regions', which is permanent and universal.

Professor Stace's paper was followed by another in the same journal, on the *Globus Intellectualis*, as set forth by the two Bacons, Roger and Francis. Both took, in the latter's phrase, the 'whole of knowledge to be their province'; and to the conquest of this province both saw the need of an 'instauration', a renewal or deeper recognition of the powers of the mind to detect lacunas and gaps in the territory of our ordered knowledge. To both, the instauration itself and its completion in discovery and conquest are not in question. They are *selbstverständlich*. To the medieval Franciscan, the *globus intellectualis*, the *universum scibile*, is the pattern or design which issues from the mind and wisdom of God. To know one is to come to know the other; and this is the *summum bonum* for man. For the Elizabethan, the end is more practical. Nature, properly understood, is a vast storehouse of remedies for human ills (even the animals can be our teachers here), and of means to human satisfaction. The aim which 'the clear spirit doth raise, to shun delights and live laborious days' is 'the relief of man's estate'. But the two are not distinct. God is not only wisdom, in which, *quoad ad homines pertinet*, it is a delight to share. He is love, to which all true happiness and well-being of His creatures is a satisfaction. The identity of the two (*isplendor di luce eterna*) has never been set forth more impressively than in the *Divine Comedy*.

Such a quest is lifted far above the mere 'interestingness' of a particular truth or occupation to this or that individual. To many, perhaps to the majority, it makes little or no practical appeal; no more, it may be said, than the appeal of beauty makes to those who are satisfied with jazz music or the 'pin-up girl'. But the great ends of human life do not wait, cap in hand, on individual interests or caprices. They demand servants whose minds have been disciplined and schooled to discovery, and who are moved by reverent loyalty to the cosmos, the ordered pattern, as it exists in the mind of God, or to the harmony which God hears now and which they will hear by and by. For such, truth is more than important; it is holy. It can never be merely the source of additional interest to a proposition; nor can it sink down to the platitudinous and the banal. It means all that has so far been learnt, with toil of head and heart, of God's design for His creation. The anthropologist and the art critic, like the physicist and the astronomer, are thinking the thoughts of God. We might, if we liked, call this an interesting thing to do, but only as we might call the day of judgement a pretty sight.

Ultimately, there are not three grand values, or four, but only one. Each of the three implies the rest, and is unintelligible apart from them: truth, all that we know or can come to know of the wisdom and order embodied in the universe; beauty, all that we can come to admire of its harmony and majesty and grace; goodness, all that we can feel of the satisfactions which that harmony and grace produce. We could never have discovered or designed a pattern if the pattern had not been there first. Perhaps, when we fancy that interest lends importance to truth, or truth to interest, we are conscious, in however darkling a fashion, of the unity of the three.

W. F. LOFTHOUSE

THOMAS CORYAT AND CHARLES READE

CORYAT'S CRUDITIES is the quaint name of a seventeenth-century book of travel. Thomas Coryat, the author, was a Somersetshire squire who spent five months of the year 1608 in touring France, Italy, and Germany, mostly on foot. When he returned home he hung up in the church at Odcombe, where he lived, the shoes in which he had walked from Venice to Flushing. Coryat was a scholar, and indeed something of a pedant. Many of the literati of the time were his friends, and among the commendatory poems (in half a dozen languages) which are prefixed to his book, there is one by Michael Drayton and another by John Donne.

Now Coryat's book is like 'the lonely dragon' in Shakespeare 'that his fen makes talked of more than seen'. Most people who are well read have heard of the book, but few have seen it, and very few have perused it, I think. No one has pointed out up to now, as far as I am aware, that it is one of the principal sources from which the detail is drawn in Charles Reade's masterpiece, *The Cloister and the Hearth*, perhaps the greatest historical novel in the language. Reade amassed a great deal of minute information about the period and the localities of the story. He had friends in Oxford — he was a Fellow of Magdalen — who 'devilled' for him in the Bodleian. Evidently he, or some of those who helped him, had gathered a good deal of picturesque detail out of Coryat. There are at least a score of instances where an incident or an observation is expressly borrowed, as the language proves.

Thus, when Coryat was in the neighbourhood of Turin, he relates that there was in the company with which he travelled: 'a merry Italian, one Antonio, that vaunted he was lineally descended from the famous Marcus Antonius of Rome, the Triumvir, and would oftentimes cheer us with this sociable conceit: *Courage, courage, le Diable est mort*. That is be merry, for the Deuil is dead.' Here is manifestly the origin of Denys, the Burgundian archer, for the whole character is developed around his famous *consigne*, which is on his lips on every occasion, *Courage, l'ami! le Diable est mort*.

Again, when Coryat is at Lyons he remarks that: 'at the South side of the higher court of mine Inne, which is hard by the hall (for there are two or three courts in that Inne), there is written this pretty French poesie: *on ne loge ceans à crédit; car il est mort, les mauvais paieurs l'ont tué*. The English is this: Here is no lodging upon credit; for he is dead, ill payers have killed him.' These are the very words which were painted in huge letters across the French inn with the sign of *Les Trois Poissons* where Gerard and Denys lodged, except that Reade makes it *ce bonhomme est mort*. When they left the inn the landlord and his servants bade them a hearty farewell, and said: 'Never pass "The Three Fish": should your purses be void, bring yourselves; *le sieur crédit* is not dead for you.'

Gerard remarks that in the south of Germany one is welcome to gather fruit or grain by the wayside to eat, 'but an ye pluck a wayside grape, your very life is in jeopardy. 'Tis eating of that Heaven gave to be drunken.' Now Coryat has a long story about how he got into serious trouble near Worms, and was threatened by a boor with a halberd, because he had plucked a bunch of grapes by the roadside. He only escaped by falling in with some travellers, one

of whom spoke Latin, and so was able to understand and interpret his excuses, and by paying some money to the peasant.

Many of the very minor details in Reade's novel are borrowed from this source. Thus Coryat notes that 'betwixt St. Saphorine de Lay and Tarare almost all the flocks of sheepe that I saw there (for there I saw very many) were coale blacke'. Gerard similarly notes that in France you see 'whole flocks of sheep as black as a coal'. On another point of natural history Coryat remarks, when he is in the neighbourhood of the Alps: 'I saw diuers red snailes of an extraordinary length and greatnesse, such as I neuer saw before', and later in his book he writes: 'I could see no Snaile in all Germanie but red, like those I saw a little on this side of the Alpes in Savoy, as I haue before written'. Gerard says in his letter to Margaret: 'In Germany the snailes be red. I lie not.'

When Coryat was in France he says: 'I saw a fellow whipped openly in the streets of Lyons that day that I departed therehence, being Munday the sixth day of Iune, who was so stout a fellow that though he receued many a bitter lash, he did not a iota relent at it.' This again Reade has borrowed, for Gerard writes, when he was in company with Cul de Jatte: 'Going through the town of Aix, we came upon a beggar walking, fast by one hand to a cart-tail, and the hangman a-lashing his bare bloody back. He, stout knave, so whipt, did not a jot relent, but I did wince at every stroke, and my master hung his head.'

In Gerard's long letter, which Margaret reads to the household at Tergou, there are many things that are borrowed from Coryat, such as the comment on the profanity of the French in their ordinary conversation, 'who say things in sport which are shocking, *Le diable l'emporte! Allez au diable!* and so forth'. Coryat attributes the same expressions to the French postillions. 'Whensoeuer their horses doe a little anger them, they will say in their fury, *Allons diable*, that is, Go thou deuill. Also if they happen to be angry with a stranger vpon any occasion, they will say to him *le diable l'emporte*, that is, The deuill take thee. This I know by mine owne experience.' When Gerard is relating his journey to Italy through the mountains he writes: 'Strong ways and steep, and the mountain girls so girded up, as from their armpits to their waist is but a handful. Of all the garbs I have yet seen, the most unlovely.' Coryat remarks the same detail: 'the shortness of the womens wastes not naturally but artificially. For all women both of that towne (Lasnebourg) and all other places besides betwixt that and Noulaise, a towne of Piemont, at the descent of the mountaine Senys on the other side, some twelve miles off, did gird themselves so high that the distance between their shoulders and their girdle seemed to be but a little handfull.' Gerard's description of Hafnagel's cousin's stupendous wine-vessel at Augsburg, ribbed like a ship, and holding a hundred and fifty hogsheads, is plainly borrowed from the passage where Coryat tells of the great tun, at Heidelberg.

But Reade borrows most from Coryat when Gerard is describing the sights of Venice and the neighbourhood. The ferry boat in which Gerard crossed a river three days before arriving at Venice was drawn across by a chain. 'On either bank was a windlass, and a single man by turning of it drew our whole company to his shore, whereat I did admire, being a stranger.' This kind of ferry is described by Coryat in the vicinity of Turin. The account of the courtesans of Venice, and of the institution where any child belonging to them

could be put through a niche in the wall, if small enough, and left to the care of the State, is all from Coryat. It is in this connection that Coryat tells the affecting story of Paphnutius and Thais, which Reade uses when he relates how Gerard, after he had become a friar, reclaims the apostate nun at the unnamed village in Holland. Curiously enough the legend is also related in the *Colloquies* of Erasmus, which is, of course, an acknowledged source of the novel.

One of the famous sights of Venice is the Pietra del Bando, a block of red porphyry, where the laws of the Republic are said to have been promulgated of old. At the corner near the Ducal Palace there are four quaint figures supposed to represent four Byzantine Emperors who shared the throne in the eleventh century. But the popular legend, as Coryat tells it, is that they represent four brothers who were Albanian nobles, and who came to Venice in a ship laden with great wealth. Two of them went ashore, and began to plot the death of the others. The two left on the ship similarly conspired together to get rid of the two who were ashore, each pair wanting to secure all the riches for themselves. The brothers met at a banquet and presented each other with poisoned food, so that all four died. The four figures are supposed to be a memorial of those unnatural brethren. Gerard relates this story exactly as Coryat does, but makes the event a contemporary one: 'the workmen were just finishing, by order of the signiory, the stone effigy of a tragical and enormous act enacted last year.' It is interesting to note that Coryat adds that Sir Henry Wotton, the ambassador of James I to Venice, took him down the Grand Canal in his gondola, and called his attention specially to this monument. (It was this Sir Henry Wotton, of course, who wrote the charming poem about James's daughter, Elizabeth of Bohemia: 'You meaner beauties of the night.')

Coryat records that there is near the south corner of St. Mark's: 'a memorable thing to be obserued. A maruailous faire paire of gallows made of alabaster, the pillars being wrought with many curious borders and workes, which serued for no other purpose but to hang the Duke whensoeuer he shall happen to commit any treason against the State. And for that cause it is erected before the very gate of his Palace to the end to put him in minde to be faithfull and true to his country, if not, he seeth the place of punishment at hand.' Gerard writes: 'But what I most admired was to see over against the Duke's palace a fair gallows in alabaster, reared express to hang him, and no other, for the least treason to the State; and there it stands in his eye whispering him *memento mori*.'

Coryat describes the bravoes of Venice in these words: 'They wander abroad very late in the night to and fro for their prey, like hungry Lyons, being armed with a priuy coate of maile, a gauntlet vpon their right hand, and a little sharpe dagger called a stiletto. They lurke commonly by the water-side.' This was evidently in Reade's mind when he described Ludovico, the assassin who was hired by the Princess Claelia to kill Gerard, and who eventually rescued him from the Tiber. "What are your weapons?" asked the Princess. The bravo showed her a steel gauntlet. "We strike with such force we need must guard our hand. This is our mallet." He then undid his doublet, and gave her a glimpse of a coat of mail beneath, and finally laid his glittering stiletto on the table with a flourish.'

Coryat has a long passage where he describes how the Venetian ladies bleach their dark tresses by using oil and drugs and then exposing their hair to the strong sunlight. Gerard remarks: 'here in Venice the dames turn their black hair yellow by the sun and art, to be wiser than Him who made them.' When Coryat was in Venice he mentions 'three very notable and auncient monuments' kept in St. Mark's — the tomb of the Evangelist, his Gospel 'written in Greeke with his owne hand', and the picture of the Virgin made by St. Luke. He adds: 'But that is altogether vncertaine whether Luke were a painter or no.' This again Reade has borrowed, for Gerard writes: 'I stood and saw the brazen chest that holds the body of St. Mark the Evangelist. I saw with these eyes and handled his ring, and his Gospel written with his own hand, and all my travels seemed light; for who am I that I should see such things? . . . After that they showed me the Virgin's chair, it is of stone; also her picture painted by St. Luke, very dark, and the features now scarce visible.' When Gerard was leaving St. Mark's he says that 'coming out of the church we met them carrying in a corpse, with the feet and face bare. This I then first learned is Venetian custom, and sure no other town will rob them of it.' This practice is also remarked by Coryat, who says of burials at Venice: 'they carry the Corse to Church with the face, handes and feete all bare, and wearing the same apparrell that the person wore lately before it died, or that which it craued to be buried in.'

Gerard twice quotes the Italian saying that 'Venice is the garden of Lombardy, Lombardy the garden of Italy, and Italy the garden of the world'. Coryat also quotes the proverb twice, once with an extension, when he is describing the garden of the Benedictine monastery of St. George: 'I have heard this conceit of this garden: That as Italy is the garden of the world, Lombardy the garden of Italy, Venice the garden of Lombardy, so this is κατ' ἐξοχήν, the garden of Venice.'

Gerard notes that in Italy the people are 'delicate in eating and abhor from putting their hand in the plate: sooner they will apply a crust or what not. They do even tell of a cardinal at Rome which armeth his guests' left hand with a little bifurcal dagger to hold the meat, while his knife cutteth it.' This comes into the novel a second time, for when Gerard accompanies his patron, Fra Colonna, to a banquet at the palace of Cardinal Bessarion, he remarks: 'But, dear father, I see not the bifurcal daggers with which men say his excellency armeth the left hand of a man.' 'Nay,' said the friar, 'tis the Cardinal Orsini which hath invented yon peevish instrument for his guests to fumble their meat withal. One, being in haste, did skewer his tongue to his palate with it, I hear. *O tempora! O mores!*' These references are specially interesting because they were undoubtedly suggested by Coryat, and Coryat was the man who first introduced forks into England. He says: 'This forme of feeding I vnderstand is generally vsed in all places of Italy, their forkes being for the most part made of yron or steele, and some of siluer, but those are vsed only by Gentlemen. The reason of this their curiosity is, because the Italian cannot by any means indure to have his dish touched with fingers, seeing all mens fingers are not alike cleane.' He goes on to say that he thought good to imitate the Italian fashion when he came home to England, and 'a learned gentleman a familiar friend of mine . . . in his merry humour doubted not to call me at

table *furcifer*, only for vsing a forke at feeding, but for no other cause'. (The point of this last demurrer is, of course, that criminals in Rome were sometimes punished by being made to carry a forked piece of wood, which pressed upon the neck behind, while the man's hands were tied to the two ends of the fork in front. Hence *furcifer*, fork-bearer, meant villain, scoundrel, malefactor.)

I may add, as a detail interesting to Methodists, that a copy of the first edition of Coryat's book was recently advertised, at a considerable price, with the note that it belonged to Samuel Wesley the elder. On one of the fly-leaves there is the inscription, *E Libris Samuelis Wesley E. Coll. Exon. Oxon. Dec. 16. 1686*, and some verses on Coryat, Bunyan, and John Dunton. If the elder Wesley took Coryat's book with him when he settled at Epworth, John Wesley may have read it in his youth.

HENRY BETT

POWER: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT AND LIFE

'POWER corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely' is popularly quoted to-day with an air of finality as if it were a self-evident truth. Some justification may be found in current history for the belief that power is liable to be abused, but in fact it is as true to say that power ennobles, and absolute power ennobles absolutely, and as easy to illustrate the thesis from the events of our day. To hold that power is essentially bound up with corruption is to undermine all faith in human nature. What hope is there for the human race if it can never handle power with competence and humility? What hope is there of realizing the Kingdom of God if every investing of authority is automatically an enthronement of evil? Ultimately, though I imagine few would press it to so drastic a logical conclusion, the statement that absolute power corrupts absolutely implies that God is the most corrupt of all.

Jesus gives no hint of this supposed inherent corruption in power, and indirectly in His parables, and directly, He accepts the possession of power as a manageable and often beneficent arrangement. Authority (*ἐξουσία*) and power (*δύναμις*) are concepts which he employs familiarly with no hint that they are fundamentally evil. It is not a valid objection to say that it is only certain forms of power which meet with His tacit approval. Fundamentally, power is power, whether it be political, social, financial, academic, moral, or religious. Whichever kind of power it is; it is capable of being wielded for good or ill, and of either corrupting or ennobling its possessors.

Power is a fundamental conception in human society, as Bertrand Russell has shown, analogous to the conception of energy in physics. It is equally basic in individual life. Of its place in social life as it affects Christian teaching and action it is not within the scope of this article to speak, though I am well aware that the Christian as an individual cannot exist *in vacuo*. The importance of the social implications of Christian teaching and the significance of the concept of power in that direction are widely recognized in our Theology to-day.

The basic importance of power in the individual Christian life has suffered something approaching a total eclipse. Witness, for example, the unquestioning acceptance and approval of G. K. Chesterton's dictum: 'Christianity has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and not tried.' Hence, too, the universal agreement with the poet:

Because I see but cannot reach the height
That lies forever in the light,
I feel my feeble hands unclasp,
And sink discouraged into night.

Hence, too, the common rejection by the outside observer of a religion whose devotees frankly regard its teachings as lovely to look at but impossible to carry out.

Such an impasse is not to be hilariously accepted, as by Chesterton, as a glorious opportunity of exploiting the *bon mot* in order to take the sting out of the unbeliever's argument that Christianity has failed. If Christianity has only succeeded in exhibiting an unattainable ideal, it has in point of fact failed as surely as if it had been found wanting in some other respect. Nor is it a valid justification for Christianity, to say that it cultivates a nice humility which forbids the assessment of achievement in the realm of virtue as indecorous. A generous inculcation of Uriah Heepism too often saps the honesty and forthrightness of Christian witness. The unconscious humility of true Christian character springs from other sources than an habitual acquiescence in low standards and impossible ideals.

A study, even superficial, of the New Testament reveals a totally different view of the relation of achievement to ideal. It shows no acceptance of low standards and no consciousness of unrealizable ideals. There is no suggestion in the teaching of Jesus that He was indulging in imaginative flights of delightful habits of mind and hand, and excellences of heart, which we can all picture as existing in the Never-Never Land. He was giving plain injunctions on practical levels. His righteousness 'exceeds'; His love 'includes'; His sincerity reaches the innermost recesses of the heart; His perfection is the perfection of God. But even so it is all plainly intended to be expressed in the lives of His followers. His injunctions are, as Manson puts it, 'Moral imperatives'. 'His way of life is shown by His example, and His precepts become the norm for Christians.' Likewise, in the Epistles of the New Testament, there is an undeviating assumption that Christianity not only sets moral and religious ideals, but definitely regards them as marks of a life which can be lived. Wherever the ideal is debased those who lower it are reprov'd, and wherever the level of life sinks the people who live at that level are rebuked. The reproof and the rebuke are based on the fact that lowered ideals and actions derive from a neglect of power.

The New Testament view of the Christian life is incomprehensible without its assurance of power. Yet it is surprising how often the importance of power has been overlooked. The Gospel has been assiduously studied, understood, and explained, but the effect as it ought to work out in the lives of men has received very perfunctory consideration. At the present time the paramount issue in Theology is the nature and destiny of man, and much ink flows over the controversy as to whether man is all or man is nothing. The humanism which

credited man with the inherent ability to proceed unaided on his way to perfection has been rudely disturbed by the Freudian revelation of barely suppressed animal instincts, and by the irruption of evil in the present war. The neo-Calvinism of Barth which, on the other hand, denies all virtue to man has been forced to recognize that the man who is nothing is not man at all. But neither point of view has any relation to the neglected power of which we are thinking. The power of which we are thinking is not the natural ability of man (or the ability of natural man), but the power of regenerated man. It is the power of the saved man to shape himself and his life as a saved man.

One thing that establishes adequate power for the man who is saved is that the very act of salvation — call it justification, or regeneration, or reconciliation, or conversion or what you will — is surely this: a setting or re-alignment of the personality in harmony with God, so that instead of warring against God, withstanding Him, or neglecting Him, it works with him so that God's power flows through it. That flow of the power of God was described in the early Church as the work of the Holy Spirit, 'the Lord of Life' as the Creed names Him. That it was possible to halt between the acceptance of salvation and the recognition of the inflow of power is indicated by the fact that there were those who 'had not received the Holy Spirit since they believed', and whose knowledge of the power that accompanies salvation was forthwith supplied as a necessary supplement.

Now here is a source of power which is only faintly grasped when we talk about the 'second blessing' as the prerogative of a favoured few, or when we annually do obeisance to the Holy Spirit at Whitsuntide. This is of the essence of the Gospel and is as wide as the world. We remember the holiness of God that we may rightly acknowledge our sinfulness and cultivate His purity. We dwell upon the justice of God that we may discern our own lack of righteousness and seek His righteousness. We think of the love of God that we may see how far it transcends the love of men and may learn to emulate it. But the power of God is regarded as a thing apart: 'It is He that sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers.' That might have been a satisfactory final word for the days of men's ignorance, but one thing has of a surety come to us. It is that in a thousand ways God has so ordered the universe that by co-operation with Him we can share and use His power. We can multiply every power we have out of all recognition by allying it with His. Ought that not to yield us a hint as to the moral resources which are at our disposal if we but use them?

In apostolic days Paul compared the surging power of God in human personality to the yearly surging of His power in Nature. The fruitfulness of the earth has evoked the wonder and gratitude of men since the dawn of time, and it still holds a prominent place in the estimation of lettered and unlettered, as the universally popular festivals of harvest testify. But few seem to draw the inference of Paul, that God, whose power is manifest in sun and rain replenishing the earth and working the recurring miracle of producing fruit and grain and vegetable — not forgetting the elusive vitamin — is at work in the personalities of men. 'The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance.' The character of God's work is not questioned, but the analogy of His power in the realm of human personality

to the power manifested in Nature is not widely accepted. Yet it is surely a valid analogy. The measureless power of God is in both.

Is it too much to say that all modern discoveries in the realm of science are simply revelations of the power which God has wrapped up in His universe, and that every application of scientific discovery to life is no more than a harnessing of that power? We may wonder at the perversity of men who turn such power to corrupt ends; but we may also reasonably marvel at the neglect of regenerated men and women to discover the power for living a victorious life, which God has wrapped up in His wisdom in this same creation, and to harness this power to the mastery of every difficulty. A Christian woman who seems to be in no way peculiar, save that she has a way of handling life with all its problems and difficulties (and she seems to have a liberal share of troubles) with a sublime competence, confessed to me that she was very unorthodox. I expected some revelation of rank heresy, but her unorthodoxy turned out to be a deep conviction that the resources of God give to the forgiven and regenerated personality an ample margin of power over the most exacting demands of a consecrated life. That may be rank heresy to the average Christian, but it is an essential item of the Christian faith. The Barthian cannot quarrel with it since it recognizes so completely the main tenet of his Credo, the sovereignty and omnipotence of God. The humanist cannot cavil at it since it reinforces and multiplies those powers of human personality in which he places his trust.

So far we have emphasized in the alinement of the human personality in the act of salvation with God the adequacy of the power which God imparts. The complementary truth is that the human personality in its regenerated state becomes an instrument through which that power can freely flow. In what limited moments of leisure come my way I am fond of designing and building wireless sets, and I know that two things are essential to the efficiency of every set. There must be an adequate supply of power; without that my set will register nothing. There must also be an instrument tuned to the frequency of the vibrations in the ether. Without the instrument the power avails nothing so far as I am concerned. The same necessities obtain in another realm if God's power is to become effective. The regenerated human personality linked to the power of God provides the requisite relation.

Here two things need to be emphasized. One is, that the whole instrument (or the instrument as a whole) is essential to the achievement of results. The other is, that one defect in the instrument can vitiate the whole process. Those two may seem to be one and the same thing, but they are not. What I mean is, that while a few pips and squeaks could be got out of the conjunction of a number of loosely related parts, if you want to receive in a satisfactory fashion the messages and melodies with which the ether is filled, you must provide a carefully designed and balanced superhet to link up with your adequate power-pack. On the other hand, one defective element in the superhet may be catastrophic in its effect on the performance of the set.

Now the noteworthy fact about the salvation of the human personality is that it begins and ends with the whole man, as a whole, not as a conglomeration of attributes. It is also significant that others, besides theologians, who are interested in some particular aspects of human personality are being driven to

the conclusion that no piecemeal dealing with those aspects can effect anything worth while. The medical man concludes that even if he specializes in stomachs or nerves it is the owner of the stomach or nerves who matters, and that ultimately his concern must be not to cure an ailment, but to cure a person. The psychotherapist realizes that aberrations of mind are aberrations of whole personalities, while education, we are assured, is henceforth to be regarded as the development of 'the whole child'.

Some recognition of this distinction is found in the Methodist Hymn-book, which declined to perpetuate the section on 'The Graces of the Christian Character', and decided in favour of 'Christian Holiness'. The distinction is radical. Christian 'wholeness' may reveal itself in many distinct virtues, but the virtues are each and all manifestations of the whole personality acting in different directions. Through that whole personality the power of God can flow and both human and divine power are behind and in every single virtue. 'Scatter Thy life through every part and sanctify the whole.' It is only in this sense that we can 'Take every virtue, every grace, and fortify the whole'.

When, however, the pre-eminence of the whole, the completeness of salvation, is established as the foundation of success in the Christian life, it is wise to recognize the fact that one defect can neutralize effectively the otherwise complete character, and distort the otherwise harmonious personality. The Achilles' heel is the all-too-frequent apology of the would-be ideal Christian, and the 'defects of our qualities' provide a ready excuse for our failures, failures which find too easy an acceptance as inevitabilities in an imperfect world; but (remember our wireless analogy) they mar the personality and restrict the power of God in us out of all proportion to their apparent insignificance.

It remains to characterize more specifically the manner in which the divine power manifests itself in human personality. The main source of power is God's self-revelation and self-impartment in Jesus Christ. The shrewd and searching analysis of Niebuhr, which sees human nature as, even in its attempts at virtue and conceptions of goodness (perhaps most of all in these), guilty of moral and spiritual pride, need not hamper us here; nor need the Barthian one-way traffic between heaven and earth. For here we begin as undone sinners, and here God reveals Himself as the bestower of unmerited grace and the provider of unlimited power — the power of Christ's cross, the power of His resurrection, and the power of His Spirit.

It might have seemed as if the whole secret of power in Christian living was revealed when Jesus set before men the ideal not only in His teaching but in Himself as the norm, and moreover required this of them because God is their Father, and for His paternal care deserved their devotion. 'The Fatherly Rule of God', as Dr. Garvie describes it, ought to appeal to that goodwill among men which would make the rule effective. But any consideration of the effect of Jesus' teaching and example in the Gospels makes it abundantly clear that the one thing lacking was power. The life pictured by Jesus was entrancing, His own ability to live it was obvious — but for others the impossibility was obvious too.

But with the death and resurrection of Jesus a tremendous power was released, the power of the love of God who gave His only-begotten Son, the power of Jesus who faced the cross, the power of a life which death could not

withstand, the power of the Spirit which found other means of entrance to the human personality than those of exhortation and example. This power made the Christian character a possibility for ordinary normal people.

Space does not allow the sketching of even the outline of such character here, but F. B. Clogg, having outlined all that is implied in it, sums it up succinctly: 'From the positive and negative aspects thus briefly sketched there appears a concrete picture of the Christian character. It is that of one who, like the Stoic, endures hardship and suffering with fortitude, but who, unlike the Stoic, does not count insensibility, dispassionateness (*κράθεια*) to be a virtue; of one who is compassionate, kind, forgiving, long-tempered, debonair, considerate, and sweetly reasonable; ready to waive his rights rather than to push them to the extreme; humble as recognizing his absolute dependence on God, accepting injuries and insults as God's means of purifying the soul; of one who is not aggressive or self-assertive; who gladly defers to others; magnanimous, but not conceited; master of himself in all the temptations of the flesh; an embodiment of the things men most highly prize, the dignity and freedom of personality. In Paul's thought this character is within the reach of the ordinary man.'

The essence of the Christian position is that this character is not only within the reach of the ordinary man, but that it is the normal Christian life. This life may be defined in terms more closely related to modern ways of thinking by saying that the Christian is master of himself, of his circumstances, and of his relationships with others. That is a fairly considerable mastery.

Other religions and philosophies have professed to be able to give men the mastery of themselves, and some men claim to be able to display such mastery without the aid of any religion or philosophy. We need not rebut these claims even if we could. The Christian case does not rest on the possibility of occasional and extraordinary personalities being able, by reason of exceptional grace of disposition or strength of mind, to discipline themselves into goodness and beauty of life. It rests upon its own claim to provide the power whereby every child of grace can display such mastery as its natural expression. If every Christian is not manifesting this complete mastery of himself it is simply because he is not using the power which is his normal and natural right. What to the unaided human will and reason presents itself as a problem, which the modern man has to confess with Paul is insoluble, 'For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do', becomes to the Christian no problem at all, but a new life, a new creation, a life of loving 'the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me'. A thus dedicated life brings every part of its being into subjection, sublimates every instinct, suffuses all with power, and reveals what Dr. L. P. Jacks describes as 'the radiance of the Christian character'.

But the Christian life does not stop at self-mastery. It triumphs over circumstances. There is still far too much sub-Christian thinking on this matter. Because on the whole, in the nature of things, a disciplined moral life is accompanied by freedom from the aches and ills that are attendant upon immorality, it is often assumed that goodness and good fortune ought invariably to go hand in hand. But the facts are otherwise, and the fact of becoming a Christian, so far from affording an insurance against the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, may mean adding to them. Becoming a Christian, however, in any real sense of the word, means learning to handle circumstances with the skill

with which a craftsman uses the tools of his trade. Straitened circumstances, crippled health, disappointed hopes, loss of friends, and all that makes up the sum of human misfortune are obstacles that the Christian takes in his stride. He is not merely content in whatsoever estate he is, but he transforms his misfortunes into his opportunities. All this, not as some extraordinary ebullition of inexplicable human grace, but as the natural, common, everyday expression of the power of God working in him.

Perhaps the main difficulty that life faces us with is that which is forced upon us by the necessity of sharing our lives with others. We are often tempted to believe that if we could, with the Psalmist, take the wings of a dove and retire to the desert, we could be at rest, or to soliloquize with Job that we could put up with unutterable sorrows if only our friends would cease to plague us with their pious moralizings. Between the friends who alternately interfere with us and neglect us, and the enemies who alternately forget us and persecute us, between the people who could help us but do not, and the people who could help themselves but prefer to seek our help, between the children who make our arms ache and the older folk who set the ache in our hearts, we find the problem of keeping others satisfied and ourselves undistracted well-nigh impossible. We might have recourse to Samuel Helps, or write to Margaret Harwood, or even see what Socrates had to say about such matters. But here, as elsewhere, the sufficiency of the Christian gospel is the obvious and adequate solution. When our human relationships are faced, not in the expediency of human understanding, but in the light of the love of God manifested to us and to them in the cross of Jesus Christ, and in the power of the Spirit, the Lord of life, the way to mastery is clear.

All this points to the conclusion that power (power, that is, of the individual to live the Christian life) is a fundamental concept of Christian theology. Hence its place is not among the vagaries and peculiarities which attach themselves to the fringes of Christian thought, but among the central and essential doctrines. This is not a plea for pragmatism, as though one should say that the test of theology is 'How does it work?' Theology may rightly claim that its prime concern is with truth rather than with life. But the truth having been found or revealed may suffer at our hands as science suffered at the hands of Anatole France's father. He filled the house with glass cases and shelves containing all manner of natural curiosities. It was his ambition to cram all creation into a cupboard. He did it in the interests of science. 'But alas it shed no light upon life.' It is possible to divorce theology from life in such a way that we place asunder what God has joined together. Let theology busy itself with the pure truth by all means. The nearer its speculations and rationalizations approach the truth, the more valuable its discoveries are likely to be when they are applied to life; but it is inconceivable that Christian theology should be indifferent to life, when it is by definition the theology at whose centre is One who said not only 'I am the truth', but 'I am the way', and 'I am the life'. His followers, indeed, were known as 'those of the Way'. The moment the change-over takes place, from the pursuit of truth to the venture of the Way, power becomes the all-important issue. Without that, Christianity is a mere system of ethics based upon our knowledge of God: with it, it is a triumphant way of life.

As a matter of fact, power is so essential an element in the Christian life that

if the true source of power is not clearly and diligently set forth, recourse will inevitably be had to ancillary and subsidiary and even to extraneous sources. History shows some strange resorts to power on the part of those who have been genuinely anxious to attain the excellences of Christian living. The imitation of Christ, the practice of the presence of God, holy living and holy dying, serious calls to a devout and holy life, have found strange companions in vows of celibacy and penury, in secluded monastery and nunnery, in fasting and self-denial, in recrudescences of anointing with oil, in communal living, in faith healing, in Christian Science and spiritualism, in revivals of early church practices, in absolutes drawn from the Sermon on the Mount, and in ecstasies that emulate the ferment of Pentecost. The reason for the existence of these is almost completely that in one form or another they have seemed to offer a power which appeared to be lacking in the orthodox line of Christian teaching.

Actually the power is in the direct line of the central conceptions of the theology, which are the accepted and agreed beliefs of all the Christian churches, and nothing is more imperative in these days when Christians and non-Christians alike are obsessed with a deep sense of futility than that we should all find access to that power; a power which brings the ideal Christian life within reach of the ordinary man and woman; and if it be objected, as doubtless it will be by some, that such triumphant radiant living is liable to beget spiritual pride, the sufficient and complete answer is, that it is the Christian life, in all its fullness, and in all its humility, which is the realm in which the power of the Christian gospel operates.

R. E. ROBERTS

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY

THE title indicates that the purpose of this article is to link closely together two aspects of the Christian religion as the human response to the divine revelation in Christ, which are often separated but are essentially related. Both have been a dominant interest in my Christian thought and life for more than sixty years, and at the age of eighty-three my concern about both is unabated.

I may be pardoned if I begin with a personal reference. Drilled in the Shorter Catechism, already as a boy I had a knowledge of, and had my doubts and difficulties about, the Calvinism of Scottish Presbyterianism, sharing a common unrest among young people. The opposition of theologians to the findings of science, especially the theory of evolution, also caused me serious distress of mind; but I was preserved from unbelief and denial, and kept my Christian faith, by the irresistible fascination of the historical personality of Jesus, to whose life on earth Farrar's *Life of Christ* had given a vivid, arresting actuality. I continued to believe in God, despite all these adverse theological influences, because of the Son's revelation of the Father. Dr. Smith's lectures on the Old Testament in the Jewish Church, and the modification of the current doctrine of plenary inspiration that the higher criticism allowed, made possible a revision of the doctrines of dual election, eternal punishment, and the death of Christ as

penal substitution, which had been the main stumbling blocks; and mind and soul, according well, could make one music as before. My theology became Christo-centric, and continues so to-day, despite the advocacy of a *theocentric* theology. The description is tautology, as theology has not and cannot have any other content, and it is not distinctive enough, for Jewish and Moslem theology can be so described, and by some the term *theocentric* is intended to commend a theology which lays stress on *the otherness of God*. It is not a question of a term only, it is a matter of the content and the character of the theology. While God reveals Himself as Creator, Preserver, Ruler, Judge, in nature and history, to reason, conscience, and religion, and has more clearly and fully disclosed His character and purpose, the duty and the destiny of man, in the history of the Hebrew nation, and its interpretation, yet it is in the Son that the Father unveils the mystery and the glory of His Fatherhood; and my guiding principle is that I will believe about God only what is contained in, or consistent with, that revelation, and will not believe anything that is not in accord. It is not, however, the abstraction of the creeds that gives content to this Christo-centric theology, nor even the Pauline or Johannine interpretation, although I accept that without the reserve with which I acquiesce in the credal formulations. It is the *Word as flesh*, tabernacling among men, showing the Shekinah, or divine presence, full of grace and truth (John i. 14), in whom I see God.

What is often advanced as the Christian Gospel is Paul's doctrine of the Cross. I accept that so fully that I can make my own confession the apostle's declaration: 'Far be it from me to glory save in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the world is crucified to me, and I to the world' (Galatians vi. 14). But that does not justify the neglect, and even sometimes the depreciation of the truth embodied in a tale, the creed of creeds in the loveliness of perfect deeds. Already as a youth in business the Inner Life of Jesus, as disclosed in word and deed, became of absorbing interest, and claimed such study as my resources then allowed. In my two pastorates I must have preached about one hundred sermons on texts from the Gospels, and of all the books I have written my *Studies on the Inner Life of Jesus* claims my warmest affection, and for it I have received more expressions of gratitude from readers than for any other. Experience and study in the many intervening years have left Jesus in the Gospels as the unchanged, unshaken foundation. That is the Christian theology that I shall expand in this article.

My concern about Christian Society reaches back to the same formative period. About 1880 I began to devote most of my leisure time to Sunday School teaching, preaching in mission halls, and visiting in the slums and mean streets of Glasgow. The first conviction forced on me in view of the appalling results of the drinking habits was that I must become a total abstainer, in profession as well as practice. The second was that the poverty, misery, insecurity of the masses was not due solely to individual misconduct, but mainly to the economic system, and the resulting social order, or rather disorder, promoting in some measure that misconduct; that individual philanthropy, and existing social services, could not afford effective reliefs; that society needed reformation as well as the persons composing it; and that it was the duty of the Christian Church to preach and work for social redemption from evil as well as individual salvation from sin; the need of a better world here as well as the hope of a better

world hereafter. Ever since, I have, amid reproach, preached the social Gospel as an essential, and not subordinate, part of the whole Gospel. What can we learn from Jesus in the Gospels about the society that will correspond to the theology of the divine Fatherhood, as He not only taught it, but lived it in His truth and grace? In answering that question I shall have occasion to deal with contributions which New Testament scholarship has made to our understanding.

It is one of the surprises, we might call it scandals, in the history of the Christian Church, that truths of revelation have been almost forgotten, at least neglected for long periods, and then recovered and explored. Jesus came preaching the Kingdom of God, or of Heaven: but the doctrine was not incorporated in the orthodox construction. It was during last century that, with the revived study of the Gospels, it was welcomed and used often without discrimination as justifying the aspiration, becoming more common, for a more Christian Society. Its meaning was, however, misrepresented, and it was used to describe the social ideal to be realized by human endeavour with some divine assistance; and in America especially the sufficiency of man for the task was magnified and the necessity of the activity of God was minimized. It was this false emphasis in a few of the speeches at the Stockholm Conference in 1925 that provoked the charge of Anglo-American activism by the German delegates, who themselves might have been charged with acceptance of a dualism between the Christian ideal and their accepted order of society outside the Church, and a quietism that deprecated human effort in sole dependence on the mysterious will of God in His Providence.

It is now agreed, however, that the term means primarily the *rule* of God, and the divine good which He offers to men in the Gospel, and only *subordinately* the *realm* of subjects of that rule, and any human duty involved. Christian theology had made much of the sovereignty of God as absolute will, generally inscrutable, decreeing damnation as well as salvation; but the Kingdom of God on the lips of Jesus was the rule of the Father, the sovereignty of forgiving, renewing, and perfecting grace, love in action and passion for the salvation of 'mankind sinners'. The *religious good* it offered was the love of God as Father in the grace of the Son of God as Saviour, and the *moral duty* it enjoined was single-minded and wholehearted love for God, and equal love to self and neighbour. Men made as creatures in the image of God for closer fellowship and likeness to God as His children had marred that image, and failed to grow like and with the Father. This Kingdom must be seen, received, and entered by the new birth or birth from above, by the Spirit of God. The universal Fatherhood of God could be experienced by men only as they became by conscious and voluntary faith in the Saviour, children of God in entire dependence, complete confidence, and unreserved submission, subjects of the sovereignty.

Jesus necessarily addressed Himself to, and found response from, individual believers and disciples; but this indubitable and inevitable fact has led to the perversion of *individualism*, which pervaded economics and politics as well as religion and morals in the latter part of last century. God's relation to men is an individual relation. In His love He sets an infinite value on, has an infinite interest in, and makes an infinite effort for, the highest good of every soul; and Free Churchmen have been justified in laying stress on individual liberty and responsibility in opposition to any authority in Church or State that would

claim an absolute sovereignty over reason or conscience. But human personality is not only individual, it is as essentially social. A man is as he is son, brother, husband, father, worker, citizen. Apart from social relations the individual is an abstraction just as is any society apart from the individuals that compose it. God's individual is not apart from, but within, this universal love as Father; man loves God fully as he loves his neighbour: the *rule* constitutes a *realm*. In correction of this error and wrong of individualism, the need and the call in the Church is to lay stress on the Christian Society.

This obligation rests on a solid historical foundation. The preparatory and progressive revelation in the Old Testament was to and for a nation, to shape its history in accord with the purpose of God. When that nation lost its political independence and became a dispersion under alien rule it preserved its unity and continuity as distinguished and separated from other societies. Jesus came as the divinely promised and humanly expected Messiah to this society. But his understanding of the promise of God was not in accord with the expectations of men. I feel warranted in assuming that in His temptation He rejected the aim of a temporal deliverer and ruler, the Son of David, and accepted as God's pattern for His ministry the suffering righteous servant of Isaiah (Chapter liii). I assume also that while He accepted this as His individual vocation, yet in addressing the Jewish people He preserved in His purpose the social reference of the prophet's vision to Israel as the servant of the Lord, as also in His use of the ambiguous term *Son of Man*, as meaning not only the exalted Messiah, but the rule of the saints. He called His disciples to share His Cross. He offered Himself to the Jewish nation as the Saviour to lead it to the fulfilment of its destiny as God's missionary, and, if need be, martyr among the Gentiles. He was rejected, because the people desired a secular deliverance and dominion. I am convinced that the burden of human sin and divine judgement that crushed His Heart on the Cross was made concrete as the Jewish refusal of its destiny and subjection to its doom.

It was a human society that was the *object*, that it might become the *organ* of the divine sovereignty of grace unto salvation of the race. Jesus called His disciples individually, but from the beginning He called them into a society. If the discourses in the Upper Room do reproduce in Johannine form the teaching of Jesus, as I believe they do, they prove how keen was His solicitude for the unity of the disciples in love for one another, as a condition of their fulfilment of the mission He was entrusting to them. In the earlier part of His ministry He had been prompt in His rebuke of any ambition or rivalry among them. After Israel had made its tragic choice, they assumed its vocation. They became the *ecclesia* of God, the assembly called together out of the world to be His witnesses. The question has been raised: Are we to regard the company of the disciples as already the Church, baptized at Pentecost, or was Pentecost the birthday? My own conviction is that — until the Jewish nation had rejected Jesus as Messiah; until the divine response to the sacrifice of the Cross had been made in the exaltation of the Crucified as the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness by the resurrection of the dead (Romans i. 4); until the new society which confessed and proclaimed Him as Lord, and so assumed the vocation which Israel had refused, was equipped with new power, born from above of the Holy Spirit — the Church was only in embryo.

The Christian Church is no human invention, but a divine creation, the continuation of the Incarnation as the third stage in the fulfilment of the divine purpose for the "salvation of men, begun in the call to Abraham, whose heirs and believers are as both objects and organs of that Kingdom of God. His sovereignty of grace. Tragic as was Israel's failure, tragic has been the history of the Christian Church, if not as irrevocable. Christ has been *parcelled out* (1 Corinthians i. 13: Moffatt) among the Churches. What for me deepens the tragedy is that there is a type of Christian who doubts if Christ founded or intended to found a society, and treats the Church as a man-made means, fallible and defective, for the Kingdom of God. It can be an organ only as it is the object of the sovereignty of God in the Lordship of Christ through the operations of the Holy Spirit. As a minister of Christ among Congregationalists I believe in witness to, and serve, the one Holy Catholic Apostolic Church as *localized* in the congregation even as the one Church was in Antioch or Ephesus.

Holding these convictions, the oecumenical movements of to-day have since 1914 claimed my active interest, and gladly should I write in their advocacy, but for my present purpose I return to the *moral duty* of human love enjoined in response to and as outcome of the *religious good* of the divine love offered in the Kingdom of God. While every neighbour is to be the object of equal love to self, and the obligation is universal, yet the equality is not to be taken as quantitative. Men are in different social relations to one another, and these differences not only justify but demand discrimination in the practical application of the universal sentiment. It is one of the merits of the Confucian ethics that it does recognize these differences, and describes these discriminations. Into the details I shall not now venture, but there is one broad distinction to which attention must be called, that of *philanthropia* (love of mankind) and *philadelphia* (love of the brethren). When Paul exhorts the Galatians: 'As we have opportunity, let us work that which is good toward all men, and especially toward them that are of the household of the faith' (vi. 10), he is not lowering the standard of the Kingdom. The 'common possession' of the Holy Spirit, conveying through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ the love of the Father (2 Corinthians xiii. 14), gives them a new common life, in which love should meet no obstacles, and find many occasions, such as the life shared as men with those who are not yet in Christ, can offer. The intensification of love within the Church is not a limitation of the love of mankind. It is a focus from which love may be more widely diffused. Must we not confess that, to use our Lord's metaphors, to-day the heaven is often more concerned about spreading in the meal (the world) than the salt in the preserving of its savour (the Church)? The Church, in seeking to keep many vineyards, is not keeping its own. Yet it is certain that only a Church which loves within its own fellowship, as the love of God claims and enables men to love one another, can be God's effective agent in spreading God's love, His sovereignty of grace in human society, so as to transform it, and make it Christian. The Social Gospel must be applied and even more intensely within the Church as well as outside of it, if that wider application is to be effective. It is no easy yoke or light burden that this *philadelphia* imposes, and it can bring rest only as the love of Christ constrains to full surrender to Himself.

The Church should be not only the *pattern* of what a Christian Society should be as the object of the sovereignty of grace, the divine love received and diffused

in human love, in the fellowship of the children of God to make manifest His Fatherhood to the world (Matthew v. 16): but also the *potency* for the expansion (the mustard plant), and the pervasion of the Kingdom (the heaven), as the organ of the sovereignty of grace. It is Christ Himself, as mediated by the Spirit of God in the Gospel to preacher and hearer alike, who is the power and the wisdom of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth. To preach the Gospel is the Church's primary task, but as the history of missions had proved, evangelism must be in deed as well as in word, and philanthropy in the widest sense (medical, educational, economic) must accompany the Gospel as an essential expression of the love of God to men, and the love of their fellow-men which His love enjoins and imparts. That philanthropy has not the Golden Rule for its measure; for it does not balance duties by rights, nor obligations to, by expectation from others. As did the Son of Man: it comes not to be served, but to serve, and even to give life as a ransom (Matthew xx. 28). Sympathy, service, sacrifice, are its ascending scale in bearing the burdens of others, and so fulfilling the love of Christ (Galatians vi. 2).

Experience has shown that this philanthropy needs the wisdom of the serpent (Matthew x. 16), since there are possible objects of it who would be harmed and not helped by its indiscriminate exercise. Idleness, thriftlessness, selfishness, might be encouraged, and not industry, economy, self-denial. The character of the recipient needs to be preserved as well as the circumstances relieved, and relief should be given in such ways as will preserve character. There is a charity which relieves the feelings, but does not recognize this responsibility for the morals of those who receive it.

Evangelism and philanthropy do not exhaust the duty of the Church to the world. The evils which philanthropy seeks to relieve are but symptoms of hidden evils which disclose themselves only on closer scrutiny. To give the most obvious example, to which I have already referred, poverty is not always due to personal defects in the sufferers from it: often they are victims of unjust and hurtful economic conditions. Hence arises the duty to discover, expose, and secure by the appropriate methods in each case the removal of these sources of disease in the body politic. As citizens, Christians have a responsibility for the reform of the evils which are infesting the community. They will attempt to apply Christian standards. There are some narrow evangelicals who contend that individual conversions are the only way in which the world around the Church can be made any better, and confine their interest and effort to evangelization. There are social reformers who rely on change of conditions and circumstances to bring about improvement in convictions and character, and neglect the preaching of the Gospel of individual salvation. Those who teach and guide the Church in this matter recognize on the one hand that a community, the majority of which is, if not hostile to, at least indifferent to, the Gospel cannot be expected to accept and apply the Christian laws of love in all its reach and range in their ways and works in the world; but on the other that there is a great deal of what is often described as natural goodness, but in which the grace of God is active, if subconsciously. The war has shown the depths to which wickedness may sink, but surely also the heights to which goodness may soar. Endurance, courage, self-sacrifice can be set over against cruelty, brutality, barbarism in our estimate of human nature. There are

many men who make no Christian confession, and yet accept and apply Christian standards. What has to be avoided is on the one hand the doctrinaire and on the other the opportunist attitude. The former is the danger of the theologian, the latter of the economist and politician. When the one insists that social changes must be practicable, and allows his judgement to be biased by the circumstances, the other, inspired by the standard, must insist that there shall be the *maximum* practicable application of principle. Those who have adequate knowledge for a competent judgement are generally agreed that justice, as the application of love, may be accepted as the maximum practicable. Into details I cannot here enter.

What is the reason for this limitation? The doctrinaire theologian will more or less dogmatically affirm that sin is the cause of this failure, and if he tends to reaction, he will talk or write about the fall, original sin, natural corruption, and total depravity. That is not the course which I think the Church should follow. Let us leave these dogmas behind and scrutinize the world around as it is, as modern knowledge presents it to us. We must accept the facts of cosmic evolution, human development, racial as well as individual, man's animal ancestry, and the appetites, impulses, and passions he shares with the animals, even if for the most part his human endowment of reason, conscience, volition frees him from the dominance of instinct. Somehow the racial development took a wrong direction, but not wholly so, since goodness survives as well as wickedness, and the human endowment does not control the animal inheritance as completely as a sinless individual development would demand. Of only One has that been affirmed. Each child starts with a handicap morally. To describe mankind as in *revolt* against God is, however, to indulge in dogmatic hyperbole. The lower tendencies prevail over the higher in most men without any conscious or voluntary defiance of the authority of God. Without minimizing in any way the condemnation of sin from the Christian discernments, we should judge men charitably, by the standards they have themselves reached. Imperfect personal development is what we should recognize as well as conscious and voluntary transgression. In the environment of each individual there is an inheritance of customs, prejudices, relations, institutions that hamper the free development of his personality. How far physical heredity conveys any inherent tendency to sin is still doubtful, but there is the social inheritance which conveys many incitements to the wrong choice, and many hindrances to the right. We must not think of the individual by himself, and the community as a whole, in abstraction. He belongs to many groups: domestic, economic, social, and it is constituted by those groups variously related to one another. These groups develop an autonomy of their own, and command a loyalty that preserves the existing conditions, and offers resistance to any reconstruction of society which justice, in relation to the place of each individual in the group, or of each group in the community as a whole, might demand. It is not only because men are selfish and worldly, and some even devilish, that the application of justice is so difficult. They are ignorant, indifferent, indolent, stupid, timid, bound by the past, doubtful of the future. To learn from anthropology, psychology, and sociology what the actual conditions are, and the usual reactions of men to them, will be much more valuable knowledge for the Church in promoting social justice than theologizing about sin in general.

In view of this formidable obstacle to progress, we may in closing raise two related questions. Can the Kingdom of God in its perfection, glory, and blessedness come here on earth under conditions of time and space? If not, to what extent may we expect its coming here? As regards the first question, the mortality of man, and his physical conditions here demand a negative answer. The saints will not be recalled from Heaven, but in Heaven the Kingdom is a reality such as it cannot be on earth, although it may be that the consummation of God's purpose on earth, whatever that may be, will have significance and value within the Kingdom in Heaven. There is joy in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth (Luke xv. 7). The Church triumphant will have more abundant joy when the Church militant ends its long campaign.

As regards the second question, the sufficiency of Christ to save to the uttermost, the sovereignty of the grace of God encourages the hope of universal salvation, but the resistance of sin to grace tempers that hope with fear. At least we can believe that the consummation will be commensurate to the infinite value of the Incarnation, God becoming man, living, dying, and rising again from the dead in the divine sacrifice for the human salvation. Even if, during the course of its history, the Church remains a minority, yet it may hope so to increase its present influence that there will be progress, not inevitable, but actual, in the coming of the Kingdom of God as more effective love in the Church, and to the world, and more consistent justice in human society. The Kingdom of God is here; the Church can be its organ to the world as its object. According to its faith, as the Church sees, receives, and enters into the Kingdom, will the Kingdoms of this world become the Kingdom of our God, and of His Christ.

A. E. GARVIE

[NOTE: When sending this article Dr. Garvie expressed the fear that, due to ill-health, this might be his last contribution to the LONDON QUARTERLY AND HOLBORN REVIEW. On going to Press we learn with deep regret of his sudden death.—EDITOR.]

THE PLANS FOR ENGLISH EDUCATION TO-MORROW

IN the future, 1944 will be regarded as a great year in the history of English Education. Not only was Mr. Butler's comprehensive Education Act passed in that year but the valuable Fleming and McNair Reports also appeared. The Norwood Report on Curriculum and Examinations in Secondary Schools had appeared in 1943. These reports are almost as important as the Education Act itself in revealing the direction in which we are likely to move in our schemes for the schools and colleges of the new era. Reports of Government Commissions are not necessarily translated into legislation, nor even made the basis of administrative regulations, but these three reports come with such a weight of opinion behind them, at a time when the spirit of reform is in the air, that it is reasonable to suppose that they will have a great influence in shaping the form of things to come. The Fleming Report in particular is a most attractively written and stimulating document; yet there are rumours that already one of its main proposals has fallen before the critics. We must wait

and see how far it is possible to build the public schools, boarding schools, and all independent schools into a national system of Education. They must be thrown open to the children of the unprivileged classes by bursaries liberally given — this is the burden of the Report. The whole question at issue is how far is the necessarily extended control by public authority to go and how far is the individuality of each school to be retained.

The McNair Report is concerned with the recruitment and training of teachers and youth leaders. It is proposed to increase the training college course from two years to three years and to link the training colleges up much more closely with university life. The Committee was divided as to the plans by which this association with the Universities should be developed. One section would attach the training colleges to the Universities very closely by University Schools of Education; the other section, almost equal in number and weight, would develop the existing Training College Joint Boards and strengthen the Delegacies which have already been established. There must be found an enormous number of new places in training colleges if the country is to find the 80,000 to 100,000 extra teachers that may be needed after the war. Local Education Authorities will have to build new colleges and the existing denominational training colleges will have to be greatly expanded. With a three-year course there must be an increase of 50 per cent in the number of students if even the present supply is to be maintained. The Treasury will have to come to the help of training colleges, whether provided by a local authority or by one of the denominations, if these places are to be found. The Norwood Report will not involve the administrative changes that the other two reports demand, but it would bring about great changes in the life of secondary schools if its proposals were carried out. If examinations were in future made to fit the curriculum and not to dominate and control it, the whole routine of schools might be changed.

All these Reports are full of constructive ideas but we have not yet begun to sail the ship by the compass of Norwood, Fleming, and McNair. We are, however, committed to the Butler-Chuter Ede product. The Education Act of 1944 is a bold and spacious plan which carries into effect what Mr. Fisher tried to do in 1918 and goes much farther. The creators of the Bill dared to tackle the religious question, which had defeated many previous adventurers, and carried through a compromise much more favourable to denominational schools than could have been thought possible twenty or thirty years ago. Moreover, in an increasingly secular age, a daily act of worship and the regular provision of religious instruction becomes a statutory obligation in every school for the first time. The lack of opposition to this innovation is almost as surprising as the languid criticism of the Bill on the ground of finance. In our present mood all things are possible financially for the New Order. Some day we may wake up to the fact that Old and New Orders are alike in the notion that bills must be paid and money must be found for interest if not for capital expenditure. However, it is just as well to go forward hopefully with your plans for to-morrow, making them as good as possible remembering that we can always adjust our schemes to harsh necessity. 'Tis better to have planned and failed than never to have planned at all.

It would, however, be churlish to assume that any of our bold hopes for an

educated England will be blasted. It is true that already the raising of the school leaving age to 15 has been postponed for a year but this regulation must become operative on April 1st, 1947, presumably whether the necessary teachers and the adequate school accommodation are ready or not. The earlier Act (1936) by which it was due on September 1st, 1939, was somewhat illusory by reason of exemptions to children who were 'beneficially' employed. In any case the war killed it. The new administrative machinery is already getting into motion. The Board of Education has become a Ministry and the President a Minister with widely extended powers. The Ministry no longer merely superintends matters relating to education in England and Wales; its duty now is to promote the education of the people and to see that the local authorities do their work. The local authorities, too, are transformed. Those dealing only with elementary education, who went by the peculiar name of Part III Authorities, disappear altogether; they are absorbed into the counties and county boroughs. This was inevitable as the term elementary loses its significance. Schools for children over 11 are all now called secondary schools (though they may only carry the child on to 14; 15 when the leaving age is raised). The secondary school of the future, therefore, may be either what was heretofore a senior elementary school, or a technical school, a grammar school, a county secondary school, or a public school. All education between the ages of 11 and 19 is now called secondary, and all for children under 11 is primary. This involves more than a disappearance of the Part III Authorities, it involves also an abolition of fees in provided secondary schools of every kind. We have had something like free education since 1891, though fees were not finally abolished in elementary schools until 1918. Now they are to be abolished in all schools maintained by a Local Education Authority.

The new Authorities will set up divisional executives to deal with primary and secondary education and some of these divisions may correspond in area with that of the smaller disappearing Authorities. The power of the purse and presumably the business of county colleges, technical schools, and adult education is likely to be with the Authority itself, though arrangements may differ in different counties. In any case we shall see a most promising new experiment in local administration coming into existence. It is to be hoped that there will be greater efficiency without any loss of local interest. There was a great deal of inconvenience and many anomalies were created by having different Authorities in the same area dealing with elementary and secondary education respectively. The extension of free education to secondary schools is likely to react on the direct grant schools, though the Fleming Committee was divided in opinion on that subject. The opinion of Parliament, however, seemed to be that wherever schools were receiving grants from public funds no tuition fees should be charged. These direct grant schools are at present independent of local authorities and mostly of a non-local character. Several of our Methodist boarding schools would be affected by any regulation along the lines of abolishing tuition fees in grant-aided schools. Government grants would then need to be of such an amount as to make this policy possible. Theorists have argued that the smaller Authorities were always the difficulties in the way of reformed administration: first it was the School Boards, then the Part III Authorities, and now both have gone.

The other difficulty has always been our dual system, but the new Bill was not bold enough to sweep that out of the way. The real obstacle to a unified system is the Roman Catholic claim that children are in real spiritual danger unless schools as well as homes are saturated with their particular religious tradition. Schools must therefore be controlled by the Church. The Church of England would be more ready to compromise with the State if the Roman Catholic schools were not in the field. Since 1870 the State has had to come again and again with new subventions of public funds to keep the denominational schools up to the required standard. In fairness it should be said that the State was a sleeping partner in the business of popular education until nearly a hundred years ago. The real pioneers were the representatives of the Churches and other voluntary organizations. When public rates and taxes came to the help of private fees and subscriptions they came in a very small trickle at first. The trickle has now become a torrent. Not only is the whole cost of running the denominational schools now found by the general public but in the 1936 Act up to 75 per cent of the cost of building new senior schools and by the 1944 Act 50 per cent of the cost of improvement of buildings of all denominational schools will be found by the Exchequer. Where the denomination is unable to find the 50 per cent the State will pay the whole cost, but the school will then become a 'controlled' school; otherwise it is an 'aided' school. The building remains the property of the denomination in both cases, but four out of the six managers of a 'controlled' school are appointed by public bodies while only two are so appointed in 'aided' schools. The remaining managers are appointed by the Foundation. Also in 'controlled' schools, in the future, the religious teaching will not be of a denominational character normally, though distinctive teaching of the character required by the Foundation can be given if parents so desire. In 'aided' schools the position is reversed; it is the agreed syllabus (i.e. undenominational) teaching which is given only if the parents so wish. 'Controlled' schools come more directly under the local Authority in the appointment of heads of schools and lose much of their distinctive denominational character. It is to be hoped that the Church of England will see the justice of the Free Church claim that in single-school areas the one school for all the children should be either a county school or a controlled school. There is no more justice in forcing children of Free Church parents to attend an Anglican school than there would be to force Anglican children to attend Roman Catholic schools. The 'controlled' school will still preserve an historic tradition but the custody and direction of the school is given back to the people, as should happen where it is the only school open to the people. It will be unfortunate if the Church of England fight for this monopoly in 4000 parishes by striving to raise funds to make the single-school area schools into 'aided' schools. The late Archbishop Temple said at the Malvern Conference that whenever an interest or concern becomes a monopoly it is time for the State to intervene and take it over. It is a pity this principle is not applied to Education as well as to the postal service.

For better or worse the Dual System is still with us but it is inevitable that the power of the State in education will become greater while the power of the Church becomes less. There is the more reason to be thankful that those who represent the aims of the State in school and college and university have a

liberal outlook. They want an education of real value for all the members of the Commonwealth. They think that such an education demands as its basis a religious philosophy, Christian in its love of God and service of man, even if not committed to a specific denominational loyalty. They believe that no child should miss its chance of development because of the poverty of its home. They would increase the number of ladders that help all who can to climb. They do not think that true culture is merely a study of literature of this or other countries but that there is a culture of hand and eye and ear that must find its place in any genuine education. The grammar school may continue to live side by side with technical, vocational, and art schools but must not lord it over them. Our leaders of to-morrow are not to be trained only in a select group of private schools that have long carried the anomalous name of public schools. So they have planned an education for all from the age of two upwards until they drop out and join the Workers' Education Association or the local community centre. There is plenty of variety here and the increasing direction by the State does not imply uniformity. From the ages of two to five there will be Nursery Schools where the need exists. At five, attendance at school becomes compulsory and remains so to the age of 18. Full-time attendance until 14 is required at present, until 15 will be the rule in the next year or so, and until 16 as soon as it may become possible. But the school-leaver must go to the County College for a day a week during forty-four weeks of the year until he reaches the age of 18, and after that he may be led on to adult education.

The real achievement of the 1944 Act is that it does bring the appearance of unity into the somewhat disorderly field of English education. We have been such violent individualists trying out new experiments according to our will or fancy that even towards the end of a second world war our new bureaucracy has not yet got us fully under control. Until 1870 private enterprise directed elementary education. Whitehall and South Kensington were content to buy bits of education from voluntary bodies by means of a complicated series of grants. In 1870 the School Boards began to take up the work on similar lines, deriving support from the rates but beginning to compete effectively with the voluntary societies. Some of the larger School Boards set up new standards of elementary education and began to pass beyond that limited sphere. They resented the attempt that was made in 1896 to transfer their powers to the new County Councils and defeated the Bill drawn up for that purpose. They themselves were defeated six years later but were so strong in death that they lived again in many Borough Councils and Part III Authorities. This created an almost watertight division between Higher and Elementary Education. There were, therefore, two dual systems to be unified, one which divided schools into 'provided' and 'non-provided'; the other which separated elementary and secondary education. If Mr. Butler has failed to unify the former of these two divisions, he has succeeded with the latter. It remains to be seen whether this success is complete enough to bring all the 'public' schools and independent schools into a national system, but the attempt is being made. It may be a harder task to bring unity into the teaching profession. There is still a marked class distinction between teachers in elementary, technical, and secondary schools, to say nothing of our teachers in public schools and

universities. The proposed changes in the Burnham Scale and the disappearance of the term 'elementary' make a start in this direction, but there is a long road to travel before the profession is completely unified.

There is, indeed, a long road unwinding before us ere we reach the goal set before us by the new Act and by the various reports on educational reforms which have recently appeared. We have got the framework of a new plan for education in England and Wales but all the work of filling in the framework remains to be done. The last great war was followed by many schemes of reconstruction and also by much disappointment and disillusionment. Mr. Fisher's Education Act was full of bold proposals but half of them were never put into effect. The proposal to continue the education of the adolescent after the school-leaving age failed completely except at Rugby. We must see to it that the new plan for County Colleges for young people who have just gone into factories and workshops and offices is no failure. It will clearly be a difficult venture, but if Rugby can carry it through, other parts of the country can do the same. In rural districts boarding colleges may be required, or holiday camp sites used for continuous courses of eight weeks in each year (or alternatively of two four-week courses) instead of the one day a week course in towns. This means the provision of many new buildings and teachers for a specialized task, and it should mean that all these courses begin on the same date in all parts of the country. Authorities are given until April 1st, 1948, to make their arrangements for this great adventure and the time is all too short. It will, however, be unfortunate if a staggered start is made so that neighbouring boroughs and counties do not march side by side in the early weeks of this revolutionary change.

It is very doubtful whether the public mind has been fully prepared for the great changes involved by the new Act. Are parents ready to see their children kept from remunerative labour until they are 15 and presently until they are 16? Are they prepared to see them continue to attend school for one day a week until they are 18? Are ratepayers prepared to see their education rate doubled without raising a protest? Are the builders and the materials ready to get our new schools and colleges built and our old schools reconstructed in good time? Are a hundred thousand young people ready and eager to rush into the teaching profession when they are released from the services and from other forms of national service? Is their education during the war years of such a character as to give us hope that they will be equal to the task of training the citizens for the new order? Are the extemporized plans for giving our would-be teachers shortened courses of training satisfactory? Shall we be able to carry out now that reform so long overdue of reducing the size of classes? Have we worked out suitable courses for the new Secondary School in which the leaving age will be 15? There is no end to the questions that arise as we look forward to the task of working out the plans of the new Act. Let us hope that the post-Hitler war world will not suffer from the same tragic ineffectiveness as that which afflicted the twenty years between 1919 and 1939.

It might be wiser and certainly would be more healthy if, instead of indulging in sceptical questionings about the possibility of our dreams coming true, we were to rejoice in the new birth of hope. A lesser people might have gone

down altogether in gloom and despair in these dark years. Our motto now is:

England, arise! the long, long night is over,
Faint in the east behold the dawn appear;
Out of your evil dream of toil and sorrow
Arise, O England, for the day is here.

We can still make our Beveridge plans and dream of a land filled with intelligent and enthusiastic citizens, 'with flame of freedom in their souls and light of knowledge in their eyes'. Surely God will give us another chance to recover all that is greatest in our past.

A. W. HARRISON

THE GONCOURT JOURNAL

THE Goncourt brothers (*Les deux Goncourt*, as the phrase goes) were a curious pair. To read their *Journal* is to enter a glittering, extravagant, and bygone world. Just under a century ago, orphaned and moderately well-off, they settled down to their combined life in a Paris flat crowded with bric-à-brac, surrounded with every evidence of refined taste and old-maidish orderliness. Jules de Goncourt, the younger and more clever, though physically the weaker, was nineteen at the time and had long been spoiled by his mother; his brother, Edmond, was twenty-seven, who on their mother's death assumed the care of him.

They had been strangely brought up, largely in the company of women, which accounts in part for their many feminine traits. They were effeminate in consequence, Jules never losing his sense of dependence on his elder brother, who outlived him by twenty-six years and who never failed in almost maternal oversight; and both were victims of recurring neurasthenia and self-pity. They were in fact born to be old maids, but through the perversity of fate became the centre of an influential literary group, afterwards known as the Académie Goncourt, and spent their days (and nights), Johnson-fashion, in literary back-chat and scandal.

They were moderately travelled and passed as amateur dabblers in etching and painting; they were collectors of antiques and of every form of good (and doubtful) craftsmanship of the previous century; they were the close friends of most of the naturalist French writers of their day: Gautier, Flaubert, Sainte-Beuve, and the rest. Possessed of few ties they spent their days, when not collaborating in laborious novels, in visits and gossip, and their nights at public suppers and social functions. They were, there is no mistake, a curious pair: finical, moody, temperamental; yet for all their eccentricity, and their remoteness from the more bracing and normal affairs of life, they exercised a considerable influence; were remarkable psychologists in the field of their own immediate observation; possessed uncanny, almost feminine, intuition; were of wide culture, and in taste and sensibility obvious heirs of the eighteenth century. They were, moreover, rebels and innovators, giving birth to a new school of writers and, though vilified for the 'slime' and 'putrescence' of their work, were hailed by youth with enthusiasm, nor could the polished symmetry and immaculate architecture of their style be disregarded.

For better then or for worse the Goncourts have their place in literary history, as they had their assured and comfortable niche in the flamboyant and artificial life of Paris society. Zola, Daudet, and a host of others found in them inspiration as did later, among others, our own George Moore and Arnold Bennett.

Perhaps the strangest thing about them was that, despite their fastidious abstraction from life, when it came to writing they plunged headlong into reality. Their works on art and eighteenth-century life, it is true, are different; but their novels, at which they toiled endlessly and with excessive artistry, are, as someone has remarked, 'something of a trial'. In these they overdid reality, reaching out after a sickening and morbid realism, using the method of deliberate reportage without regard to beauty or sublimity; all must be depicted in cold and repellent actuality. Modern fiction in certain directions shows the same tendency. The documentary novel, the reliance upon dossiers of facts, the mere scheduling of material and recording of horrors, are no substitute for artistic creation, and do not constitute literary art. Sentiment and sublimity are fundamental to good writing. The accurate observation and reproduction of facts are essential, but your true artist is no mere reporter or recorder. He must pass the material through the crucible of his own mind, distilling it, inspiring it, reinforcing it with the colour and power of his personality, transmuting it by his genius, sublimating and exalting it into an aesthetic unity. Only thus does the prosaic become romantic, and the commonplace become refined and transcendent; and only thus too, on a lower level, does a medley of assorted facts assume pattern and coherence.

This deliberate method of the Goncourts indicates a flaw in their mutual make-up which temperamentally was predisposed to art and beauty, art and beauty indeed for art and beauty's sake, though art in this connection was confined to style and taste, and beauty often to mere prettiness. They idolized the eighteenth century, its elegance and refinement, yet were among the first to exploit, in novel form, the shame and squalor of the streets, and to lay bare, like Zola, who imitated them, the seamy side of life and character. Unmoved by social ideals and in no way zealous for reform, they focused their attention on disease and vice, confining themselves to the physical side of existence, subjecting their characters to clinical scrutiny and analysis; thus, uninspired by lofty principle or moral sentiment, their novels reflect little more than their own inquisitiveness and morbidity.

But the *Journal* is different. It stands alone and makes good reading. Even Saintsbury confesses, after denouncing the 'literary vamping' in their novels that 'if it could be purged of its bad blood, the book would really deserve to rank, for substance, with Pepys' diary or Walpole's letters'. It is in fact what it claims to be, namely a journal, a clear and vivid record of contemporary life. All the stir and bustle of the boulevards are here, the light and glitter of the theatres and cafés, a living panorama of the streets and drawing-room and Court. It is the colourful society of the Second Empire.

Its main interest lies in the literary lions it portrays. The Goncourts almost out-Boswelled Boswell. Endless cameos and miniatures are included, sparkling descriptions, racy conversations, vivid close-ups, intermixed with scintillating epigrams and *bon mots*. There is Gavarni who accompanied Balzac to Bourg and had to see, most of the time, that Balzac kept himself clean; Balzac, 'a

plump little man with fine dark eyes and a slightly broken turned-up nose, talking volubly in a loud voice and looking like a bookseller's clerk — as for what he looked like in front, his outline was the absolute contour of an ace of spades'.

Flaubert is seen in a room all foggy with cigar smoke, striding to and fro across the carpet, 'knocking his bald head against the pendant of the chandelier, pouring out words', telling of his lonely life, his horror of the country, his ten hours' work a day, his waste of time, rarely warming to his work before five in the evening and unable to begin straight away on a clean piece of paper. There are many pictures of Flaubert here with whom, among others, the Goncourts dined every fortnight. One confession is particularly interesting: 'Flaubert said to us to-day: "The story or plot of a novel is of no interest to me. When I write a novel I have in mind rendering a colour, a shade. For example, in my Carthaginian novel I want to do something *purple*. In *Madame Bovary* all I was after was to render a special tone, that colour of mouldiness of a wood louse's existence." (Readers of it will recall its smoothness, its nutty and mellow brownness, the quiet splendour of its natural plainness.) "My first '*Madame Bovary*'", he goes on, "was to have been set in the surroundings and painted in the tone I actually used, but she was to have been a chaste and devout old maid. And then I saw that this would be an impossible character."'

Commenting on *Salammbô*, after hearing Flaubert reading from it for hours on end 'in his moving, sonorous voice, that cradles you in a sound like a bronze murmur', Goncourt writes of its coarse colours and illumination, the effort undoubtedly immense, the patience infinite, the talent rare, but bewilderment rather than vision, lack of perspective, unrelieved brilliance and interminably long, the syntax too beautiful — 'the syntax of the funeral oration' — artificial comparisons 'like forced camellias', declamatory phrases, and no muted harmonies. And the Orient portrayed is melodramatic under the aspect of the Algerian bazaars. The criticism is just and agrees with Sainte-Beuve's, though Flaubert's oriental novel is immense and unique and incredibly alive in spite of faults and anachronisms.

Speaking of Taine, he was 'thin, gaunt, with a sparse beard, and a rather harsh look about him. When he spoke, however, his rather vacant face became animated, and when he listened to you it took on a certain charm. He spoke amenable words which fell from a mouth filled with long teeth, like an old Englishwoman's. This was Taine, the incarnation in flesh and blood of modern criticism, a criticism at once very learned, very ingenious, and very often erroneous beyond imagining'. An interesting comment of Taine's is given on contemporary French literature. He remarked on the absence of intellectual interest in the French provinces and on the unhealthy gravitation of cultural activity to the capital. This 'plethora' of Paris, attracting, absorbing and fabricating everything would lead, he declared — and it has proved a singularly correct judgement — to the future of France ending in a cerebral haemorrhage. Matthew Arnold made a prediction not entirely dissimilar. Both have proved right. The corruption of French literature, the disposition to an unnatural 'naturalism', and other concomitants of hardness and artificiality, reflect the life of the boulevards rather than the soul of France; and the growing gulf between the capital and the provinces in the long run was bad. A nation's

culture can only remain vigorous and strong by drawing continually upon the life and genius, not of a single section, but of the entire community, and perhaps invigorates itself most by frequent inoculations of local dialect and colour drawn from a wide, and often indeed remote, provincial range.

But to return to the Goncourts: George Sand 'looks like an automaton', a seated shade with a slumbrous air who 'talks in a mechanical and monotonous voice which neither falls nor rises, and is never animated', with a gravity and placidity in her attitude 'like the semi-slumber of a ruminant', her gestures slow, the gestures of a somnambulist. 'Madame Sand was extremely nice to us, extremely complimentary, but with ideas so childish, expressions so flat, and an amiability so doleful that it was as chilling as a bare bedroom wall.' She talked of her private theatre, where plays were put on for her own solitary pleasure and that of her servant and lasted until four in the morning. Her working hours were usually at night, from one until four, with two hours in the daytime. She was a prodigious worker, never minding interruptions, and could turn on her writing like a tap in a barrel. Her face was kind, gentle, serene and colourless; her features delicately firm in a pallid and pacified complexion, the colour of pale amber. 'There is in her a tenuousness and a fine chiselling of feature which her portraits do not reveal.'

Turgenev 'is an attractive colossus, a gentle white-haired giant who looks like the benevolent genie of a mountain or a forest. He is handsome . . . with the blue of the skies in his eyes and the charm of the Russian chant in his accent, that singsong in which there is a spot of the child and of the Negro. . . . He blushed to confess that he and a dozen others were paid as much as 600 francs a page. On the other hand, books brought them nothing in Russia—a maximum of 4000 francs.'

There is a vivid thumbnail sketch of Sainte-Beuve: 'a short, round, little man with a peasant's neck and shoulders, dressed like a country parson. . . . He has a high forehead, a bald, shining skull, large protuberant eyes, the nose of a greedy, sensual, snooping fellow, a wide coarse mouth whose rudimentary shape is disguised by a friendly smile, and remarkable cheekbones, high knobby cheekbones, like a pair of wens. To see him with his white forehead and rosy cheeks, the pink and babyish colouring of the lower half of his face, one might take him for a provincial librarian living in the shadow of a cloister of books over a cellarful of ripe burgundy wines.' The Goncourts certainly did not spare their friends.

At times they could touch on gentler sentiment. There is a moving description of a late night visit they paid to a charity hospital. Down the long corridors come figures in white carrying candles, their voices mild and gentle. The Goncourts follow them to a ward, watch them bend over an abusive patient, hear one of them calm her with quiet words, see another give her a soothing drink, and change her bedsheets. Such a scene, they declare, fills one's heart with admiration, its grandeur is so simple. 'It is surely a triumph for a religion to have brought womankind, that vessel of frailty, that delicate nervous apparatus, to this victory over disgust with nature, to have placed the affectivity of a sensitive creature so entirely in the service of the sufferings of the abject, the sordid, and the impoverished.' As they watch the young nurse bend over the squalid creature who is abusing her they think with disgust of Béranger's

'distorted values, in one of his poems, in placing a sister of mercy and an opera dancer together in heaven and in equating their services.' Even the Goncourts had their finer sentiment. Perhaps their hypochondriacal tendencies made them sensitive to the suffering of others.

Quite early in the *Journal* there is a reference to their mother, and old memories of childhood come back. 'I am at Gisors, and like a radiant shade all my childhood rises up before me. My faded little memories are reborn in my mind and in my heart, and every corner of the garden and the house is a reminder, a thing refound, though it is also a tomb of pleasures I am never to know again. Seeing these beloved places, I remember this person and that. . . . Many childish memories are here, lightly touched on, deftly portrayed, a whole long-vanished world, glowing and radiant as in a golden mist. One is reminded of those lines in Shakespeare's *King Henry V*:

And all my mother came into my eyes
And gave me up to tears.

There is, too, a moving reference to Christ. It comes in a description of a scene at the Pelligrini hostel which they visit in order to get colour for a novel. 'This journey that we were fearful of making and did embark upon only out of literary conscience, to verify certain scenes of our novel, turns out to have brought us a sense of relief, of release, almost of cheerfulness, of which we had no expectation.' They describe the scene: unforgettable, rows of unkempt, wild-looking peasants seated on benches in the yellow gaslight removing their stockings, washing their feet in buckets, while the brothers of the Trinity, dressed in red with white *jabots* and aprons — pilgrims, cardinals, princes, with varnished boots peeping out from under their servants' costumes, their carriages waiting outside in the square — go round with napkins, and wipe and kiss the line of waiting feet. 'This ruthless reminder of equality', they confess, 'raises in us a certain emotion. The Catholic religion is after all a great source of humanity. . . . Everything that is tender, that is sensitive, that is movingly beautiful in modernity, comes from Christ.'

The method of the *Journal* was a unique form of collaboration and of joint confession. 'This Journal is our nightly confession, the confession of two lives never parted in pleasure, in work, or in toil, the confession of two twin spirits, two minds engaged in receiving, from contact with men and things, impressions so like, so identic, so homogeneous, that this confession may be deemed the elaboration of a single ego, of a single I.'

It was further intensely realistic, a portrayal of men and women thrown by chance across their daily path, presenting them exactly as they had appeared on a given day and at a given hour. There is no set attempt at colour or relief, no dressing up or toning down. 'Our ambition has been to show meandering humanity in its *momentary reality*.'

Throughout they expose their own joint emotional and nervous weaknesses and unhealthily impressionable natures, and confess in their foreword that this may lead at times to injustice or antipathy, but that never consciously have they misrepresented their contemporaries. They have deliberately tried to bring them to life for posterity, 'to paint them in their living, animated resemblances', and have employed to this end 'the vivid stenography of conversation,

the physiological surprise that springs from gesture, the record of those swiftly passing moments of emotion in which a personality reveals itself, those *imponderabilia* which lend intensity to a human being, and, finally, a little of that feverishness which is characteristic of the heady life of Paris'. The word feverishness is not ill-chosen, for there is throughout the *Journal* a feeling of heightened temperature, an animation bright and vivid, but unnatural like the flush upon a sick man's cheek, and bordering slightly on hysteria; at the same time we must not misrepresent it, for the result is a work instinct with life and animated by unusual independence and vivacity.

The *Journal* was begun in December 1851, on the day when Louis Bonaparte made himself dictator of France. It was written down in the first place by Jules, the younger, at their joint dictation, and it ended with the death of Jules in January 1870. For those nearly twenty years the dual record continued. Thereafter, Edmond recounted the final months and death of his brother, and from time to time continued it alone.

It is true the Goncourts lacked humour and took themselves far too seriously. Flaubert nearly died of remorse, they record, because, too late, he discovered two successive genitives in *Madame Bovary*. Did they smile as they reported this? Probably so, and never realized how like themselves, for they too were painstaking and pedantic to the point of fussiness, buttoned up with their own affectation and importance. But they had their points, among them an acute love for the common people and the common scene; and though their feelings ran too easily to the morbid and the grotesque, the crude and the vulgar, they had always an unfailing sympathy with the sufferer and a quick eye for the kindly and humane. There is, for instance, the account of the wedding of the innkeeper's daughter, another of a consumptive actress whose heart 'would knock like a cuckoo in a village tavern clock', and a quaint story of a photographer's wife who started to colour portraits for a living and specialized in the photographs of dead children. One day she added *gouache* wings to one of them and the child's mother, seeing it already in heaven, paid her handsomely. Since then, says Goncourt, the photographer's wife gives them all wings.

'Humanity', they declare, 'is at bottom — and to its honour — one vast Don Quixote. It is true that it has its Sancho Panza, its Reason, its Common Sense; but it marches far ahead of that. The most exhausting efforts, the most enormous sacrifices of humanity have been made in honour of ideals.'

They dislike nature intensely. The countryside is a green mortuary, the earth itself a vast cemetery, the sun — the great putrefier. When they visit the country they feel like shop assistants on an excursion. They dislike the quiet fields and the placid river, preferring the hum of the cafés and the roar of the boulevards.

Their melancholia never left them. It was not the despairing, suicidal type, but good-humoured and ironical, ever given to headaches and boredom. It was partly temperamental, but their own deliberate introspectiveness and manner of life increased it. They gave in too easily and led sheltered and pampered lives. After visiting the hospital their nervous systems are shattered and they are exhausted through overtaxing their powers of observation. They cannot, that evening, shake off the weight of dark melancholy and, at table, the sound of a dropped fork sends a shudder through all their body.

The *Journal*, which opens amusingly — capriciously, some might say — with a picture of towering angels on the Day of Judgement standing, dozing like court attendants during the proceedings, their chins resting on their gloved hands, closes with Edmond's quiet account of his brother's death. 'After months, many months, I take up the pen fallen from my brother's fingers. . . . The dual partnership is broken. His career, ambition, mind are dead. He has passed through months of unspeakable despair. Only now is the deeper quality of that relationship apparent to the reader. It was finer than we had realized.' Despite his lacerated feelings he recalls and records for future readers the last memories of his brother.

For weeks he had watched him suffer, had noted the growing melancholy and despair, had been unable to tear him from the chair in which he sat day and night relentlessly driving his pen, repelling rest, in the obstinate travail of finishing his final book. Words spoken at the time, carelessly listened to, now go droning through his mind. He noted a return of the habits of childhood, lapses of memory, mental weaknesses. Slowly the haggard mask of imbecility creeps across the well-loved features. Sensibility, tenderness, and all the intimacies of long attachment are gradually undermined. 'That sweet friendship which was the great prize of our life, which was my very happiness, exists no longer. I feel that he no longer loves me, and this is the worst torture of all.' The chain of ideas is broken. He has taken a fierce dislike to logic. He shuts himself up in a stubborn silence. He turns into a different being. His eyes evade one's glance, as if one were spying upon his enfeeblement and humiliation. 'It is a long time since his face lost the power to smile, since he forgot how to laugh.'

Now he is haunted by this final memory. One night he had left him, exasperated by his unresponsiveness, had gone into the woods, had hacked at the shrubs and the plants in his impatience, had beaten the air in the darkness, then, seeing his brother's apparition among the trees, had turned back, finding him at home awaiting him with affectionate welcome, having got out of bed in his nightshirt. The memory too of an emotional moment in a café, a momentary clumsiness of his brother's, his own impatience, Jules's sudden outburst of tenderness and understanding, and the two of them going home through the shadowed boulevards, their eyes wet with tears.

But there was no escape, no recovery. 'It was the sadness of a soul experiencing its Passion, the sadness of the agony in the Mount of Olives.' Finally, fear and delirium gave way to unconsciousness, and 'he died like a baby falling asleep'.

Deprived of his *alter ego* he still wrote books, was the centre of a considerable literary circle, founded the Académie Goncourt, and encouraged young writers of the realist school. He was honoured in his old age by leading men of letters, regarded by some as the great initiator, and the *Prix Goncourt*, awarded annually for the best imaginative work in prose, remains as the monument of his friends to his memory. Edmond de Goncourt survived his brother twenty-six years, dying in 1896 at the age of seventy-four.

As to the brothers' work in general, so mixed and unequal, it is neither necessary nor worth while to assess its true value; but as diarists and anecdotalists of rare sensibility, acute and exact observation, and vivid and natural style,

they take a high place. They lacked the power to transcendentalize. Life for them held no illusions. But with incredible patience and unremitting care they reproduced the life they saw around them, and depicted, better than most, in highly sensitive and personal form, a living and animated world.

FREDERICK C. GILL

KIERKEGAARD AND SCHWEITZER

An Essay in Comparison and Contrast

IN reviewing Oscar Kraus's study of Albert Schweitzer, Dr. Ryder Smith remarked 'that it would be interesting to compare and contrast Schweitzer with Kierkegaard'.

Now the interest of such an essay lies in the surprises it affords. For, while both Schweitzer and Kierkegaard are to be deemed ardent Christians, they are also to be classed as Christian heretics (Kierkegaard being the usher of Barthianism and Schweitzer the herald of Modernist Christian Humanism), yet they are heretics who have very much in common despite the radical differences between their experience and their eccentric types of thought. This secret agreement, along with their anticipation of present-day trends in religious thinking, lends fascination to the comparative study of the personal histories behind their standpoints. Indeed, comparing Schweitzer and Kierkegaard, one is reminded of G. K. Chesterton's dictum about the understanding of history resting upon 'a certain tenderness for anachronism'.

Sören Aaby Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen on May 5, 1813, and he died on November 11, 1855. His father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, was a wealthy merchant whose religious discipline gave to the boy's life 'a dark background from the very earliest time'. Like the father of Sir Edmund Gosse, Kierkegaard's father did not leave his boy to develop naturally his personal religion, but forced the pace by exercising a magisterial authority which inhibited the boy's affection, and produced in him 'a prodigious melancholy' that made Christianity seem 'an inhuman cruelty'.

The mother, described by a relative of Kierkegaard as 'a nice little woman with an even and cheerful disposition', appears to have had little influence upon our subject, for he simply says 'I had no mother'.

The father's morbidity was due to his belief that he was forsaken of God, for once, when a little boy, and suffering much hardship, he revolted against his cruel lot and blasphemed. Yet he lived and prospered; but ever afterwards he could regard his prosperity as nought but a sign that God was indifferent to his spiritual state; and so he sought to atone by 'playing Providence' to Sören Aaby — impressing upon him the awesomeness of God and the fearfulness of moral responsibility.

Young Kierkegaard consequently became prematurely old, ill-adjusted to life, the victim of 'a lonely inward torment', whose chief joy lay in hiding the fact of his unhappiness so as to keep secret his 'crazy' and 'very unusual' upbringing. Among his toys he found a crucifix (placed there by his father), and this gave him 'the only impression he had of the Saviour', but it was an

impression which, even in childhood, dominated his thought and imagination, and evoked a desire 'to suffer in some way comparable to His sufferings in the world'. But this precocious evangelicalism did not retain its original intensity, for Kierkegaard, in struggling to adapt himself to others who were enjoying life, found that he could do so only at the cost of secretly defying his father's demand for 'obedience absolute'. Consequently he was 'tossed about in life, tempted by many and the most various things, also by errors and by the faith of perdition'. Yet the impression of the crucifix was only deepened: it was not obliterated; it remained with him, producing 'dialectical tensions which (without God) would drive any man with my imagination to madness'. This mental and moral strain led to his breaking of the engagement to marry Regina Olsen. He broke off the engagement from a feeling of unworthiness, and the result was that he experienced a sense of freedom which found expression in a religious awakening, although it was not until two years had elapsed that he felt himself to be 'reborn and entering the gates of Paradise'. Kierkegaard's tumultuous personal history resembles the spiritual progress described in George Herbert's poem 'The Flower':

Who would have thought my shrivel'd heart
 Could have recover'd greenness? It was gone
 Quite underground, as flow'rs depart
 To see their Mother-root, when they have blown;
 Where they together
 All the hard weather
 Dead to the world, keep house unknown,
 And now in age I bud again.
 After so many deaths I live and write,
 I once more smell the dew and rain,
 And relish versing. O my only light
 It cannot be
 That I am he
 On whom thy tempests fell at night.

But Schweitzer's story is happier reading. Our great contemporary passed 'a delightful childhood'; he says: 'I lived through a very happy childhood and youth, unclouded but for the frequent illnesses of my father.' Early in childhood his characteristic curiosity and compassion were in evidence. At the age of eight he read the New Testament 'eagerly', but he was perplexed about the Magis' Gifts, and about the identity of the Shepherds: 'What did the parents of Jesus do with the gold and other valuables which they got from these men?'; 'Why are the Shepherds not mentioned with the disciples of Jesus?' — this last query came out of 'a severe shock'. A year later he was passionately interested in politics and was also able to deputize for the organist at the church in Günsbach. Nor was his compassion less pronounced. He resented being better dressed than the other boys at the village school and he keenly felt for the sufferings of birds and animals. It was this last feeling which constituted his greatest religious difficulty: 'As far back as I can remember', Schweitzer has written, 'one thing that specially saddened me was that the unfortunate animals had to suffer so much pain and misery'. And he

confesses that even as a schoolboy the usual explanations seemed to him to be 'sophistries'.

Yet this awareness of the 'problem of suffering' did not — so far as we can see — imperil his Christian convictions. He pursued his studies as the years passed, and, in 1899, when a preacher at the Church of St. Nicolaus, Strasbourg, 'felt it as something wonderful that he was allowed to address a congregation every Sunday about the deepest things of life'.

Meanwhile he was secretly wrestling with two problems: one was the problem of a truly historical understanding of the life and faith of Jesus, and the other was his personal problem of the 'right to happiness'. The latter problem sprang to his mind out of an experience he had in 1896 — 'there came to me, as I awoke, the thought that I must not accept this happiness as a matter of course, but must give something in return for it'. What he did to solve his personal problem, the world knows.

Kierkegaard and Schweitzer clearly have much in common, even though there are deep differences between their interpretations of Christianity. Schweitzer's infant essays in New Testament criticism are paralleled by Kierkegaard's falling 'in love with thinking'. Both men had a shadowed childhood — one by the perverted Puritanism of a well-meaning father, the other by a precocious preoccupation with the 'problem of suffering'. Each of these men developed a keen interest in natural science, and they speak of this interest in almost identical terms: 'I have been enthusiastic about the natural sciences,' says Kierkegaard; 'the study of the natural sciences was to me a spiritual experience,' confesses Schweitzer. And — most important of all — both men had a vocation in response to which they alone found true self-fulfilment. But the contexts of their vocations differed. Kierkegaard's vocation resolved a psychological tension: 'What I especially need is to become clear about myself, what I ought to do; the thing is to understand my destiny, to understand what the Deity would have me to do. . . .'

Now Kierkegaard's vocation was coloured by his exceptional personal history. He himself admitted this to be the fact. Yet beneath the moral upheavals he endured was the realization that, for him, religion had to be 'all or nothing'. But Schweitzer faced the same alternative, although it forced itself upon him differently — if anything, more dramatically — than it did on Kierkegaard. But Schweitzer's acceptance of vocation was different in spirit from Kierkegaard's acceptance of vocation. Schweitzer's attitude was more 'world-affirming' even in renunciation; and there was a difference still more profound: Schweitzer's acceptance of vocation was an act of faith in which reason decided each step forward. In 1896 he resolved to devote nine more years to theology and art; at the end of that period he would seek to engage in direct service to humanity; circumstances were left to determine the precise form of that service. On reading the magazine of the Paris Missionary Society he resolved to become a *Medical* Missionary because such work would enable him to express 'the love preached by Jesus', to mitigate by personal service the pain and misery in the world, and to be a voluntary medical servant of the Paris society would avoid that embarrassment which his tutorial ministry might have occasioned. Thus, reason was at work all the time, and logic was

fired by the evangelical morality; and in this respect Schweitzer contrasts with Kierkegaard.

Another contrast is that between their criticisms of orthodoxy; whereas Schweitzer's criticism is patient and philosophic in spirit, the Danish thinker is violent and vituperative. To Kierkegaard, Christianity was 'a strange, stuffy atmosphere', an insult to the name of Christ, a 'frightful illusion', a 'humbugging of God'; Schweitzer, however, regards Christianity, in its historical expression, as an unconscious compromise with the spiritual and ethical implication of Jesus's teaching, which has resulted from that divorce between reason and religion that is implicit (Schweitzer thinks) in the orthodox formulations of the faith; historic Christianity is 'merely a beginning, full of weaknesses and mistakes, not a full-grown Christianity springing from the Spirit of Jesus'. Yet these different types of criticism have a principle in common — the principle of ethical relevance. Both Kierkegaard and Schweitzer sought to vindicate the relevance of Christianity to the intellectual and moral life of mankind. To Kierkegaard, orthodoxy was theoretically true but actually irrelevant. Hence, his purpose was not to reform dogmas so much as to revive them. Orthodoxy, to this Danish thinker, was like an enchanted castle wherein lay many sleeping beauties (the traditional Christian dogmas), and what was needed was the voice of faith to bring these sleeping beauties back to life. Faith was the acknowledgement of God's grace in His self-donation: 'When God lets Himself be born and becomes a man, this is not an idle notion of His. . . . No, it is the seriousness of existence.' And the serious acceptance of this grace is faith on man's part.

Now Schweitzer construes the ethical relevance of Christianity very differently. In his view, Christianity is relevant to thought. Christianity delivers thought from scepticism by challenging man to think elementally, for

a twofold world

Must go to a perfect cosmos, natural things

And spiritual — who separates these two

In art, in morals, or the social drift

Tears up the bond of nature.

This redemption of thought is secured by 'the love preached by Jesus'. That love is a condition of true thought; whenever it is disregarded, thinking loses itself in pessimism, because mere intellection cannot establish an inward spiritual relation to the world-order.

These contrasted interpretations of Christian faith state one of the living issues in contemporary religious thought, namely, the problem of the nature of faith.

Now Karl Barth, in his *Doctrine of the World of God*, castigates 'the anthropologizing of theology', and follows Kierkegaard in the contention that 'the inner man is the wholly other in us who is not in the world in any sense whatever'. On this basis faith is independent of reason: and this was one of Kierkegaard's primary submissions: 'Assuming', writes Kierkegaard, 'that all is well with respect to the Holy Scriptures; what then? Has, then, he who had no faith come a step nearer to faith? No, not a single one! Has he who had faith gained anything in respect to the vigour of his faith? No, nothing at all!' The appeal

to reason is 'an enemy'. True faith is self-authenticating and is aware of itself as seriousness, for the experience of faith brings man before God, and in that experience man realizes how qualitatively different God is from himself, and how qualitatively different God is as a God of grace who forgives man.

It is interesting to observe that faith for Schweitzer, likewise, is self-authenticating, and it is self-authenticating because it is rational. Further, the mode of experience in which God is known is sincerity — intellectual and practical — towards 'the love, preached by Jesus': for 'too much thinking leads to pessimism in regard to a world-view. To cut through the knot I have to *act*, to sacrifice myself *for* a cause, which is different from being sacrificed *to* a cause'. This conception of 'sincerity' has much in common with Kierkegaard's 'seriousness'.

Between these two conceptions of faith — Kierkegaard's 'faith *beyond* reason' and Schweitzer's 'faith *through* reason' — there are intriguing differences and resemblances, and the resemblances are the more important because they are 'beneath the threshold'. Yet the differences are not unimportant, since they define some crucial issues in modern religious discussion.

One of the differences between the Danish philosopher and the modern missionary is with respect to the place of reason in religion. Here Kierkegaard's standpoint is the less consistent; for it can only be vindicated by that appeal to reason which it condemns as treachery; and, further, it rests upon a false antithesis between 'faith as cognition' and 'faith as will'. Naturally, Kierkegaard wrote under the influence of a powerful experience of God's grace ('No man', he said, 'can hit upon the thought that God loves him'), but, even so, the acceptance of such a thought as a truth is, in part, an intellectual venture. Kierkegaard's personal history illustrates this, for he himself was ever moving to new conceptions of the truth about religion. More significantly, however, the Dane's view of faith does scant justice to the ideal of it expressed by the life and teaching of Jesus; and this because Kierkegaard adopted a pre-historical approach to the Gospels. Of course, every view of faith rests upon a Christology — in the last resort — but the Christian is obliged to see that his Christology is truly built upon the data. The synoptics show Jesus teaching men that faith is trust in and love toward the Father, and respect for Himself as Son of God — not in the metaphysical sense of the historic creeds, however. Here, then, with reference to reason in religion and with regard to the Gospels' ideal of faith, is a deep difference between our subjects.

But Schweitzer does not please everyone. Some consider that his philosophy of religion is deficient in evangelical force and not in accord with the full import of the fact of Christ for Christian theism: it is felt, in short, that Schweitzer leaves a great gulf between Jesus and the *Deus Absconditus*, as his abandonment of 'the problem of the interpretation of the universe' appears to prove. Now it is unjust to isolate this strand in Schweitzer's thought, for it is plain that our contemporary pauses in his thinking only where man must pause, namely, at the idea of God as an object of thought; further, he pauses as John Owen the Puritan paused, recognizing that we can *know* little of God because it is *God* we seek to know — confessing, like Loisy, that Man cannot lodge the transcendent in his mind. Even so, what many stigmatize as agnosticism in Schweitzer would be better called reverence; for Schweitzer himself declares

that with reference to these high themes 'rational thinking ends of necessity in the non-rational of mysticism'.

But the real point is here: that with regard to Jesus and the *Deus Absconditus*, Schweitzer stands where Kierkegaard stood. Thus: '... what is the unknown? To say that it is God means to us merely that it is the unknown. But to say that it is the unknown does not satisfy the passion of the understanding. ... The unknown is the different, the absolutely different. ... The understanding has brought God just as near as possible — and just as far.' From this it is clear that *fundamentally* Schweitzer and Kierkegaard are at one; only their paths towards certainty of God diverge: Schweitzer relies on the 'love preached by Jesus' as 'a beam from the Infinite', known in human experience for its full worth when that experience is conditioned by obedience to the call to discipleship; Kierkegaard finds assurance in the fact that man is separated from God by a 'qualitative abyss', man being a sinner — and God is separated from man by the abyss of grace disclosed in the forgiveness of sins.

Another similarity might be touched upon, namely the similarity between these men's interpretation of Christian ethics. To Kierkegaard, Christian ethics comprise 'a teleological suspension of the natural', that is to say, they require a real sacrifice of many relationships which are, humanly speaking, right and proper — 'natural'. His famous illustration of this thought is Abraham's willingness to offer Isaac as a sacrifice to God. Only in this context — willingness to sacrifice the natural and the right — is the demand of Christian idealism truly heard. Reason might deem the sacrifice absurd; common sense might be scandalized; but, even so, the human, everyday loyalties do not meet the challenge of the will of God ... there are moments when 'what things are gain' must be 'counted loss for Christ's sake'.

Now this is Schweitzer's plea also, and he, too, speaks from experience: 'I had the natural tendency to follow the argument of my friends that one should do that for which one is gifted, and that one can do best. But through the spirit of Jesus I became conscious that a man can be called to a place without knowing exactly just why he has been called to it. He would like to withdraw from this obedience — arguing that others would do better than he. Yet — this is the great mystery — the spirit of Jesus commands, and we have to obey.'

In concluding this brief essay in comparison and contrast it might not be unkind to refer to Mr. Ellis Roberts's remark about the religious outlook of Canon H. R. L. Sheppard. Mr. Roberts says: 'Dick was not a theist: he preached and prayed, and sometimes wrote, as if God is Jesus.' That verdict might be passed upon Schweitzer, in a sense: for it is clear that it is the 'love preached by Jesus' that saves Schweitzer from pantheism. But the reverse charge is to be levelled at Kierkegaard; he was more of a theist than a 'Jesus-Christian'. And unhappily his view was dominated by his personal history, by his father's attitude to him: 'he made me unhappy out of love'.

Of course, the root difficulty is that we have no exact words to permanently define the significance of Jesus. Even our subjects agree in regarding Him as the Incognito.

That is why it is permissible to suggest that there is something to be said for that theological liberalism they are both reported to have slain.

E. M. DODD

Notes and Discussions

'THE BOOK OF DELIGHT'

IN these days, when from one cause or another access to new books is hard to obtain, I find myself more and more often going back to old ones. Nor do I think that I have in this respect much to regret, for to the pleasure which books have always given me is added that of recollection and association. Suppose, for example, that I take down from my shelves a volume of Froude's *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, not only do I feel the delight I felt when I first read it thirty or forty years ago, but every now and then I light upon a passage which, by some train of thought, brings back to me the face of a friend with whom I discussed it, or the light of the summer day which was all about me in the garden at the time. Should it be *The Faerie Queene*, there rises up before me the picture of the shop where I bought this identical copy, and the road along which I walked for over two miles, lured by the charm of the story and the verse, regardless of everything around me. So too if I open *The Idylls of the King*, there returns the time when *Guinevere* was read aloud by our family at the seaside in the shade cast by a rock.

But few discoveries on my bookshelves have given me such unadulterated pleasure as the book bearing the title which heads this paper. It is dated 1912, and I do not think I had opened it since that year. I happened on it by the merest chance, while looking up a reference, and some unexplained impulse made me start reading it; after which I did not pause till I had reached the end. I had completely forgotten the name of the editor, Israel Abrahams, but as I went on the old stories came back to me with their full magic. I do not know whether Mr. Abrahams is still alive; if he is I should like to thank him for his truly 'delightful' gift.

Nor is this the only thing to thank him for. There are also a number of papers, originally spoken addresses, and still retaining that character, on such subjects as a visit to Hebron, medieval wayfaring, and Hebrew Love-songs, with an illuminating comparison between Theocritus and the Song of Songs; then finally some detached notes on George Eliot's study of Solomon Maimon in *Daniel Deronda*, on Milton's pronunciation of Hebrew as shown in his version of the Psalms, and on the Medieval Jews and their methods of correspondence among themselves. All these illustrate what the world owes, both in philosophy and in general culture, to the nation which Hitler, in his blind fanaticism, has done his utmost to destroy.

But to return to *The Book of Delight*. This is a poetical romance written about 1200 by Joseph Zabara, a Catalan Jew, almost certainly a physician. He was not incapable of satirizing his own profession. 'Here', says Mr. Abrahams, 'is a witticism that has been attributed to more recent humorists. A philosopher was sick unto death, and his doctor gave him up; yet the patient recovered. The convalescent was walking in the street when the doctor met him. "You come", said he, "from the other world." "Yes, I come from there, and I saw the awful retribution that falls on doctors, for they kill their patients. Yet you will not suffer. I told them you were no doctor."'

The book is in the main a collection of popular stories, one inside another, and adorned with epigrams, or 'hard questions' like those with which the Queen of Sheba came to prove King Solomon; and it is based on the old legends of Solomon and Marcolf. But Solomon has become Zabara himself, and his visitor is a gigantic demon named Enan. 'While I slept', says Zabara, 'I dreamed, and a gigantic but manly figure appeared before me, rousing me from my slumber. "Arise, thou sleeper, and look upon the wine while it is red; sit thee down and eat." It was dawn when I arose, and saw before me wine, bread, and viands, and I said: "What are these, my master?" "My wine, my bread, my viands; come, eat, for I love thee as one of my

mother's sons." I thanked him but protested: "I cannot eat or drink till I have prayed to the Orderer of all my ways; for Moses, the choice of the prophets, and the head of those called, hath ordained, Eat not with the blood; therefore no son of Israel will eat until he prays for his soul, for the blood is the soul."

Enan allows him to pray and eat, and then tells him he will guide him to another place, pleasant as a garden, peopled by loving men, wise above all others. 'Nay, my lord,' says Joseph (Zabara), 'I cannot go; I fear thee for thy long limbs, and in thy face I see the marks of unworthiness. I fear, if I go with thee, that may befall me which befell the leopard and the fox.' Then comes the tale, how the leopard determined to go a journey with the fox. The leopard's wife urged him not to go, for the fox equally with the serpent was the subtlest of all the beasts of the field, enforcing her advice by telling the story of the fox and the lion, in which, as might be expected, the lion got the worst of it. The leopard then told the fox what his wife had said, whereupon the fox told the leopard the story of the dreadful fate that befell the silversmith who hearkened to the voice of his wife, following it up with 'The Woodcutter and the Woman', 'Man's Love and Woman's', and so on. Thus the book makes its way, till the travellers approach their destination. Spending a night at the house of one of Enan's friends, Rabbi Judah, they hear from him a number of proverbs and sayings 'from the books of the Arabs'. I give a few of them.

A man said to a sage, Thou braggest of thy wisdom, but it came from me. Yes, replied the sage, and it forgot its way back.

Who is the worst of men? He who is good in his own esteem.

A king said to a sage, A king's reign would be sweet if it lasted for ever. What if thy predecessor's reign had been eternal?

Diogenes and Dives were attacked by robbers. Woe is me, said Dives; if they recognize me. And woe is me, said Diogenes, if they don't recognize me.

Which is the best of the beasts? Woman.

Rather a wise enemy than a foolish friend.

All things grow with time except grief.

What is the best way of hiding? Speaking.

What prayer dost thou pray at night? they asked a wise man. Fear God by day, and you will sleep at night.

Death is the dread of the rich and the hope of the poor.

Reason rules the body, wisdom is its pilot, the law its light.

These are examples of the 'gnomic' sayings of which Orientals are so fond: we see them in the Book of Proverbs; we find approximations to them in the early verses of Amos; and their highest flights are found in the 'Logia' of Christ Himself. The *Maximes* of La Rochefoucauld, and the similar dicta of others, though they probably would not have been written apart from Eastern influences, are different in tone.

The journey proceeds, and Joseph apparently wearies of the stories, but Enan does not spare him; he tries another tack, and proves him with a series of 'hard questions': why babies have no teeth, and when they do come do not retain them; why a man lowers his head to think fresh things out, but raises it to recover what he has forgotten; what is laughter; why snow is white. To all these Joseph gives answers, and then says: 'My lord, now let me question thee.' 'I am sleepy, but ask on, for of all knowledge I know the half.' Then Joseph asks a score of questions, astronomical, logical, musical, mathematical; and Enan to all replies: 'I do not know.' 'How then couldst thou boast thou knowest half of everything, when it is clear thou knowest nothing?' 'Because', said he, 'Aristotle says that he who confesses that he does not know has already attained the half of knowledge.'

At length they actually arrive at Enan's city, where are wizards and sorcerers,

sinner and fool, all giants, and Enan confesses himself to be 'Enan the Satan, son of Arnan the Demon, son of the Place of Death, son of Death's Shadow, son of Terror, of Mocking, of Deceit, of Injury, of Asmodeus'. But he now undergoes that conversion which Origen anticipated and of which Tillotson did not despair. He is, says Mr. Abrahams, metamorphosed into something like a domestic saint. Zabara gives us an inverted Faust: and, as an explanation of the way in which this happened, Enan tells the last of his stories, that of the 'Washerwoman who did the Devil's work'. Moved by the terrible results of this woman's activities, Enan is afraid to marry, but Joseph provides him with a bride both beautiful and good. Enan weds her, and loves her, and, we may imagine, never returns to his Satanism. Some time later, Zabara goes back to his native Barcelona.

How much allegory there is in this curious narrative is hard to say. But it seems clear that Zabara's wanderings in strange lands, the perception that their ways please him not, and the return to his old home, symbolize a kind of *Pilgrim's Progress*, the end of which is the discovery that the religion of his youth is the right one. For when he returns, it is to seek again the guidance of his old teacher, Rabbi Sheshet Beneviste, of whom 'Wisdom says, thou art my teacher, and faith, thou art my friend, in whom one discerns simplicity and humility, uprightness and saintliness'.

E. E. KELLETT

OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEOPLES OF DEPENDENT TERRITORIES¹

HERE are two books of quite different quality on the same subject, namely, the responsibility of imperial peoples like those of France, Britain, Holland, Portugal, and Belgium for the social well-being, and ultimately the freedom and independence of peoples under their rule in dependent territories. The one is a painstaking administrative review by the International Labour Office (undeterred by European war) of labour and social conditions from 1919-39 in territories that stretch from the West Indies across Africa by way of the Netherlands East Indies to the South Pacific. The well-being of at least 250,000,000 of the human race is thus brought under scrutiny. The other is written, from a missionary point of view, with a prophetic fire that sometimes blazes into indignation. Not so factual nor so balanced in his judgements, Mr. Young's words burn more.² With his eyes mainly set on British responsibilities in Africa, on the sin of race discrimination and the colour bar, he wants to know why, when an international train sets off from Cape Town on the Cape to Cairo railway, its train crew is composed entirely of white men, but when it reaches Belgian territory they are replaced by Africans. Taking a side-glance at India he finds that a phrase, *Sahib-log*, which once expressed the spirit of British domination in that country, means the same as the universally detested German word *Herrenvolk*, 'the lordly people'. Mr. Young's real concern is whether the British people are sufficiently sensitive to the responsibility involved in the principle of trusteeship for primitive peoples which they have avowed as their ideal in the government of dependent territories. He recalls with admiration the historic reply of Lord Stanley in 1843, when certain financial and industrial interests were urging the British Government to cancel a guarantee given by the British Crown to the Maori people and accepted by them in good faith: 'Lord Stanley entertains a different view of the respect due to an obligation contracted by the Crown of England, and his final answer to the demands of the Company must be that he will not admit that any

¹ *Social Policy in Dependent Territories* (International Labour Office, Montreal, 4s.)

² *Herrenvolk and Sahib-Log*, by T. Cullen Young (Lutterworth Press, 1s. 6d.)

person or Government can . . . despoil others of their lawful and equitable rights.' The Company in question had pleaded that the Maori, with whom the British Government had contracted a solemn treaty, were 'naked savages'. The result of Lord Stanley's resolution to keep good faith with the Maori is that they are now 'happily absorbed in the life of New Zealand and barred in no way from its opportunities and its responsibilities'. 'It lies within our power', says Mr. Young, 'to have as good success in other lands to-day as has followed that declaration in New Zealand so long ago; provided that we, as a people, have an equal courage and an equal loyalty to our national principle of free and equal rights and treatment.'

Though Mr. Young's book stirs us with its prophetic glow we learn more from the first, and, indeed, if it is read diligently between the lines, there is more to kindle the imagination and quicken responsibility. After all, to have the life and well-being of 250,000,000 people brought under review in a book of 180 pages should awaken sympathy and reflection. Nor, though they live in distant places from the West Indies to the South Pacific, are they remote from present happenings or our responsibility. West Indians and West Africans are fighting with us in Europe and the Far East, the campaign that led us to Italy began in East Africa, and Burma, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Indo-China and New Guinea, all lands whose conditions come under review in this book, are now entirely under Japanese control or only partially liberated.

What, then, are the issues which confront us in these calm and balanced pages, and which provoke reflection? First, there is the basic problem of change in the social structure of primitive life as more and more it is brought within the ambit of world economic forces. Virgin lands like Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, or older developed regions like the West Indies, are world sources of supply for raw materials — rubber, tin, coffee, sugar. Industrialism spreads northwards through Africa from the Rand to the Copper Belt of Northern Rhodesia, and through Belgian Congo a thousand miles or more up the Congo valley. Slowly the old subsistence basis of tribal economics is changed for wage-paid industry, and for primitive barter is substituted monetary exchange. The sturdy African male slips away, periodically at first, later for good and for all, from his hut and family in the kraal to the mine compound, to be hewer of wood and drawer of water — and worse — for the white man's trade. Or, in West Africa and in Malaya and the East Indies, it is a question of the change from peasant labour tilling its own patch to the rubber, the cocoa, and the coffee plantation; and again the structure of primitive society is slowly undermined by world economic forces.

Second, just because life in these regions has been sucked into the vortex of world economics, it has become subject to the blast of economic blizzards beyond their immediate power to control. The years under review in these pages are the inter-war years, 1919-39, with their post-war boom, world depression, and world economy geared to war preparations. Doubtless primitive tribal economics were also subject to the devastations of nature — hurricane, pestilence, murrain on cattle, and the like. But now the blast came mysteriously out of the ups and downs of European markets. Take, first, the fact that during these years sugar was nearly always bought and sold on a falling market — 'there was no stability of prices in sugar, and no irreducible price minimum' — and consider the effect on the West Indies. Or take rubber prices in the same period: 6½d. per lb. in 1922, 4s. 8d. in 1925, 1s. 1½d. in 1929 and under 2d. in 1932. So depression came to the rubber plantations in Malaya, and unemployment and poverty followed in its train. Tin and copper mines suffered in the same way.

Yet with all this, there is an encouraging strain in this book, a tale of patient and sustained administrative action, painstakingly seeking to master facts and interpret

them correctly, wrestling with the innate tendency of the economically strong to exploit the economically weak, imposing conditions for the regulation of industry, seeking to promote health and overcome poverty. For here is one moral of this book. As primitive life is absorbed by world economic forces, the same evils that followed the Industrial Revolution in Britain and other Western lands overtake the tribesman. He is urbanized — consider Johannesburg or Bombay — overcrowded, badly housed, insufficiently paid, underfed, and quickly liable to disease. It is one of the merits of the I.L.O. that it provides a forum of debate where these issues can be thrashed out by representatives of governments, employers, and workers — there is an admirable example of such discussion in one of the appendixes: and slowly judgement is evoked, conscience is stirred, and administrative action follows in this place and that. Illustrations can be found in minimum food standards for mine workers, health provision for plantation workers, regulations guarding contracts of labour from exploitation and abuse. Doubtless progress is painfully slow, action lags far behind aim, and much human iniquity has to be overcome — as Mr. Young is there to remind us. Most pernicious of all, distinctions of race and colour still persist, and the coloured man is too often denied an equal chance with the white. Nevertheless, the trend of administration, with some notorious exceptions, is right.

The obligation remains. We carry responsibility for those 250,000,000 and dare not neglect it. The discussion named above took place at Philadelphia in April 1944 on Recommendations concerning Minimum Standards of Social Policy in Dependent Territories. The Recommendations consist of a Charter for Native Labour embodying 46 Articles dealing with all sides of the problem. When representatives of the United Nations meet at San Francisco in April 1945, they will *have* to take stock of these Recommendations, for on the raising of the standard of life of these 250,000,000, and on their steady admission to freedom and independence, their own welfare depends.

E. C. URWIN

THE COURSE OF EVOLUTION

In a book entitled *Age and Area*, published in 1922, Dr. J. C. Willis advanced the theory, neither abstruse nor apparently controversial, that within similar groups of living creatures, the genus or species that covered the wider area was the oldest, the greater area being due to the fact that the creatures had had more time in which to spread. This implies that, in most cases, the forms occupying small areas are the youngest. This theory has met with very little success, probably because it is found to traverse the invariable assumption of Darwinism that the forms occupying small areas, or the genera with few species, or only one, are dying relics.

Dr. Willis has recently returned to the attack, and in his work *The Course of Evolution*¹ he presents a great deal more evidence in favour of the 'Age and Area' theory, and in general discusses its bearing on the Darwinian theory of evolution.

Darwin started with the assumption that all animals, for example, were originally of one type, or at least a very few. Each individual varying a very little from every other, by means of Natural Selection less favoured forms were killed out, and the survivors gradually drifted apart into what are now separate species, genera and orders. Here the individual is first, and the order or family the end-product. The struggle for existence is between individuals. It was very soon pointed out that unless many individuals were simultaneously affected by the same variation, it would be swamped at once by crossing. Darwin allowed this, so that the variation and competition now took place between groups — a far more difficult theory, involving many new factors, and really at variance with the former.

¹ *The Course of Evolution*, by J. C. Willis, Sc.D., F.R.S. (Cambridge University Press).

However, *somehow*, new species arise. With Darwin, the process is from the individual to the variety, and so to the species and the genus, the great orders arising as the upshot of the process as a whole. Willis says that this is to invert the true order of evolution, which is from the greater to the less; so Darwin has got evolution upside down.

Another assumption of Darwinism is that the new species or forms will kill out the parent forms. But if the process is put into the right order, there is no reason why the older species should not go on flourishing side by side with the new.

Natural Selection is the agency by means of which new forms are brought into being. Here Willis, with many other biologists, insists that Natural Selection is a purely lethal process of sifting or elimination. So, he says, it will act at *right angles* to the stream of the positive evolutionary process, destroying forms unsuited to their environment. The positive force or forces producing the ever new and varied series of more and more advanced forms, is not understood at all. We call these new forms 'mutations', and how new mutations arise is as yet a quite unsolved problem.

Willis has a great deal to say about 'endemics', those local species which occupy very small areas, and are in number incomparably greater than the number of possible parent species. For him, these are new and recent species and genera. In the Darwinian view, they are just dying remnants. If so, it is difficult, one may say impossible, to account for their very large numbers, and for the fact that there are almost no transitional forms between them. Take for example the six hundred endemic species of heath which are found in South Africa. If these are just a mob of dwindling species which have been driven down to the Cape Province, where they are putting up a final struggle for existence, it is amazing that there is nothing like them to be found further North, nor do they show any signs of such evanescence. They are the very glory of the whole order. It rather appears that the presiding genius of the order has found South Africa a specially good field of effort, and has produced in bewildering beauty and variety a whole host of new forms.

Some of Willis's general conclusions may be repeated and summarized.

Evolution has resulted in beings of increasing complexity. It has proceeded, not by the selection of chance variations, but according to some definite (as yet unknown) plan. Evolution and Natural Selection work to a great extent independently. Evolution goes on by way of mutation; but this does not mean that ancestors necessarily die out.

Evolution proceeds from the family to the species and variety, and not the reverse way, as is required by Natural Selection. Thus Natural Selection is, taken alone, reversing the true course of evolution. Most mutations have no functional or adaptive significance whatever. Chromosome alterations may be largely responsible for their occurrence.

Natural Selection works upon individuals rather than upon groups. Mutations may easily result in a new species at once crossing the 'sterility line', which Natural Selection is quite unable to account for. Also the mutation theory explains why so few transitional forms are found, either in recent or fossil plants, which is quite contrary to the way in which Natural Selection, taken alone, would work. It also explains the facts connected with the enormous numbers of small genera and small areas of endemic species.

Such facts at least require a far more careful examination by biologists than they have hitherto received. The Darwinian theory is far too simple, and ignores the great complexity of the problem or problems of evolution. Thus it may not be amiss to quote a few statements by contemporary biologists who cannot possibly be supposed to be committed to any unorthodox theory. Most of them are taken from Singer's *Short History of Biology*.

'As to the mechanism and the directive forces of Evolution we are still in utter doubt.'

'The phenomena of mimicry (regularly expounded in expositions of Darwinism) are little susceptible of explanation by known laws. The literature of the subject is peculiarly naive and unscientific.'

The transmission of characters by way of the germ-plasm is 'a picture of mystery and wonder . . . not very far from the mysteries associated with religion'.

'How species have come to be is a matter on which we must, for the present, say *ignoramus*.'

'We do not know how parasites came to be.'

'The mode of origin of migration as well as the method by which these birds find their way over vast distances remain a mystery.'

How a nervous impulse causes sensation, and, eventually, action, we do not know. 'There are reasons to believe that . . . here is a veil which can never be rent by mortal man.'

'The last of the biological theories leaves us where the first started, in the presence of a power called *life* and *psyche*, which is not only of its own kind but unique in each and all of its exhibitions.' Radl, *History of Biological Theories*: 'We know very little of the nature of the struggle for existence.' 'The tyranny of Darwinism is ended, but it is a great intellectual system all the same.' Woltereck: 'The doctrine that the orderly growth of one species into another can be explained by "chance" variations has produced some of the most curious aberrations in the history of psychology.' Watson: 'I do not know a single case in which it has been shown that the difference which separates two races of a mammalian species from one another has the slightest adaptive significance.' Vialleton: 'It is infinitely probable that life did not begin in only one composite living form, but in several different forms, complementary, combining to assure the life of the whole, just as each living creature is so constituted as to maintain and propagate its own life.'

'The great families have arisen independently or by a mutation of such extent and such perfect suitability to its new use that it corresponds to a new creation.'

'All this development, instead of being the result of blind force and chance, testifies on the contrary to an intelligence using existing materials in the most rational way, in order to build up the animate world according to a small number of elementary patterns.'

These things being so, it is to be desired that a survey of the course of evolution, highly competent and supported by a great array of facts, should be welcomed, and should receive the attention and the criticism that are due to it.

T. STEPHENSON

THE GREAT DEAN AND THE YOUNG PREACHER

IN the two hundred years that have now passed since Jonathan Swift, Dean of St. Patrick's, Dublin, died in the gloom of madness, a great deal has been written in the attempt to explain the mystery of his life and character; so many questions have been asked and so many theories put forward by friend and enemy. One thing at any rate is fairly clear: he is accepted as a supreme master of English prose, perhaps the greatest we have ever known. I suggest that anyone who aims at some kind of working-mastery of that most difficult and fascinating instrument would profit greatly from a careful study of Swift's principal writings. In particular, the young preacher, who must somehow learn to value simplicity and precision in the use of words, will admire the wonderful effect of greatness and simplicity.

In the *Letter to a Young Gentleman lately enter'd into Holy Orders* Swift offers

some very sensible and stimulating advice. Moreover it is fairly free from that subtle and disturbing irony which is such a marked feature of his main work. Here we get his famous definition of *style*, or, as he calls it, the true definition of a style: '*Proper words in proper places.*' He urges the study of the *English* language, 'the neglect whereof is one of the most general defects among the scholars of this kingdom'.

After warning the novice against pedantry and vulgarity, he mentions two special faults: 'The first is the frequency of flat, unnecessary epithets, and the other is the folly of using old threadbare phrases . . . nauseous to rational hearers. . . . When a man's thoughts are clear, the properest words will generally offer themselves first, and his own judgement will direct him in what order to place them so as they may be best understood. Where men err against this method, it is usually on purpose, and to show their learning, their oratory, their politeness or their knowledge of the world. In short, that simplicity without which no human performance can arrive to any great perfection is nowhere more eminently useful than in this.'

Swift's advice on certain kindred matters is also very helpful. As you might expect, he urges the claim of 'a plain convincing *reason*' as being far more edifying than 'the art of wetting the handkerchiefs of a whole congregation — if you were sure to attain it!'

Then on the vexed question of a manuscript in the pulpit: 'I cannot but think, that whatever is *read*, differs as much from what is repeated without book, as a copy does from an original.' He adds a word about preachers who have 'a trick of popping up and down every moment from their paper to the audience, like an idle schoolboy on a repetition day'.

Again: 'I cannot forbear warning you in the most earnest manner against endeavouring at *wit* in your sermons, because by the strictest computation, it is very near a million to one that you have none; and because too many of your calling have consequently made themselves everlastingly ridiculous by attempting it.'

Another word of warning is this: 'Before you enter into the common unsufferable cant of taking all occasions to disparage the heathen philosophers, I hope you will differ from some of your brethren, by first enquiring what those philosophers can say for themselves.'

As to our attempts to explain the mysteries of the Christian religion, he says: 'If you explain them, they are mysteries no longer; if you fail, you have laboured to no purpose.' A note concerning opponents reads thus: 'If religion will be against a man, a man will be against religion.'

From *Thoughts on Various Subjects* I select these two extracts, showing his robust sense as well as satire: 'The common Fluency of Speech in many men, and most women, is owing to a scarcity of matter, and scarcity of words; for whoever is a master of language, and hath a mind full of ideas, will be apt in speaking to hesitate upon the choice of both; whereas common speakers have only one set of ideas, and one set of words to cloath them in; and these are always ready at the mouth; so people come faster out of a Church when it is almost empty than when a crowd is at the door'; and this most helpful and timely remark: 'Since the union of divinity and humanity is the great article of our religion, it is odd to see some clergymen in their writings of divinity wholly devoid of humanity.'

Finally, I suggest the following passage, chosen at random, as an ordinary specimen of Swift's admirable style. It happens to be the last few lines of the *Drapier's First Letter*:

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people by putting them into a bull of brass with fire under it; but the prince put the projector first into his own brazen bull to make the experiment. This very much resembles the project of Mr. Wood, and the like of this may possibly be Mr. Wood's fate that the brass he contrived to torment this kingdom with, may prove his own torment; and his destruction at last.'

In the above extract, we note that he not only avoids 'flat, unnecessary epithets', but rarely uses an adjective. One is reminded of the old saying that the adjective is often the enemy of the noun! Dean Swift and John Wesley seem to have had little in common, but their prose style is very similar; plain and yet vivid, direct, finely pointed. 'That great man', as Wesley called him, is unique, not only for the greatness and simplicity of his style, but mainly for the wonderful way he makes his singular personality felt even in the most trivial piece of writing.

It is an interesting coincidence that two hundred years before Dean Swift there was another great Dean, who in his day helped greatly to preserve 'the well of English undefiled'. Dean Colet, of St. Paul's, the great Humanist, in addition to being a pioneer of Greek Testament study, devoted many years to a direct first-hand study of the ordinary racy speech of common labouring men. The result was that he developed such a gift of simple direct forceful preaching that he partly changed and directed the whole current of our national life and literature.

CHARLES GIMBLETT

RELIGIOUS DRAMA AND RECONSTRUCTION

THE present ideological conflict which threatens to crack the foundations and dislodge the pillars of the edifice of civilization in the west is not raging without its blessings. It has shaken the sluggish and complacent mind of man into an activity characterized by an urgent and burning concern for the world of the future. To put it briefly, it has given rise to a spirit of Utopianism.

Perhaps the most popular 'left-wing' protagonist of this new and praiseworthy spirit of the age in this country is Mr. J. B. Priestley, who combines with a capacity for serious thought that rugged practicality associated with the men and women of the West Riding of Yorkshire. We have read with sympathy of his social experiments with evacuated mothers and children, for here is a man who goes farther than mere talking and discussion. We have listened, emotionally stirred or mentally provoked, to his inimitable postscripts over the ether; and even if we have disagreed with him we have, at least, moved by our inherent British honesty, admired him for having the courage of his convictions.

Mr. Priestley is a utopian with a difference: he is not satisfied to rear the domes and pinnacles of his New Jerusalem merely in a misty realm of thought. The new order which he deems desirable he attempts to externalize and build upon the rubble of our blitzed towns and cities, and, with the help of all that is best in human culture, to effect a change in the desires and valuation of his compatriots.

A modern Erewhon

Some time ago we 'listened in' to a chapter of Mr. Priestley's *Utopia*. It was the fifth broadcast in the series, 'Listen to my note-book', and, as we might have expected, very good entertainment. Like the great satirists, Mr. Priestley has the

gift of sugaring the social or philosophic pill. Moreover, his experience of the stage is a mighty weapon in his propaganda. He wields it with consummate skill and mastery.

The theme of the broadcast was the transformation of an industrial town, presumably in the north, with all its squalor and urban utilitarian ugliness into a 'garden city', possessing every social amenity imaginable; boulevards, cafés, brilliantly lighted streets, dance halls, and a most up-to-date theatre to serve as the cultural nerve-centre of the community's newly-discovered life. But our Prospero did not show *how* the miracle was worked, and therefore we feel justified in putting this chapter from his note-book under the general heading of EREWHON. It belongs to the utopian NOWHERES of which there are so many being sketched to-day. But we are not concerned about this. We wish rather to ask whether such a transformation, even if it were possible, would be desirable.

Is not Mr. Priestley pandering to the desires of a large and unfortunately growing section of modern youth who before the war sought a life of thrills and amusement? If every industrial town were to be changed into a miniature Paris, would that ensure a desirable social life, and accrue in individual and communal well-being? Will better dance halls, public-houses, and cafés bring the new age of our hopes and prayers nearer realization? Let history be our commentator on the insecurity of these foundations on which this popular propagandist would build his city. Let the 'hollow men' of Greece and Rome testify against him.

The failure of Humanism

But these social amenities do not in themselves satisfy the desires of a 'comrade' in Mr. Priestley's new community. The heart and soul of his millennial 'polis' is the theatre. In his utopian reverie he takes us into one of the theatres of the new age. (And let us say here that if Mr. Priestley were allowed to organize the entertainment of the New Britain after the war, the theatre and the music hall would suffer a much-needed purge. Perhaps our social reformers will make a note of this suggestion for future reference!) As we enter this magnificent building we hear the emotionally-charged soliloquy of Shakespeare's Cleopatra couched in some of the finest poetry in the world. The auditorium is filled to capacity. There is a breathless stillness betokening a newly-discovered awareness of the value of the highest attainments in human culture. The masses are no longer drugged by the cacophony of the crooner or the metallic ejaculations of the American film star. There has been a cultural revolution. William Shakespeare has come back to his own again as the entertainer of the people.

It is not surprising that Mr. Priestley, the dramatist, should desire the reinstatement of the theatre in his New Jerusalem. But, again, how is this cultural miracle to be brought about? And, what is more important still, is one justified, from history, in holding the faith that such a change, even if it were possible, would serve as the source and inspiration of a new order of life?

It would appear that Mr. Priestley takes the way of all flesh, particularly of the ultra-intellectual variety, in imagining that a revolution in cultural values will serve as a substitute for religious revival. He is one of the great humanists of our generation whose mind has been whipped by the gales of the Spirit into an active concern for the future of his fellows, and his social enthusiasm, if we are not mistaken, owes much, in its origin, to the nonconformist pulpit of the West Riding. In his present frame of mind and heart, however, he is trying to effect a social miracle without the power of the Christian Faith. He has unconsciously divorced a humanitarian ethic from the Christian faith, and naturally the ethic will not work. That is Mr. Priestley's impasse, and in so far as he is the articulate voice of the masses of the

industrialized north, he expresses also the dilemma of the people. He and they want some order of life approximating to the Kingdom of Heaven, but they will not accept the King.

The place of the theatre in religious re-orientation

Very near in time to J. B. Priestley's broadcast we heard over the air a little play, *Isaiah*, from the pen of L. Du Garde Peach. We take off our hats to this writer who apparently is working without respite to popularize in dramatic form the best in our national heritage. His interpretation of the life and work of the Old Testament prophet convinced us of the relevance of a notion which has been at the back of our minds for many years, namely, the dramatic potentialities of the Bible. In our college days we were blessed with a Biblical professor with a keen dramatic appreciation and histrionic gift who encouraged us to dramatize the Scriptures in the original tongues. We recall with what spiritual profit we 'acted' the story of our Lord's Passion, some of the historical events behind the Pauline Epistles, and the Problem Play of the Book of Job. To many of us the Bible became living literature for the first time. The great personalities walked out of its pages, addressing us personally in the concrete situations of our own day.

We were doing no new thing, and receiving no new experience. The dramatic value of the Bible was not a discovery, but a re-discovery. The fountain-head of British drama was the Scriptures. The Roman Catholic Church, despite its evils, has ever possessed a rare capacity for reaching the masses and holding them by the spiritualizing of their dominant interests, and finding in the medieval age that its services in Latin had little or no educative value for the common people, hit upon the plan of dramatizing the pivotal events in the life and ministry of Jesus. The concrete symbolism of the Biblical play became part, and an important part, of the home mission work of the Roman Church.

A Biblical theatre the need of the age

We hardly think that our Christian educationists to-day, despite their awakened concern for the spiritual future of the nation, have appreciated at all fully what a rich legacy of dramatic material is to be found stored up for their use and exploration in the Biblical literature. Much of that literature as it stands is drama at its best. In example we cite the whole of the Book of Job, the little missionary play of Jonah, much of the Prophets, parts of the Historical Books, and practically the whole of that enigmatic writing, the Revelation of John. Again, the language of the Bible in its picturesque concreteness is the language of drama. Incidentally it is the language of Shakespeare.

Mr. L. Du Garde Peach is aware of all this, and his little play, *Isaiah*, and those excellent Biblical plays on Job and Jonah, recently sponsored by the B.B.C., are paving the way for a needed renaissance of the religious theatre. We suggest that if Mr. Priestley must have a theatre at the centre of the new post-war community, let it be a theatre in which his own dramatic genius is hitched to the Biblical theme of individual and world salvation through the gracious initiative of God in Jesus Christ.

The Greek drama originated as a religious observance. It was associated with the feast of Dionysus, and in the centre of the stage stood the altar of the god. That is a parable of the kind of drama (or of any art) which would prove creative of spiritual power in the new age. With due respect to Mr. Priestley, no theatre is worthy of a central place in a community, acting as the norm of its life, that is not both a pulpit and an altar. A theatre fulfilling this double purpose would have the power, not only of educating our youth in religious and cultural matters, but of making

God's voice heard above the Babel of conflicting voices, calling men to repentance and committal of life to Him.

We are not going to build a new world by a mere modification of social conditions, nor by the democratization of cultural opportunities. 'You cannot make silken purses out of sows' ears.'

We are all blind until we see
That, in the human plan,
Nothing is worth the making
That does not make the MAN!
Why build these cities glorious
If man unbridled goes?
In vain we build the world
Unless the builder grows.

Have we appreciated the power for spiritual renewal in the Biblical drama?

HARRY ESCOTT

Editorial Comments

GOOD COMPANIONSHIP

Much has been written recently about the psychological effects of war on the soldier and the civilian. Unfortunately it is not sufficiently recognized that there is a sharp distinction between the mental attitudes of those in 'forward areas' and those who are removed from active operational zones. A few weeks ago, in conversation with men of a division which had just been withdrawn from the line for rest, a young officer made this perfectly clear. He reproved his neighbour for a small and, perhaps thoughtless, act of selfishness. 'You wouldn't have done that ten days ago,' he said. Ten days before they had both been in action. Everyone smiled at the paternal rebuke, but it was at once agreed that the farther one got from the front line the easier it was to be selfish.

There has been a similar geographical and psychological distinction at home. England has had its 'forward and back areas'. The difference in the direct incidence of war on the individual has been accidental and inevitable. Whilst it would be unfair to pass judgement on the more fortunate sections of society, it is necessary, at this stage, to remind ourselves that men and women who suffer in a worthy and common cause tend to grow together. The fellowship of suffering is no sentimental fiction, and the degree of hardship and peril seems to be reflected in the quality of good comradeship. In the post-war days we are approaching the distinction will not be so obvious. It will be easy, on the one hand, for the people of the forward areas to grow bitter as they make contact with their more fortunate fellows and, on the other hand, it will be possible for the latter to become impatient with the returning soldier or the much-bombed civilian.

If we are to maintain what was best in the comradeship of the front line we must remember the strain to which 'the other fellow' has been subjected and realize the urgency of the common cause to which we are now committed. Only by so doing can we begin to achieve equalization of sacrifice in the making of the peace.

No one would suggest that Iraq was a comfortable or easy zone in which to serve, yet it is one's personal experience that the men of Paiforce are relatively contented. Conditions are not good and the distance from home is great, yet the majority

accept the situation philosophically. The reason is partly that they know what they are doing. Guarding a thousand miles of pipe-line is of vital importance to the progress of the Allied tanks beyond the Rhine. Without a guaranteed oil supply the more spectacular work of the Armies of Liberation would be impossible.

To-morrow, when we set about rebuilding the world, we shall need the comradeship which comes not merely from racial similarity, but from sharing equally in the effort for 'a common cause'. There must be no 'forward and back areas' in the hour of reconstruction, nor must there be groups of forgotten men working at what seem to be isolated tasks. The equalization of sacrifice must be obtained by every man making his maximum effort on work which he sees is related to the whole enterprise. If this could be, then the comradeship of every street would be like the comradeship of the trenches. If it fails, then the new house of humanity will have its foundations on shifty sand. That is a lesson soldier and civilian must learn in this critical hour.

JEWS AND PALESTINE

Two factors which are of great importance in the establishment of peace are concerned with the status of the Jew in Europe and Palestine, and of the Mohammedan in India. Many people are inclined to form their opinions on localized evidence. How often, for example, one has heard the soldier in Palestine saying 'I don't like the Jews'. The judgement is passed, usually in a casual way without any real bitterness. It expresses a sentiment that should be described as pro-Arab rather than anti-Semitic. At the moment it represents the general opinion of men who have observed the behaviour of certain sections of Palestinian Jews. Such loose generalizations and sectional criticisms are always dangerous and misleading. The verdict has no true relationship to Jewry as a whole. No section of humanity has suffered more than have the Jews during these years of total war, and the tragic story of their agony has not yet been completely told. The situation in Palestine is complicated, and it is natural that the casual observer may be tempted to pass a general verdict on local circumstantial evidence. It must, however, be realized that no peace plans can leave out of account the unspeakable suffering of the Jewish people, and their right to consideration in the post-war world. How far their future should be located in Palestine is another question. The Arab also has his claims. At the moment only about seventeen per cent of the Jewish population in Palestine is engaged on agricultural work. There are those who believe that when Europe is liberated many Jews will return to the countries from which they have been driven away. No one can prophesy how far this will be the case, but in the period of peace-making, it is highly important that one does not confuse the problem of the Jew as a whole, by imagining that a certain political section in Palestine is representative of the best elements in Jewry.

THE ATTITUDE OF AN INDIAN SOLDIER

It happened that the writer of these lines lived in close association recently with an officer in a famous Indian regiment. For some days conversation was maintained on general topics. There came a time when the Indian officer very politely but earnestly asked the question: 'Can you tell me, quite briefly and simply, the difference between Christianity and Mohammedanism?' It did not seem a question which could be answered either simply or briefly, but, fresh from a sojourn in Egypt, one made an attempt. Presently the Indian said, 'But that is not Mohammedanism as I understand it. You are judging a great religion by a caricature of it. Let me tell you what I believe.' For a little time he expounded his creed and his own quite reverent attitude to Christianity. It was something completely remote from the

examples one had seen in Egypt. Again, as in the case of Palestine, it made one realize how easy it was to generalize and to arrive at unfair and unhappy conclusions.

In Egypt, with a population of seventeen millions, it is probably true to say that about eighty per cent of the wealth is in the hands of a thousand people. The level of religious life is definitely low, and poverty and ignorance are widespread. Though various movements for economic and social reform are in being, and though attempts are being made to establish a new system of popular education, these efforts are only in an elementary stage. The friendly Indian officer made it quite clear it would be unfair to judge Mohammedanism by a degenerate expression of it, in some particular locality. One felt, too, that similar unfair verdicts are being passed on Christianity to-day by those who mistake a nominal profession for the fundamental Christian faith.

The conversation continued for a while, and the Indian officer began to express his admiration and presently his love for One whom he called 'the risen Christ'.

At last there remained a final question to be asked, 'Why is it some of your Indian soldiers seem unfriendly?' He smiled and said, 'If you love my men, sir, they will love you'. 'That', I answered, 'is the heart of Christianity.'

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The passing of President Roosevelt has united the Allied Nations in a proud community of sorrow. His death has brought to all democratic peoples a sense of personal loss. On the very threshold of the victory for which he strove so valiantly he is translated. One uses the word with confidence. It is impossible to think of such a vital personality ceasing to be. It may be said of him, as it was said of Lincoln, 'Now he belongs to the ages'. One cannot imagine him passing into the shades, his identity lost in 'the vast Democracy of Death'. In spite of disabilities that might have excused him the normal activities of an ordinary man, he became a leader who will go down to history as one who helped to establish the Democracy of Life for every man. Future generations reading of the Atlantic Charter, of Casablanca, Teheran and Yalta will learn something also of a great statesman who led a perplexed nation into unity of thought, of purpose and of action. They may forget that physical frailty which might have limited his achievements. He never sought to remind his own generation of its existence.

When the whole world seemed about to be overwhelmed by the Great Evil, his words rang out bravely: 'If the forces of freedom and civil liberties burn low in other lands, they must be made brighter in our own.'

When men stood almost empty-handed, waiting the onslaught of a remorseless foe, he spoke with stern insistence to his people: 'We must be the great arsenal of democracy.'

As British and American soldiers handle the Allied Military Currency they find on every note the Four Freedoms named — the freedoms which he sought so earnestly to define. As he propounded them, he said: 'We are now in this war. We are all in it — all the way.'

And as the clouds of war began to show signs of passing he looked in those last hours through the battle-smoke and cried again: 'We can gain no lasting peace if we approach it with suspicion, mistrust, and fear. We can gain it only if we proceed with understanding and confidence.' That was his last appeal. As he had called his people to war, so he called them through the final battle to a final peace. With great gratitude for his courage and his faith we shall remember him, and the men of to-morrow must not forget. He gave his life for them.

LESLIE F. CHURCH

Ministers in Council

STUDY GROUPS IN ITALY. It is good to hear that the Study Group method is being employed with excellent effect in the Forces abroad as well as at home. From Italy comes word of a Moral Leadership course, run, says my correspondent, on somewhat different lines from those in England. The objects are the fostering of Free Church fellowship, instruction in Christian belief and guidance in various forms of evangelical service. Each course lasts a week and some twenty-five (officers and men mixed) are enrolled from R.A.F. units in the field, on the recommendation of their own chaplain. The gatherings in this particular instance are held in the Theological College of the Waldensian Church in the city of Rome, using its lecture rooms and chapel. Three padres of different Nonconformist denominations are lecturers. Students are given a typed précis of each lecture beforehand and they are also encouraged to make notes and ask questions.

The time-table shows that from arrival on one Saturday to departure on the next, the hours are well filled up. The first evening is devoted to an introduction to the course. Sunday begins with Holy Communion, followed by morning church service and afternoon fellowship at Wesley House. After an evening service a lecture is given on The Waldensian Church in Italy. From Monday to Friday there are two lectures each morning on Why we believe in God, Who is Jesus Christ, The Bible, The Church, Christianity and other world faiths, The Christian and Society, The Discipline of the Christian Life, The Task and Method of Evangelism, The Christian and the Family, and Our Immediate Task.

The afternoons are used for conducted tours mapped out thus: visit to Pagan Rome; visit to Early Christian Rome; its catacombs; its churches; visit to Renaissance Rome.

Each evening are held discussions dealing with Our Christian Faiths, Christianity and the Community, Personal Religion, and the Method of Evangelism. On the Wednesday evening a local surgeon from one of the army hospitals, himself a keen Christian, speaks on matters relating to sex and answers questions put to him. This is found to be a most valuable addition to the syllabus.

Copies of the ten lecture summaries have been sent to me and reference may be made to some of these to show the kind of approach.

The lecture-syllabus on the Bible, for example, has sections on the Basic Christian belief about the Bible, the approach to the Bible, the composite nature of the Bible, methods of inquiry into the nature of the Bible (higher criticism, lower criticism, form criticism), the Bible as the record of God's revelation through history, how did our Bible come to us, the English Bible, and how to read the Bible.

The Basic Christian Belief about the Bible is thus phrased: 'Because it is the means of God's self-communication and because God has so appointed it, it has a value which no other book has ever had. The Book is the only source of first-hand witness concerning the Person through whom God revealed the saving knowledge of Himself to the world. It is in its pages that our encounter with the Person of Christ takes place.'

The topic of The Christian Church is dealt with historically, including a discussion of the Reformation, the rise of the Free Churches, the Evangelical Revival, and the recent Ecumenical Movement.

Under the title of The Christian World Faiths a survey is afforded of Communism, the Nazi, Fascist and Japanese claims upon the individual, with an exposition also of Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism.

'The Discipline of the Christian Life' is related to the life of the Spirit, the practice of prayer, the Word of God, and corporate worship and fellowship — all in a very searching fashion.

'Modern Methods of Evangelism' are considered with reference to the Gospel, to

evangelical preaching, the individual witness, special efforts, and requirements in an evangelist. Evangelical preaching is said to be that which awakens a sense of need, shows that salvation is a positive thing (not only salvation from, but salvation to) and which makes clear that conversion is not an isolated experience but the beginning of a progressive life and entrance into necessary fellowship.

On 'The Christian and the Family' an exposition is given of New Testament teaching and then instruction on preparation for marriage, the test of marriage, the coming of the family, the training of the family, the family grows up, divorce, irregular sexual intercourse, the broken family and Christian family life. This lecture calls to study and thought on especially modern lines.

Every fortnight such a course as above outlined is held in Rome. . . . It is no wonder that my correspondent is deeply impressed with what he has himself heard. One can imagine the impact of such instruction on those who have come from our home churches and the new outlook which they will bring back with them. With the Report comes the query whether some such courses could not be held in the homeland for the youth of our churches.

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RURAL EDUCATION UNDER THE BUTLER ACT. The attention of those concerned about the religious education of children in country day-schools may be drawn to Section 76 of the 1944 Education Act which provides that 'In the exercise and performance of all powers and duties conferred and imposed on them by this Act the Ministers and the local education authorities shall have regard to the general principle that . . . pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents'. This gives opportunity for new action to Free Churchmen who live in single-school areas and who have long objected to sending their children to local Anglican schools, especially if such schools are Anglo-Catholic. They may now ask that their children shall go to the nearest County school, i.e. one provided by the Council. They would thus be putting into effect the statutory provision that pupils shall be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents.

Other matters of importance to Nonconformists may be seen simply set out in a pamphlet chiefly intended for parents but of service also to ministers. It is entitled *Education: Your Rights as a Free Churchman* (Independent Press, Memorial Hall, Faringdon Street, London E.C.4; from whom it may be had, post free, for 2½d.).

The pamphlet is written by Mr. D. S. Johns, M.A., and Mr. Wilfred J. Rowland; Mr. Rowland is the vigilant and versatile secretary of the National Education Association. A son of the manse, his father was Dr. Rowland, one time Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales. Mr. Rowland and the Association of which he is secretary have done much for many years in safeguarding Free Church interests in the field of education.

Another matter may here be mentioned. Under the 1944 Act some of the present Church schools in single-school areas may receive a fifty per cent grant from public funds and so become Aided Schools. In these Aided Schools there is no legislative compulsion to provide Agreed Syllabus teaching — i.e. non-sectarian religious instruction — unless Free Church parents demand it. By Section 28 (1) however parents have a right to ask for religious instruction free from sectarian bias and on an Agreed Syllabus. To assist in giving effect to this provision there have just been published 'Forms of Request for Religious Instruction under the Agreed Syllabus'. These may be had from the Rev. Dr. A. W. Harrison, M.C., Benson's Buildings, Wesley Chapel, City Road, London, E.C.1.

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PRINCIPLES OF DAY SCHOOL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. Mr. A. Victor Murray, M.A., B.LITT., B.D., Professor of Education at the University College, Hull, has written

under the title of *The School and the Church* (Student Christian Movement, 3s. 6d.) a thought-provoking work.

As the sub-title is 'The theory and practice under the Butler Act' Mr. Murray has occasion to take up several crucial points that have occurred in the events leading up to this legislation. Thus, as against the claim to right of entry by the clergy, he points out that the clergy are no longer monopolists in religious education and that very few of them have had training or experience to fit them to deal with children of different grades. He stresses the absurdity of assuming that a man becomes competent to give such education simply through the mechanics of ordination.

As against the claim to give separate denominational teaching whether in the day school or, by withdrawal from the day school, in the parish church in school hours, he speaks of the resentment of day-school teachers who have been trying to build up a corporate religious spirit in the school but find that through outside agitation that unity is broken up.

Mr. Murray states (evidently with Anglo-Catholics in mind) that some kinds of denominational teaching carry with them an insistence that the whole truth is on their side, and children are so taught. For this reason they may not join with children of other denominations in school assembly and denominationalism of this kind involves segregation into groups. On this Mr. Murray rightly adds: 'As the schools are the schools of the nation, it is hardly reasonable that this attitude should be supported by public funds.'

Meeting the charge of schism sometimes made against Protestants and Free Churchmen, Mr. Murray says what badly needs saying, that 'it is a misreading of spiritual history to assume that the part that did not change was the true church and the part that changed was schismatic'. The schismatic spirit was in the old, unreformed church that by its accretions to and deviations from the pure Gospel made necessary a new start. 'The words "true", "schismatic", "heretical", are counters which render a partisan game possible.'

It should be added that the book abounds in valuable contributions on the meaning of the Christian faith and ways of imparting it. So Mr. Murray insists that a subject like Christianity which is really an activity has many sides to it. There is something in it to learn, something to feel, something to choose, something to do and something to belong to. This will remind Methodists of his Fernley-Hartley Lecture on 'Personal Experience and the Historic Faith' with its chapters on Christian Discipline—Feeling, Knowing, Choosing, Doing, Belonging.

A particularly important section is that on The Education of the Emotions. Here the writer declares that a real education of the emotions consists in doing something which seems the very opposite, namely prolonging the intellectual effort with greater thoroughness and greater faith. Or to put it in another way, the true discipline of the intellect comes through the emotions and one form of this is to pursue the intellectual effort far enough till it takes fire.

Study Circles and Fraternals would discover much in this book to arouse discussion and fruitful conversation.

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RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS IN A SENIOR SCHOOL. Mr. Murray thinks that most of the present Agreed Syllabuses are usually quite admirable as far as they go for children up to the age of eleven. For the instruction of children aged twelve to fourteen or older, they are weak, he states.

It is interesting therefore to hear what the Head of a Senior School has to say on this very point. In his *Religious Education in the Senior School* (Nelson, 8s. 6d.) Mr. R. L. Arundale, the Headmaster of St. John's College Senior School, York,

reveals impressions that have resulted from experiments and work in a variety of post-primary schools.

One problem in dealing with Senior School children is to prepare them for assimilation of the critical attitude to the Bible by answering their own questions. Thus, a child asked 'Is the story about Adam and Eve, and God making the world in six days true?' In meeting the inquiry, the teacher discussed the various kinds of truth. There is the truth of the facts of the experience of the senses, as when we say an orange is round in shape, has pips in it, a bitter skin but sweet juice. There is the truth of a picture, as when in some of the old masterpieces, showing Mary, the mother of Jesus, with the child in her arms, the details of the dress and background may be quite out of period, but the truth of the spirit is there. There is the truth of poetry as when Wordsworth said of the daffodils 'Ten thousand saw I at a glance', though he had presumably not counted that number but was conveying a vivid pictorial suggestion of masses of them. So the Bible story of creation is true in its context, in its great affirmation that 'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth'.

Scholars can be helped by showing that the miraculous stories in the Bible are sometimes capable of being interpreted by reference to natural causes. Of the invading hosts of Sennacherib it is said in II Kings xix. 35, 'when men arose early in the morning, behold, they were all dead corpses'. Mr. Arundale quotes an instance given by James Harpole in his *Leaves from a Surgeon's Case Book* of a similar thing that happened to the British after they captured Jerusalem in 1917. An attack was launched across the Jordan. After an advance into the mountains of Moab, the British were pushed back into the deadly Jordan valley. The men were not in a fit condition, owing to the heat, flies, and dust. It was decided to send them back to the rest camp at Jerusalem. Some were sent back there and in the normal way went to their quarters. Nothing unusual was noticed till next morning when half of them were found dead. It was discovered that they had been smitten by malignant malaria. The change of temperature in passing from the Jordan to Jerusalem had so weakened the men that they fell easy victims to the disease. Mr. Arundale suggests that the same cause had been operative in the time of Hezekiah.

Eleven chapters in this book deal with The Aim of Religious Education in Schools, School Worship, The Use of the Bible, Biblical Criticism, The Old Testament, The New Testament, the Growth of The Church, The Syllabus, The Oral Lesson, Written Work and Private Study and Teaching Aids. Each chapter has a useful bibliography.

The author has rendered useful service on a most timely theme.

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CARLYLE AND THE METHODIST MINER. Mr. Wilson Harris in his *Caroline Fox* (Constable) throws new light on the story of the Methodist miner told by Thomas Carlyle in his *Life of John Sterling* (Part III, Chapter ii). There Carlyle relates that in a certain Cornish mine, two miners deep down in the shaft were engaged in putting in a shot for blasting: they had completed their affair and were about to give the signal for being hoisted up — one at a time was all their coadjutor at the top could manage, and the second was to kindle the match and then mount with all speed. Now it chanced while they were still below, one of them thought the match too long, tried to break it shorter, took a couple of stones, a flat and a sharp, to cut it shorter; did cut it of the due length, but horrible to relate, kindled it at the same time, and both were still below. Both shouted vehemently to the coadjutor at the windlass, both sprang at the basket; the windlass man could not move it with them both. Here was a moment for poor miner Jack and miner Will. Instant, horrible death hangs over both — when Will generously resigns himself, 'Go aloft, Jack', and sits down; 'Away, in one minute I shall be in heaven'. Jack bounds aloft, the explosion instantly

follows, bruises his face as he looks over; he is safe above ground. And poor Will? Descending eagerly, they find Will, too, as if by miracle, buried under rocks which had arched themselves over him, and little injured. He too is brought up safe.

So runs the Carlylean story with this addition, that on investigation, it had been found that 'Will, an honest, ignorant, good man, entirely given up to Methodism, had been perfect in the faith of assurance, certain that he should go to heaven if he died, certain that Jack would not, which had been the ground of his decision in that great moment.'

Mr. Harris is able to show that miner Will's Christian name was Michael and his surname Verran. The mine was at Carradon, about five miles from Liskeard and thirty miles from Falmouth.

Caroline Fox records in her diary on January 21, 1843, an account of a visit paid to Michael Verran by members of the Society of Friends at Liskeard. They had reported that 'He is a thorough Methodist who sometimes feels so full of joy that his skin seems too small for him, and he is obliged to lie down and pray that he may be enlarged, to make room for his bursting happiness. He gave a simple quiet account of the Carradon affair, during which, it seems, his mind was so full of the prospect of being so soon with his Saviour that the idea of death and its suffering hardly occurred to him, and on coming to the surface he fell down on his knees in the shed and "gave glory".'

Wesley used to say 'Our people die well'. Here is undesigned testimony to the conquest of the fear of death by Methodists of a generation later than that of the Founder.

W. E. FARNDALÉ

Recent Literature

This is the Message. By Franz Hildebrandt. (Lutterworth Press, 4s. 6d.)

Here is the reply of a Lutheran Pastor to the caustic criticisms of present-day Continental Theology and its offshoots in this country contained in Canon Raven's *Good News of God*. One of the impressions the book leaves is that Martin Luther is not the theological nonentity which British thinkers so often assume. Another is that the author is completely at home with the Wesleys and acknowledges that he is greatly in their debt. O happy union! Great commendation as this is, however, there is a greater still, namely that Pastor Hildebrandt's theology is rooted and grounded in the Scriptures. The contrast between *Good News of God* and *This is the Message* is most marked. Despite the attractive style, the scientific sincerity, and the high human motives of the former, the conviction remains that it is a disappointing yield from the study of Romans i-viii. Pastor Hildebrandt's reply is based on 1 John. His theology is throughout Christo-centric. For this reason he is more anxious to point out the limits of Natural Theology than to exalt its merits. Philosophy is also kept in its right place as the handmaid, not the mistress, of Theology. Salvation is by Grace alone, through Faith alone, in Christ alone. It is true that Dr. Hildebrandt does not give us a clear definition of what he means by the Word of God, but the emphasis on the Bible as the record of the witness, not the witness itself, and on the need for the illumination of the Divine Interpreter before the record becomes the witness, is important. This book deals with living issues and the author has everywhere something important to say. It is written in perfect charity and good humour

by one who could not remain silent. Methodists especially will rejoice in this book as they rejoice in the revival of Biblical Theology and expository preaching, to which it makes a real contribution.

PERCY SCOTT

The Original Order and Chapters of St. John's Gospel. By F. H. Hoare. (Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 10s. 6d.)

The author, who is a Roman Catholic, tells us (p. 4) that 'one of the purposes of this book is to show that, without altering a syllable of the Gospel but simply by rearranging certain sections of it, many supposedly obscure passages can be made clearer, and yet lose none of their profundities in the process, but rather reveal more of them'. In other words, this is yet another attempt to rearrange the Fourth Gospel in what is presumed to be its original order. Mr. Hoare acknowledges his debts to several pioneers in this field, but strangely ignores the most thoroughgoing of them all (*Disarrangements in the Fourth Gospel*, by F. Warburton Lewis). That such disarrangements exist in the text as we have it is fairly obvious. As Mr. Lewis says, 'Chap. iv brings Jesus to Galilee (vv. 43-54), Chap. v brings Him back to Jerusalem, and leaves Him there. At the opening of Chap. vi He is back in Galilee again, and in Chap. vii we are told that He went to Galilee, where—according to our order—He already is'. Further obvious incoherences occur in Chaps. viii, x, xiii-xvii, and xviii. Strangely enough, Mr. Hoare leaves the most serious of these dislocations incompletely mended in his reconstruction. They occur in Chaps. xiii-xvii. and Every attentive reader must notice that while in xiv. 31 Jesus is represented as saying 'Arise, let us be going', the party does *not* leave the room till we reach xviii. 1. Again, in xiii. 36 Peter says 'Lord, whither goest Thou?', but in xvi. 5 Jesus says, 'None of you asks me "Whither goest Thou?"' The first criticism the present reviewer would make of Mr. Hoare's rearrangement is that it fails to solve, or even to recognize, these glaring incoherences.

In Dr. Bernard's commentary on the Fourth Gospel he insisted on the necessity of some *physical* basis for a solution of the problem offered by displacements. By 'physical' he meant some disarrangement *through accident* to the leaves or separate sheets of the autograph. He suggested six transferences, each accounted for by the dropping out of place of a sheet or set of sheets. To make an adequate case for this type of solution we must count up the number of lines and letters in a sheet or slip in contemporary documents, and then use this total as a unit for mathematical calculation, on the understanding that any passage to be transposed must contain the required total of letters or a multiple of it. This method was used very ingeniously by Dr. A. C. Clark in *The Primitive Text of the Gospels and Acts* to explain many of the various readings in the New Testament, but his unit was the line rather than the page. 'There is nothing improbable', writes Mr. Hoare, 'in the supposition that a pile of such strips, not yet numbered but otherwise ready for making up into a roll, should have fallen to the floor with the overturning of a table.' He continues: 'At every point from which'—in his proposed rearrangement—'we have removed a passage we make a break in the text, and at every point at which we insert a transferred passage we make another break in the text, and every interval between these breaks . . . must be the equivalent of one or more pages in the autograph.' In Mr. Hoare's reconstruction twenty-one breaks are made in the existing text. The passages *between* breaks he calls 'segments'. A segment covers from two to twenty-four pages (or sheets) and together they amount to about five-sevenths of the Gospel. It is clear that the chief hindrance to such a reconstruction is likely to be found in the different totals of letters offered by various readings; as a good Roman, the author prefers Mark's text. The general result—summarily stated—is that his method seems to work out fairly well, but that the number of lines is

generally four, or a multiple of four, short of the presumed page. This deficiency our author accounts for by the suggestion that gaps were left deliberately to mark the end of chapters (which he prefers to call *capita*). If we allow him this suggestion, his mathematical confirmation of his transferences is impressive. The present reviewer confesses, however, to a suspicion that other reconstructions could find the same kind of support in arithmetic, and, when we are asked to believe that the effort to dictate his translation of original Aramaic discourses into Greek to his secretary was too much for the aged apostle, who fell into a coma when the table overturned, we become a little sceptical, and wonder whether the lack of sequence in the Gospel is not to be accounted for by the easier suggestion that the beloved disciple left his papers in some disorder, and the editors (xxi. 24) or editor (xxi. 25) arranged them as best they, or he, could. Our author declares that he is not an expert in textual criticism; perhaps I need do no more than mention the fact that the Sinaitic Syriac rearrangement of xviii. 13-28 invalidates the statement made on p. 6 that 'there is no support either in the MSS. or early translations of the Gospel for any order other than the one in which it stands now'. The Sinaitic Syriac is probably the earliest of all the versions, and its variations in the Fourth Gospel are specially numerous and important.

J. ALEXANDER FINDLAY

Eastern Pilgrimage. By F. D. Bacon. (Lutterworth Press, 5s.)

'There are some 172 millions of Eastern Christians', Mr. Bacon tells us in his Foreword. While the events of to-day, not least in Russia where seven-tenths of these millions belong, make *population* statistics of little value in dealing with Church allegiance, the same events are rightly drawing attention to the ancient Churches of the East.

Kidd's *The Churches of Eastern Christendom* is not every man's meat. For this subject, and indeed for most 'oecumenical' knowledge which a working parson needs, *A Christian Year Book* (S.C.M. Press, 2s. 6d.) is a mine of information which deserves to be better known. There was room for a book between, giving more historical ground than the scope of the latter allows. Such is the book which Mr. Bacon has given us. There are a few imperfections. 'Corporate' is one of the most overworked of words, but 'corporate body' (p. 93) surely breaks the camel's back! Diocletian began to persecute not in 285 (p. 16) but in 303. Few believe that the 'India' which Pantenus visited took him beyond the Red Sea (p. 42). The association of 'John of Persia' of the year 325 with 'Prester John', who is first mentioned in 1145 (p. 22), reaches back to an unhappy inspiration of Dean Stanley's in his *Eastern Church*. 'Is there any connection?' he asked, and the answer even then ought to have been 'No'. The ruling bishop of one section of the Jacobites in Travancore is not 'Patriarch of Antioch' (p. 88). When I was presented to him in 1939, it was to 'His Holiness the Catholicos of the East'. The Roman Uniate Church there is by no means small (p. 87). Compared with the Jacobite section they are as four is to three. There is room, therefore, for some revision. This is understandable when the field is so vast. Indeed its vastness makes it certain that most readers — and this reviewer among them — will feel less critical of incorrect detail and more grateful for this and that item of knowledge which we had not come across before.

JOHN FOSTER

The Notebook of John Penry. Edited by Dr. Albert Peel. (Royal Historical Society, Camden Series.)

The real excitements of historical reading are not to be found in secondary authorities but in primary documents, of which this Notebook is, in its very incoherence, a

lively and pathetic example. 'On 29th May, 1593, John Penry, a young Welshman thirty years of age . . . was executed at St. Thomas a Watering, London.' Dr. Albert Peel has done good service in this careful edition of Penry's Notebook and in his competent introduction to it. There are two points about Penry which the reader of the Notebook should bear in mind—first, that he was one of the earliest to suffer in the Separatist cause and also one of the last to suffer the extreme penalty for his faith; second, that he was, in his lifetime and after, vehemently suspect of at least part authorship of the famous 'Martin Marprelate Tracts'. Dr. Peel rightly refuses to commit himself to Dr. Dover Wilson's theories about Martin Marprelate (for Dr. Wilson has a way of riding his theories hard), and he does not claim too much for his document—'the Notebook still leaves us asking more questions than we can answer'. He rightly refuses to accept the rather fulsome denial of the charge of authorship which Penry gives: it leaves loopholes. Penry and his friends 'told the truth, but they told no more of it than was necessary'. We may hope that Dr. Peel will one day take the discussion a further stage. Meanwhile the Marprelate tracts remain the best anti-clerical satire since 'Rede Me and be not wroth' a generation earlier, and though many of the Puritans would have echoed Tyndale's 'It becometh not the Lord's servants to use railing', the tracts moved and became events. Dr. Dover Wilson says that Penry paid 'with his life for the part he had taken in the Marprelate controversy'. Yet as Dr. Peel admits (p. xxi), 'this was not part of the indictment—so far as we know it was not mentioned in the trial'. There was enough matter in his writings to support the charge of sedition: Dr. Peel says Penry never learned discretion, and there were sentences where his pen and tongue outran his wit. In 1593 it was ill judged to leave some sentences to be torn from a well-meaning context, e.g. 'Where live we? In what commonwealth? Where tyrannous anarchic possesseth all things, or the liberty of free subjects remains?' (p. 55); 'It were better for us to be Queen Elizabeth's beasts than her subjects, yea, her Christian subjects' (p. 59); 'Whether kings or princes have made their states so out of order as the truth cannot come to light under their governments'; 'See it amended except you would have every man to embolden himself to do what his hand hath power to effect in this land' (p. 55). Here, despite Penry's sincere protestations of loyalty, there was a new temper towards earthly authority, which hugely differed from that of the first generation of the Reformation, but it can be traced from John Knox to the coming of the Civil War. Join with it the Separatist attitude which excommunicated the entire Church Establishment, coupling it with Anti-Christ, and here was a problem to test greater wits and broader charity than Whitgift's. The execution was worse than a crime, it was a mistake. But though Penry's death points ahead, the pathetic note to his wife, his prayers and his diary belong to the recognizable pattern of the earlier martyrs, and join him in solemn company with that greater young man, John Frith, who had gone to the fire sixty years before, confiding in the mercy of Christ against the mercilessness of Christ's disciples.

E. GORDON RUPP

Eighteenth Century Piety. By W. K. Lowther Clarke. (S.P.C.K., 10s. 6d.)

The author of this book, Canon W. K. Lowther Clarke, has rendered nearly thirty years of devoted and valued service as the Secretary of the Publishing Department of the S.P.C.K. and much of his matter is drawn from the Society's archives. He is rather uncomfortably aware that the title of his book is misleading and apologizes for this on the plea that he wished to retain the word *piety* as indicating the filial affection which he feels for several of the characters introduced. Caution, however, is needed in equating the English word 'piety' with the Latin *pietas*. Our word *piety* has come in popular usage to be confined to one's attitude towards God, expressive of personal

religion issuing in *pious* actions and mode of life. Anyone, therefore, who approaches this book as the reviewer did, expecting to find a treatment of the devotional spirit as manifested in the eighteenth century, will be disappointed. He will find no account of the numerous Religious Societies which existed both within and apart from the Church of England, nor appreciative reference to other Christian communions. There is no mention of George Whitefield, William Romaine, John Newton, Henry Venn, Grimshaw of Haworth, Berridge, John Fletcher, James Hervey, John Howard, Susanna Wesley, to mention but a few outstanding names. Readers wholly ignorant of John Wesley might conclude from the few references to him that he was an unpleasant kind of person who led a set of religious fanatics and bigots. It is a pity that use is made of contemporary strictures and innuendoes passed upon Wesley and the Methodists as if they were incontrovertible, whilst no reference is made to Wesley's trenchant replies.

Canon Clarke is concerned about the severe and generally accepted judgements which reputable historians have passed upon the Established Church in the eighteenth century, and writes: 'I do not want to dispute these judgements, for which abundant evidence can be produced. Nor do I aim at a balanced appraisal of all the facts.' His purpose is to describe English Church life 'as it appears to one who reads the books and pamphlets put out by the S.P.C.K.' during this period, in the hope that this will lead to a reconsideration of the 'conventional' judgements, particularly the charge of complacency.

Accordingly he describes contemporary publications of the S.P.C.K. which deal with Churchmanship, Church Services, Sacraments, Catechizing, Confirmation, Home Life, Moral Corruption, etc., and urges that their authors, the Society responsible for their publication, and the sympathetic public who bought them, constitute a body of piety to which the historians have not given due consideration. It is true that all these were concerned to promote the spiritual fitness and general efficiency of the Church of England, but the books were written to correct, if possible, a deplorable state of things to whose existence the writers themselves bear witness. The publications provide evidence for the plaintiff rather than the defendant. Nevertheless, the summaries of these books are useful and interesting and we gladly acknowledge the piety of their producers and readers. The student of the eighteenth century will readily concede a far wider and deeper piety than our author claims and yet stand by the generally accepted judgements. There follows an appreciative account of an early secretary of the Society, Henry Newman, 1670-1743. Interesting extracts from his letters are given, such as eye-witness descriptions of the arrival of King George I in this country and scenes on the accession of George II. There is a useful account of the Charity Schools, as evidence of 'piety', though self-interest must on occasion have been a motive for supporting them, for they taught the children how to order themselves before their 'betters'. The latter half of the book consists of fugitive papers on such subjects as 'The Homilies', a useful summary of information; a dispute at law over a Grammar School in Suffolk; Thomas Bray, the founder of the S.P.C.K.; three clergymen of the century, George Horne, William Jones, and William Stevens; and 'Good Mrs. Trimmer,' for whom the author has great admiration. She published various works of the 'improving' kind, so popular in some circles at that time, and has the distinction of a sarcastic reference in Byron's *Don Juan*. After an article on 'The Church in Crabbe's Poems' the writer goes out beyond his selected period to deal with the attitude of Charles Dickens to the Church. There is a good deal of interesting matter, some of it of antiquarian character, pleasantly set forth in these by-ways of the century.

W. L. DOUGHTY

Albert Schweitzer: Christian Revolutionary. By George Seaver. (James Clarke, 5s.)

Kraus's book on Schweitzer, which appeared last year, covers the same ground as this one, but covers it differently, so that there is little overlap. Schweitzer too is a subject big enough for more than one book. Mr. Seaver's volume is around, rather than about, Schweitzer. He is concerned with setting him in his relation to the systems of thought which influenced his own. Hence we have chapters on Greek Eudemonism, the Enlightenment, Kant and German Idealism, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Ethics and Nature Philosophies, and so forth. There is much of interest in this but it limits what the author has to say of Schweitzer as a 'Christian Revolutionary'. One learns more about what Schweitzer thinks of other thinkers, of the similarities and dissimilarities of his views and theirs, rather than of the man himself, of that baffling personality which fits itself into no common pattern of life. To say this is in no way to detract from the considerable value of Mr. Seaver's work. It is only to point out what contribution this book directly makes to the study of Schweitzer. No one can show him to be a conventionally consistent thinker. His mind has its share of that Augustinian many-sidedness which refuses to fall into ready-made categories. The life of Schweitzer is often the contradiction of the logic of Schweitzer. In such a case, it is the life, not the thought, which gives the true man. While it is of value to relate Schweitzer to the thought systems which impinge on his own, the secret of his life is not to be found in the philosophies he studied. It lies rather in the early religious influences of his home and the ultra-sensitive nature which, even in early childhood, made him sick with distress at the suffering of animals, a compassion which extended to all suffering everywhere. Schweitzer's unorthodox theology is a much less important factor than this for those who would seek to comprehend the course his life has taken. His shattering challenge in *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* has ceased to cause much stir, but the far greater challenge of his life in the primeval forests of Africa will be remembered when his books are forgotten. While Schweitzer is a brilliant thinker, he is not a great one. It is as a great Christian that his memory will live.

E. S. WATERHOUSE

What is Christian Marriage? By Arthur Tarleton Macmillan. (Macmillan, 8s. 6d.)
Can the Family Survive? By E. C. Urwin. (S.C.M., 5s.)

Mr. Macmillan has given us a work which has long been needed, a survey of the existing regulations in this country on marriage, with some account of the processes by which they have become what they now are. This involves licences and banns, affinity and consanguinity, nullity and divorce, and the explanation of a good many technical terms — like 'null', 'voidable', 'diriment', and 'consent' — which occur in larger treatises and are common in the law courts. Marriage law, in this as in other countries, has had a long history; both lawyers and theologians have been at work on it for centuries; and behind their labours are the Biblical references, Hebrew and Christian, and the vast and perplexing mass of the Roman marriage law, with which the author, himself a lawyer, deals briefly but usefully. The result is that 'as regards marriage, the very corner-stone of human society, the position is . . . a vast muddle'. To most Christian people to-day, no doubt, the idea of marriage is simple; any two people who are attracted to one another may get married, provided that they are not very closely related; and marriage is to be lasting, though divorce is always a possibility if married life grows unbearable. But is a Christian marriage no more than this? Christianity, which to the author means now the undivided pre-Reformation Church, and now the Church of England (he is not sure about other religious communions), has always held that marriage is indissoluble (that is, either that divorce is impossible, or that re-marriage is forbidden), and that for a Christian

marriage certain conditions are essential; if these are not observed the result is — not that the spouses may be divorced but that they have never been married — the marriage is null. Each, therefore, is free to marry again. It is notorious that in the Roman Catholic body, where divorce proper is not allowed, these conditions are conveniently numerous, and, in addition, the Pope can always grant his own dispensation. Mr. Macmillan's devotion to the church catholic does not go as far as this; but he holds that Christian marriage in this country is between baptized and confirmed members of the Church of England, who are aware that it must last 'till death us do part'. To such marriages, he says, our Lord's prohibition of divorce, which he regards as legislation at least for Christians, is authoritative. He will not allow that our Lord made any exception for the husband of an unfaithful wife; still less (what is not actually mentioned in the Gospel texts) for the wife of an unfaithful husband. But where one or both of the spouses is not baptized (i.e. is not a Christian!), or where they are married at a registry (or perhaps in some Protestant church), the words 'till death us do part' being used but presumably not intended, the marriage is not a Christian marriage, and the Gospel prohibition of divorce does not apply. It follows that the Church of England must insist that 'her children' are married according to her own Marriage office, and also that they must not marry a Quaker or a member of the Salvation Army, or indeed of any Nonconformist body. Scotland creates a difficulty, since Scotland, both in Church and State, has its own laws; and Mr. Macmillan shrinks from actually saying that a marriage between an Episcopalian and a Presbyterian is un-Christian. No wonder that he quotes Canon Knox to the effect that if the Church of England were to insist on all this, it would be disestablished.

It is a relief to turn to Mr. Urwin's book, which deals, not with legally valid conditions of Christian marriage, but with its spirit. His is one of those books, happily growing more frequent of late, which should be put into the hands of all who are married or who contemplate marriage. Instead of quoting authorities on canon and state law, he refers to authors like L. T. Hobhouse, Henry Drummond, Ian Suttie, and Drs. A. H. Gray and D. R. Mace. He discusses, with much aptness and sympathy, the place of religion in family life; the causes and the results of the spread of the small family of to-day; the tension that grows up, often side by side with the warmest affection, between husband and wife, parents and children; the influence of the specifically sex interest in family and in social life; and the effects of State action and social legislation, to-day and to-morrow, on family cohesion and on the sense of mutual responsibility; the necessity of chastity; the plea for contraceptives; and the way out for the unmarried. 'The fundamental argument of the book is that marriage and home life can only be viewed aright as they are seen in the purpose of God and achieved by divine Grace'; and if, as Mr. Urwin elsewhere remarks, the family is no longer an economic-producing but an economic-consuming unit — if too, 'there is a return of the sense that the interests of the family are communal' and that 'the clan has now become the nation' — we must expect the family to be able to adapt itself to the new conditions. The family has survived greater shocks than these in its long history. Mr. Urwin more than once quotes the Methodist Declaration on the Christian View of Marriage and the Family to good effect.

Mr. Urwin has no doubt that the family will survive. His book would more suitably bear Mr. Macmillan's title. For while he is not concerned with the subtleties of the canonists, he probes to the central idea in marriage and the family (for the two cannot be held apart) and to the essentials of the Christian spirit; while Mr. Macmillan, if he does not suggest the question 'Can the Family Survive?', makes his readers wonder if the legal conditions of Christian marriage, as he understands them, can do so. For in these days the State no longer looks to the Church, as it did when it left the decision on matrimonial causes to church lawyers and courts. The churches

must now, on the one hand, maintain their own ideals for their own members, and on the other, do their utmost to induce the state to become, in this as in other matters — none of them more important — their ally.

W. F. LOFTHOUSE

An African Looks at Marriage. By Isaac O. Delano. (Lutterworth Press, 1s.)

Our People of the Sierra Leone Protectorate. By Max Gorvie. (Lutterworth Press, 1s. 3d.)

Aggrey of Achimota. By M. Musson. (Lutterworth Press, 1s. 3d.)

Notes and Comments from Nigeria. By Isaac O. Delano. (Lutterworth Press, 1s. 3d.)

The United Society for Christian Literature is to be congratulated on having published four more books in the 'Africa's Own Library', a 'series designed' (as the Publishers' Note says) 'to stimulate Africans to take an interest in reading of the great tribes and personalities of their continent'. Of these four books, three are by Africans. *Aggrey of Achimota*, by a European, is a simple, exciting, and well-balanced account of Aggrey as Omankiyama, 'interpreter', of Black and White to one another. In *An African Looks at Marriage* Mr. Delano takes up the cudgels with great vigour against all hypocrisy and pretence in the Church in Nigeria, especially in the matter of Christian marriage. He blames marriage under Government ordinance for many of the present difficulties of the Church and for much of the failure of marriage among Church members. The suggestions in his last chapter for African Christian marriage, though of necessity scanty, are particularly valuable and merit careful and sympathetic study. *Notes and Comments from Nigeria* is the title of a traveller's scrap-book. It is inevitable that in such a collection of short papers some parts should be of greater value than others, but Mr. Delano writes of his people with wit and insight. The past history of Sierra Leone is so obscure that anyone who seeks to commit tradition to writing before it dies out, does a service not only to his own people but also to the linguist and the anthropologist. Such a service the Rev. G. Max Gorvie has performed in *Our People of the Sierra Leone Protectorate*. While one may not entirely agree with him that the passing of the chiefs' prestige and authority is a bad thing, we altogether agree in hoping that future developments in the Protectorate will bring a law-abiding citizenship and an economic prosperity that has too long been denied.

KENNETH H. CROSBY

Salute to India. By J. Z. Hodge. (S.C.M., 6s.)

In the nineteenth century, British honour and British justice were trusted in India. This is no longer so. This regrettable fact is fully proved in Dr. Hodge's new book, whose opening chapters deal with the confused and unhappy events following the failure of the Cripps Mission in June 1942. It is no sweeping statement of a casual visitor, but the judgement of a missionary of over forty years' experience. As a personal friend of Mr. Gandhi the author declares his belief in the Mahatma's sincerity and tries to dispel the rumour that he was responsible for the breakdown. He places that responsibility mainly on the lateness and speed of the negotiations, for to the Eastern mind 'the long palaver' is an essential preliminary to a definite decision. With the unique authority of a Secretary of the Indian National Christian Council, Dr. Hodge devotes the second half of his book to an admirable survey of the Church in India, its growth and work to-day, and its opportunities to-morrow. An important chapter deals with the place of the missionary in a free India. He holds that while India is anxious to say 'Quit India' to the British Government, that land will continue to welcome the Western missionary. 'You are a missionary, then you are our friend,' the comment of a crowded railway compartment, is the feeling of many. But Dr. Hodge's optimistic belief in religious toleration in that land in the future will not be shared by many. Though a tolerant Christianity will be met by a tolerant Hinduism,

aggressive Christian evangelism will certainly arouse violent opposition. Hinduism is only tolerant in so far as she is left undisturbed. Returning to the problem of the present political impasse, the author is urgent that the tide is set for complete separation and that opportunity for any understanding will be finally lost by further delay. The only hope for an India, friendly as well as free, is to reopen negotiations at once where Sir Stafford Cripps had to leave them. This can only come by a magnanimous gesture on Britain's part. Dr. Hodge holds that the Church in India believes that British politics can be greatly helped to such magnanimity by the Church at home.

S. S. LUCKCOCK

The Common Interest in International Economic Organization. By J. B. Condliffe and A. Stevenson. (International Labour Office, 6s.)

This is a careful study of some of the problems connected with a satisfactory peace. The common people have been encouraged to hope for improvements in their standards of living — work for all, proper nutrition, social security, etc. Here is an attempt to set down the changes in international economic, commercial, and monetary arrangements which are essential if the widespread expectation of better living conditions is to be fulfilled. It is not a Utopian statement but a painstaking effort to cut a path from things as they are to things as we want them to be. Independent national action alone cannot take us where we would be; it failed disastrously in the period between the two wars. Attempts at national self-sufficiency depress the level of living. Well-conceived national schemes for welfare will break down if other nations refuse to keep in step. To implement the four freedoms international co-operation is necessary. Yet national sovereignty is not likely soon to abdicate in favour of federal or world government, so that the best we can hope for is that nations will consult together, collaborate willingly, and work their own policies into a general policy designed to bring stability and advance. An outline is given of the broad principles which should guide and govern such merging of national efforts. The economic and commercial changes of recent years are analysed. The trend is towards ever larger units of production and distribution. The growth of monopolies and cartels and, lately, of government controls has greatly modified the competition of fifty years ago. Here is one of the pressing problems of the near future, and the authors are not sanguine as to its solution. Experience after the last war should help us in making the transition from a war to a peace economy. It is to be hoped that we shall not repeat our old mistakes. The lessons to be learned — and some of the more important are indicated — may be applied according to varying conditions by the nations concerned, but of themselves they will not suffice for the well-being of the common man. There will be urgent need for international co-operation in (1) food, agriculture and raw materials, (2) monetary arrangements, (3) commercial policy, and (4) investments. These points are sanely discussed.

This is a lucid piece of writing, which the non-expert can readily follow. It poses clearly some of the questions which must be properly answered if well-intentioned national schemes are to be successful. Two large questions emerge. First, will the nations consent to plan together for the welfare of the whole? Second, will the various interests involved agree to subordinate their short-term gains to the general advantage? The authors keep close to economic considerations, but, perhaps unwittingly, they reveal that 'the shape of things to come' depends, in the last issue, on a moral choice. Economic, commercial and monetary adjustments will not be carried through without the driving force of international goodwill and each nation's readiness to sacrifice its own immediate good to the good of all the nations.

J. LESLIE WEBB

A Preface to Peace. By Harold Callender. (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d.)

This book is the work of an American journalist and is written primarily for Americans. It is, however, a very judicious survey of the present world situation and should receive a welcome in this country as a study of future international policy, all the more interesting because of its American 'slant'. Mr. Callender has spent fourteen years in Europe and knows several European countries well, especially Germany. He is not only alive to the real character of Germany, its dangerous qualities through the years between the wars, and its potentialities for future war, he is also aware of the weaknesses of the policy of France, Russia, Great Britain, and even the United States. Indeed, he considers that the U.S.A. was completely devoid of a foreign policy when this war broke out.

Differences between the British and American approach to some immediate problems can be indicated by two quotations. The first is: 'It will be difficult for us to make an arrangement with Russia that does not re-establish the pre-1939 integrity of Finland and the independence of Poland and the Baltic States, and does not apply the principle of self-determination to states and territories in Eastern Europe' (p. 241). He considers that British policy would tend to be much more friendly to Russian claims than the American attitude could be. We must wait and see, but Great Britain must do her best to foster the understanding between the two great Powers of the Western world and the mighty colossus of eastern Europe and northern Asia. Then again, in speaking chiefly of economic problems Mr. Callender says: 'The United States may appear as the most conservative of the great nations, and we may find again in America an impulse to withdraw from a world that seems unpleasantly radical. For the war will not have shaken us so much as Britain, where conservatism has in any case not been so rigid in recent years as in America' (p. 247). The whole book is worth careful study. It is well written, sane and strong in outlook, and enlightening on the attitudes of North and South America and different European countries towards each other, towards the war and towards the peace.

A. W. HARRISON

The Economic Consequences of the Church. By Reginald T. Brooks. (Independent Press, 2s.)

The Struggle of the Dutch Church. Edited by W. A. Visser 'tHooft. (S.C.M., 2s. 6d.)

... but *Suppose He was Right.* By Max Warren. (Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 2s.)

Pax Christi. By Albert T. Belden. (Carwal Publications, Wallington, Surrey. 3s. 6d.)

Both the man in the street and the man in the pew are asking 'What has the Church to say about war?', 'Why isn't the Church doing something for freedom and a real democracy?', 'Why don't our preachers speak out on economic questions?', and so on. Here is a batch of brave little books which answer, in no equivocal fashion, these and similar questions. Those who are troubled about politics in the pulpit or the participation of the Church in political and economic questions should read Mr. Brooks's sane and suggestive summary of the various schemes propounded for solving our social and economic problems. He holds that, while it is *ultra vires* for the Church to produce any blue-print on these matters, not having, *qua ecclesia*, sufficient economic or technological knowledge, it is yet within its province to examine every plan, whether Controlled Capitalism, Class Socialism, or Common Wealth (of which a particularly clear summary is given), and to ask of which the consequences accord best with our idea of what human life ought to be, and 'which plan would give the Church most scope to make its witness and to call men to their true nature by calling them to faith in Christ?' He claims only to guess, but those who know Mr. Brooks's pulpit at Skipton will be aware how faithfully he has directed the thoughts of his people in this inquiry. Believing that world-wide Christianity is able to do something towards the prevention of war, Dr. Belden outlines a grandiose scheme for

what he calls 'Ultimate Pacifism'. He is a convinced pacifist, and summarizes the message of Christ—as pacifists do—in somewhat extravagant language and without too much regard for counter-arguments. A more moderate tone would have been more persuasive, for here and there he makes a good point. But what is the Church doing *now* against the violence of men? Dr. 'tHooft has laid the future historian under great obligation by his collection of documents issued by the Dutch Church under duress. They afford stimulating reading and prove how organized Christianity in occupied Europe has led the struggle against Nazi tyranny as no other corporate body has done. In other spheres, too, the world-Church is active and effective, as Mr. Warren of the C.M.S. sets forth in his book with its arresting title. In a fresh and original approach to the study of overseas missions he recounts how the Way of Christ has been effective in the freeing of slaves, the healing of the sick, the education of backward peoples, and the new community-life of old enemies. These two books show what Christianity is doing *now*.

T. HAROLD MALLINSON

The Old Testament in the Christian Church. By H. F. D. Sparks. (S.C.M., 6s.)

The Presentation of the Old Testament. By Neil L. Pritchard. (S.P.C.K., 3s.)

Since the days of Marcion the Church has had to defend and explain, even to its own members, the value of the Old Testament, but never more strenuously than to-day. Each of these two books attempts part of the task. The first deals with the question 'Why should we as Christians of the twentieth century still bother to read the Old Testament at all?' The second 'aims at presenting some of the principles which must be borne in mind by all who have the responsibility of teaching the Old Testament'. Together they cover a good deal of the ground. Mr. Sparks begins by surveying the history of the traditional Christian view, and explains clearly how modern advances in critical and historical method and in science (especially astronomy, geology, and anthropology) have rendered belief in the infallibility of the Old Testament untenable. This is excellent; but is there a proper proportion between the seventy-one pages thus employed and the twenty-one which state a positive view? In fact, when the value of the Old Testament as literature, and as source-book for historian, anthropologist, and student of religion, has been rightly judged peripheral, and when the modern arguments for rejecting the Old Testament, selecting from it, or swallowing it whole have been discussed, less than ten pages remain. Nor does one feel that the necessity of the Old Testament for an understanding of the New is adequately demonstrated by a short paragraph on Christian technical terms and another on the doctrine of Election. The importance of the Old Testament for the life and teaching of Jesus, which is surely the central issue, is not discussed at all. Mr. Pritchard's book admirably supplies the missing positive statement by its demonstration that the Old Testament is a record of development ultimately fulfilled in the New. This development is illustrated from theology, legend and history, prophecy, poetry, symbolism, and allegory. Perhaps the suggestion in the Introduction that there is a parallel between the development of the racial soul and that of the individual might have been more explicitly expounded. Again, one asks why the historical chapters are so haphazardly placed, and one cannot help wondering how many teachers in day-schools or Sunday-schools have sufficient knowledge to work out in detail the excellent method which Mr. Pritchard advocates.

CHARLES F. DAVEY

The School and the Church. By A. Victor Murray. (S.C.M., 3s. 6d.)

Boy Scouts. By E. E. Reynolds. (Collins, 4s. 6d.)

Professor Murray's is an admirable book, tightly packed with good things, closely reasoned, deeply religious, tolerant, and readable. The entire field in dispute between

Religion and Education (and it is far wider than they know who only think of the dual system) is here reviewed. Methods of Education, administrative problems and fundamental principles are all examined with the 1944 Education Act in mind. Read by all concerned with the Schools, but especially by the protagonists and antagonists of Church control, it will contribute to better understanding of the questions at issue. If all the problems are not resolved by Professor Murray, his elucidations will greatly help those attempting a solution. The closing chapters entitled 'The Education of the Emotions', 'The Christian Society', and 'Worship' are full of wise counsel to religious educators, be they teachers or preachers. The book is attractively printed but is published only in paper covers: it is to be hoped that as soon as circumstances permit the publishers will give it a more durable binding.

The second book deserves its place in Collins's 'Britain in Pictures' series, for the Scout Movement is essentially British, not only in origin but in decentralization of control, the encouragement of individual freedom, and the spontaneity of its development. It is significant that it has never been possible to get a genuine Scout Movement founded in Germany. Baden-Powell wrote *Scouting for Boys* as a handbook to outdoor activities for the Boys' Brigade, but boys began scouting for themselves and the Movement grew like a living thing to the amazement of its founder. The first Scout shop started cautiously with a small stock, including 12 cowboy hats; in 1938 30,000 hats were sold. The story of the aims, methods, and achievements of the largest Youth Movement in the world is here concisely told and fittingly illustrated.

J. K. WHITEHEAD

Understanding the Young Child. By W. E. Blatz. (University of London Press, 6s.)

This most stimulating book is written by a Canadian doctor who has given great practical help to British children in the City of Birmingham. In 1941 Birmingham suffered severely in the raids. Many schools were closed, many parents were away from home, and the lives of many children still in the city were much disorganized. Professor Blatz, however, with a highly trained staff of Nursery School experts, set up the Garrison Lane Nursery Training School. This centre soon became noted for its enlightened methods and organization. In this book we are given an outline of Dr. Blatz's training scheme, together with valuable chapters on the young child in every phase of mental and physical growth. The book does not deal with the religious development of young children, though the author does not minimize the importance of religion from the earliest days. He maintains that during the Nursery School years 'religion in the form of dogma is unimportant . . . during this period the child is susceptible to attitudes, but not to concepts'. Nevertheless, 'in the home the parents may use any opportunity for inculcating any plan which they themselves practise'. He very pertinently adds that parents 'are not justified in teaching anything which they do not fully believe and practise'. The numerous tables, charts, and diagrams, including a Nursery School programme, are specially to be commended. A companion chart shows the remarkable gains in weight of the children in the Garrison Lane School. Their Intelligence Quotient values advanced in some cases as much as 15. This will surprise those who still imagine that a child's I.Q. represents 'inborn' capacity, for of course this cannot be increased. What can be increased is the child's ability to develop his capacity to the full. As Dr. Blatz puts it, 'the salvage of undeveloped capacities is as important to a country at war or at peace as the salvage of rubber, bones, and paper'. Perhaps no field of Social and Educational study has advanced so much during war-time years as the field of Nursery School work, and Dr. Blatz is one of its pioneers. His book is to be commended not only to Nursery School students, but to parents and teachers. It is technical, but always lucid.

JOHN W. WATERHOUSE

Experience Worketh Hope. By Arthur John Gossip. (T. & T. Clark, 8s.)

Of the twenty-eight volumes already published in the *Scholar and Preacher* series no fewer than four are from the pen of Dr. A. J. Gossip. Most of the twenty sermons in this volume were delivered to his fellow Scotsmen during these years of storm and stress. But to Dr. Gossip there has been granted the somewhat rare combination of the gifts of the scholar, the writer, and the preacher, and his name is honoured far beyond the limits of his native land. The message of these sermons will be welcomed throughout the English-speaking world, for they are in very truth 'tracts for the times'. The preacher's scholarship is manifest in the frequency and ease of his quotations, ranging from the books of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome to those of such men as Karl Marx, Dr. Joad, and 'that odd person, Mr. Wells'. No reader can be left in any doubt as to the preacher's own convictions. To Methodists especially the reference to 'the fifth gospel, written by [Christians'] experience' will be welcome. To the men in the forces, to the workers in factories and mines, to the anxious and bereaved, to the women and the children, to the aged and the dying, to all who are losing faith and hope, there is here one inclusive message — 'Thou, O Christ, art all I want: Other refuge have I none.' These sermons come from a heart convinced by long experience of the all-sufficiency of Christ and on fire with love to God and man. One sermon, 'On the Imitation of Christ: A Warning', stands quite apart. The 'warning' is addressed to neutrals in the war and to pacifists. The preacher's own strong opinions should be treated with respect, but many of us who are far from being 'pacifists' are thankful for such a witness as that of the 'Friends Ambulance Unit', working for 'the relief of suffering caused by war, wherever the need is greatest'. To them too will the final 'Inasmuch' of blessing be spoken. Meanwhile we agree that 'Experience worketh Hope', and we recommend this book to all who value faith, courage, sincerity, and love.

T. H. BARRATT

Between Ourselves. By Leslie F. Church. (Epworth Press, 6s.)

Builders and Makers. By Gilbert Thomas. (Epworth Press, 7s. 6d.)

A Thousand Sunrises. By Rita F. Snowden. (Epworth Press, 6s.)

Dr. Church's 'Letters' were, in the first instance, addressed to his brethren in the Methodist Ministry, but many others will be glad to read and re-read them to get refreshment in the struggle in which we are all engaged. There is all the literary charm that we expect and enjoy in all Dr. Church's works, but here there is also an intimacy which brings all Christian workers in these times of stress 'together' as they face their difficult duties. The reader feels that the writer has a personal sympathy with all struggling souls, not least with those who, like himself, are suffering because of 'enemy action'. This sympathy has more than an ephemeral value. We thank God for all Dr. Church's power, shown alike by pen and voice, and we are sure that this beautifully illustrated volume will bring courage and cheer to many in all branches of the Christian Church.

In his collection of Essays Mr. Gilbert Thomas excels himself in portraying such different people as Horace, Bunyan, Defoe, Lamb, Cobbett, Wordsworth, Shelley, Hardy, Constable, Mrs. Gaskell, George Eliot, and Bridget Ilbert. Many will place highly the delineation of John Wesley and 'Brother Charles'. The Founder of Methodism faced mob violence and the concerted attack of the Church and the Press until he won through and became 'the best-loved man in England'. He was the 'Master Builder'. He kept abreast with contemporary classical and theological thought. His *Notes on the New Testament* were in advance of his day, and often give interpretations adopted by the Revisers. We also specially commend the study of 'The Child in English Poetry', with its confidence for the future. Mr. Thomas's lucid style, his clear-cut delineations, and his new ideas, concerning

well-known people, give him a high place among our present-day essayists.

A Thousand Sunrises, by one who has lived for a long time in lovely New Zealand, describes a caravan tour of three years. 'Miles, miles, miles, always there are miles; books and people' — and besides those to whom she introduces us *en route*, she recalls such people as Schweitzer, Tischendorf, Rupert Brooke, Kipling, and Dick Sheppard. The mention of them is always relevant to the theme of the moment. This book is a tonic of big things in earth, and sky, and sea. It has beautifully executed illustrations. 'Sunrises' bubble up as well as books. From all, the writer distils 'healing' and restfulness. This is a work by one who has both a roaming and a homely heart. It is a good book for pilgrims.

GEORGE SWAINE

Prayer and the Service of God. By Daniel T. Jenkins. (Faber & Faber, 5s.)

Heart in Pilgrimage. By E. Romilly Micklem. (Independent Press, 2s.)

John Dean. By Minnie Lindsay Carpenter. (Epworth Press, 2s.)

The Inward Journey of Isaac Penington. Compiled by Robert J. Leach. (Friends' Book Centre, 1s.)

These four small books all deal with that inner life of communion which alone can issue in fruitful service. The writer of the first is a young Congregational minister who has already won recognition as a creative theological thinker. This book is, as he says, 'a preface to prayer rather than a book on prayer itself, an attempt to face some of the questions and difficulties which present themselves to those who find it hard to maintain the life of prayer in the stress of this grim and confused twentieth century'. The book is both a diagnosis of the modern situation and a plea for the recovery of that lost 'dimension' in which alone prayer is really possible. *Heart in Pilgrimage* is a much simpler book, with some sound practical guidance for those who would explore for themselves the spiritual land. The other two books are illustrations of the inward life and its fruits. John Dean was an Australian Methodist Minister who sought a larger liberty in the Salvation Army. For some years he laboured in his own land and then came to England, where he served on the staff of the International Training College, and had a great part in the making of the Army's officers. This short biography, written by the wife of General Carpenter, is an attractive portrait of a man who had himself found the inward way, and knew both its sorrows and its joys. The last book is of purest gold. Among the first generation of Quaker leaders, Isaac Penington stands out as the supreme mystic, with a deep sense of those abiding realities that are to be found by all who press inward, beyond the world of shadows with which most people try to be content. Penington's writings are contained in two large volumes, a treasure indeed, but one that few to-day have the chance or the will to explore. A discerning reader of this selection can hardly fail to hear the call to the inward journey whereof Isaac Penington himself testifies: 'But some may desire to know what I have at last met with. I answer, I have met with my God; I have met with my Saviour; and He hath not been present with me without His salvation; but I have felt the healings drop upon my soul from under His wings.'

FRANCIS B. JAMES

From My New Shelf

BY C. RYDER SMITH

The Interpreter Spirit and Human Life. By A. J. Macdonald. (S.P.C.K., 6s.)

This volume falls into three parts — in the first the doctrine of the Spirit in the Old Testament is examined, the Apocrypha being included; in the second the New Testament evidence is similarly treated; in the third — that is, in the last two

chapters — the writer discusses the relevance of the Biblical doctrine to the life of to-day. There is no need to say that Dr. Macdonald has given us a careful and useful piece of work on a subject that is in the forefront of current theological studies. In his discussion of the Old Testament and Apocrypha there are, however, quite a number of details on which his findings may be challenged, and, on wider issues, he too readily concludes that the doctrine of Wisdom is just a variant of the doctrine of the Spirit, and he does not define exactly enough what he means either by 'immanence' or 'personality'. He speaks once or twice of 'key texts', but this is misleading, for it assumes that one text is the key to many others, the fact being that it needs to be proved that the Old Testament writers have a single consistent doctrine of the Spirit. The author suggests that the three chapters on the New Testament 'form his chief contribution to the study of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit'. This is especially true of the first and third of them. In the first there is a very interesting attempt to solve the problem of the use of the Greek article with the phrases 'Spirit' and 'Holy Spirit' in some passages and its omission in others. Dr. Macdonald claims that when used with the article the Holy Spirit is 'agent', and when used without it 'endowment'. As he tells us, this distinction has also been made independently by others. He seems clearly to have proved that the New Testament writers *tend*, whether consciously or not, to make this distinction, but, as his prolonged examination of apparent exceptions shows, it is doubtful whether it can be maintained everywhere. Indeed, one may doubt whether the Apostolic writers would have admitted that there is a clear-cut distinction. Similarly, Dr. Macdonald does not, at least to one reader, sufficiently distinguish between the Spirit of God in the Christian and what Paul calls 'our spirit'. In the third New Testament chapter Dr. Macdonald — following the Barthians at least in part, as he says — insists that it is the Word or Son that *reveals* and the Spirit that *interprets*. To one reader he seems here, too, to push the distinction too far, doing less than justice to what is technically called the doctrine of Circumcision. In the concluding chapters, where the author applies the doctrine to current life, one misses the New Testament emphasis upon the *power* of the Spirit, though this is not altogether omitted. One is rather surprised too to find that Dr. Macdonald seems to suggest that, since the Christian can do so little to change 'this present evil world', he should give himself chiefly to his own spiritual edification. Is not the New Testament doctrine rather that the Christian (and the Church) should set himself, in the power of the Spirit, to undertake the impossible and change 'this present evil world'? One or two incidental assumptions may also be challenged — e.g. that Timothy was a bishop. But all these and other queries do not mean that the book is a poor book, for no one could at present write a non-contentious book on this subject that would be of much use to students. Disagreement is often the stimulus of thought. This book gives a good example.

Effective Religion. By T. E. Jessop. (Epworth Press, 5s.)

This book is a welcome relief. It is addressed not vaguely to 'the Church' but to every Christian, and it does not discuss blue-prints *in vacuo* but life *in re*. Again, it is not mere criticism, still less denunciation, but is positive and constructive. Professor Jessop takes a wide range. In thirty-six short chapters he deals with worship and prayer and listening to sermons and idealism and compromise and the war and humanism, etc., etc. And on every subject he has something, or rather *the* thing, to say. His chief plea is that Christians need to *think*. They have long been plunging about like an army without a clear aim. 'Look before you leap,' says Professor Jessop, 'and then leap with a will.' He closes his book with a line from Wordsworth — 'The vacillating, inconsistent good' — which describes the people for whom he writes. This writer, at any rate, cannot be charged with talking an out-of-date 'theological'

language that 'modern man' does not understand. He writes pithily — indeed, I had marked so many short sentences for quotation that I've given the list up in despair! He can be pungent as well as pithy. He rightly prefers the surgeon's knife to a 'good bedside manner'. Even a reader who, unlike myself, differs from him on a serious point, will find himself astir with thought — which is just what Professor Jessop intends. He is a Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, yet he neither philosophizes nor psychologizes — but behind all that he says there lies a mastery of his chosen subjects. (To me one of the merits of this layman is that he doesn't put down all the ills of the Church to the parsons!) The chapters of the book were originally articles in a magazine for young Christians. They sometimes resent advice, but if they mean business I don't think they will resent Professor Jessop's, for, in effect, he says to the modern David: 'Take the measure of your Goliath, and then up and at him!' Yet there is nothing here that is *only* for the young. This is one of the most stimulating books that I have read for a long time.

The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. By Jacob Burckhardt. (Phaidon Press, 7s. 6d.)

At last we have a handy edition of the great Swiss historian's masterpiece in English. The printing is not impeccable, but we may put that down to the war. A number of recent writers have told us that the seeds of the present catastrophe in Europe were sown in Italy at the time of the Renaissance, but they have concentrated rather on the evil results than the good ones. Eighty years ago and more Professor Burckhardt claimed that modern civilization had its origins in the same period and place, but his book lays out dispassionately both what is good and what is bad in it. For the most part he does not draw comparisons but keeps to his subject and leaves his readers to their own conclusions. For him the term 'renaissance' does not refer merely to art, of which he has little to say, but to the whole civilization whose occasion was the revival of classical studies. He deals with the rise of the modern concept of the State, with individualism, with humanism, with social phenomena, with religion, and so on. Everywhere he prefers the concrete to the abstract; everywhere he flees hot-foot from easy generalizations. There is no need to say that he knows the whole of the immense relevant literature from top to bottom. Very few of his findings have been challenged by more recent study, and then only in details. Illustration tumbles over illustration in every realm that he treats. For instance, he shows us the great Mendicant preachers, those past masters in revivalism, at their work, with their bonfires of cards and pictures and musical instruments and false hair. They out-puritaned all the Puritans! There is a wholly dispassionate account of the state of the Church at the time — again with definite, concrete examples. Burckhardt believed that Protestantism saved the Papacy by provoking the Counter-Reformation — or rather by provoking the spread of a reform that had already begun in Spain. Mr. L. Goldscheider, who writes a foreword, has added no less than a hundred plates, with rather brief notes, to illustrate the many phases of Italian life at the time. To represent the whole age he selects a statue of a *condottiere*. Was not Napoleon just the greatest of this kind of man?

The English Medieval Recluse. By Francis D. S. Darwin. (S.P.C.K., 6s.)

Bit by bit the facts about the Middle Ages are being recovered for us, and it is well that controversialists should know the facts. Mr. Darwin has gathered into this volume most of what is to be known about the recluses who took a vow never to leave a given spot. Like other authorities he distinguishes them from hermits, who might move from place to place, but he admits that the two were sometimes identified even in the Middle Ages and the term 'hermitage' was occasionally used for the habitat of a recluse. May not the latter have been a particular kind of hermit? In England, at any rate, the recluse was more often a woman, an 'ancre', than a man.

Her enclosure might be a single room or a house or even a house and garden. Usually it was near a church and often leaned against it, so that she might join in the Mass through a window. She had always a window through which she could talk with visitors. She had a maid to bring her food, etc., and sometimes she held property. In the Exeter Use the ceremony of enclosure — prescribing, for instance, Extreme Unction — suggests that with enclosure she had begun to die, but the facts in general suggest that her lot was by no means so terrible. At best she seems to have been a kind of neutral and helpful adviser to such of her neighbours as came to her window, but sometimes she was a giver and receiver of gossip, and there is at least one instance of something much worse. Much of her time was spent in keeping the 'hours', and some of it in needlework, but she was not forbidden an afternoon nap. Mr. Darwin's book is packed with interesting detail. For instance, the woman who waited on an 'ancre' was forbidden in one of the 'rules' to wash her head lest she should prove too attractive to a man! Or again, William of Wykeham went so far as to offer an indulgence for forty days to those who would help two poverty-stricken anchores. There is a list of English anchorages.

How to Study an Old Church. By A. Needham. (Batsford, 6s.)

There is little need to say that a 'Batsford Book' is a good book. Mr. Needham provides a multitude of drawings of such things as may be found in any old church, large or small. These are gathered into twenty-six plates, with exact and clear descriptions in the letterpress. On account of the paper shortage there are many drawings on each plate, but, with the exception of the drawing of one or two spires, these all 'come out well'. The book is an excellent vade-mecum for all kinds of visitors to churches — not least for the ignoramus. Mr. Needham includes 'movables' as well as 'fixtures', inside and outside, the only important exception being church plate, which is rarely to be seen. A very few queries suggest themselves: Were there no panelled doors? Was it the church or the churchyard that was thought to be infested by demons? Were the doors of anchorages always blocked up? Were none of the *graffiti* mason-marks? But if anyone wishes to understand how the medieval church was the centre of the whole life of a parish, this is the book for him. To name one or two un-ecclesiastical instances — here are drawings of a 'brank' or 'gossip's bridle', of the 'dog-tongs' with which the 'expeller' seized a dog that had come to church and proved irreverent, and of a 'butterfly head-dress'. There is no need to say that the book is an excellent guide to the development of the architecture of English churches right up to the Renaissance. About some details Mr. Needham comes later still.

Samuel the Kingmaker. By Laurence Housman. (Cape, 6s.)

'Dead rat! Get back to your hole!' These are the last words of the last scene in Mr. Housman's new tragedy. They are spoken by the Witch of Endor to the Ghost of Samuel, and they give the key to the play. The author tells us in his introduction that he 'wishes' that his 'reading of the character of Samuel' should have 'the backing of probability'. The play may therefore be considered under two different questions: 'Do the stories of Samuel in the Bible give good grounds for the conviction that he was a self-seeking schemer, who knew how to use his position as Prophet to maintain his own power?' and 'Is this play a fine work of art?' We may begin with the first.

Mr. Housman shows in his introduction that he has some knowledge of the findings of modern specialists about the sources of the First Book of Samuel, and, in particular, he knows that they agree that the book contains more than one account of God's attitude to the people's request for a king. He does not, however, add that these experts hold that the account in the eighth and twelfth chapters dates from the days

when Israel had had a long experience of evil kings, that they were written some three centuries after Samuel's time, and that the earlier account is to be preferred. If he had mentioned this, it would have robbed him of the two stories upon which his theory of Samuel's self-seeking can most easily be intruded. Even here, however, he has to proceed chiefly by insinuation. He uses the same method more subtly when he deals with the other stories about Samuel. Next, he supports his theory by adding stories of his own invention — chiefly about Samuel's two sons, Abiah and Joel, and about the Witch. Lastly, he omits Samuel's last rebuke to Saul in the Witch's cave in favour of a reconstruction of the scene which ends with the words already quoted. Readers who know their Bible and keep their eyes open will easily see how deftly Mr. Housman uses his methods. His new account of Samuel keeps no closer to the sources than the Romanist account of Luther, or the Royalist account of Cromwell, or Lytton Strachey's of Manning.

But what of the play as a work of art? It is a very fine play indeed. Mr. Housman weaves many Scripture passages into the play, yet his own language is near enough to the Scriptural style to give little sense of jar. The play is well constructed and leads inevitably up to the tragic scene where Samuel dies alone. There is no humour in the play, but there is sarcasm, and the conversations of Samuel's sons, which form a kind of under-plot, relieve the tension of tragedy as it needs to be relieved. The characterization is good, not least in the case of Saul. The Witch too is finely drawn, though she sometimes upholds a modern rather than ancient account of God. In brief one may adapt Bentley's famous verdict on Pope's translation of Homer and say, 'A very fine play, Mr. Housman, but please don't call it Samuel'.

Hated Servants. By H. F. Rubinstein. (Gollancz, 6s.)

Even though the title of this book is based upon a text in the Fourth Gospel, it is not very appropriate, for it does not suggest the nature of the book. Here are eight one-act plays, all connected more or less closely to the Bible. They range from Jerusalem to Glastonbury, and from Rahab to Johanan, disciple of Gamaliel. The writer tells us that his secondary purpose in writing them was to find out whether he is both a Jew and a Christian. From the point of view of the orthodox he is neither, but this does not matter. What he has to say is good for anybody. He has taken eight stories and has set himself to make them live. He succeeds admirably, for he has a dramatist's gifts. This is far from his first work in the world of plays, as one would guess from internal evidence. It is unfortunate that the first play is the least successful, particularly in its earlier part — for the Hebrew spies would seem anything but 'gentlemen' to a Canaanite. Perhaps the best of all of the eight is the play based upon the First Epistle to the Corinthians. It is remarkable how large a part women take in every play. One idea runs throughout the book — the relation of the Jew and the Christian to the 'outsider'. It would be possible to criticize a detail here and there — for instance, Jacob's Well was not on a hill, and James is needlessly taken to Rome, and one may doubt whether Paul, however angry, would have spoken of 'those damned circumcisionist busy-bodies' — but the writer does reach to the heart and temper of the matter, and this is his main business. His stage-directions are few and simple, and he does not strain after a meticulous accuracy about such things as costume and furniture, but this too is unimportant. Shakespeare was no archaeologist! These plays, or at any rate most of them, are 'just the thing' for Wesley Guilds, etc., both because of their pertinence, their sincerity, and their artistic qualities.

Problems of the Peace. By Wilson Harris. (Cambridge, 3s. 6d.)

Mr. Wilson Harris is well qualified to write on this subject, for he was in close touch with the diplomatists when the Treaty of Versailles was being drawn up. It has

been his business to keep himself informed of world events ever since, and he has a sanity of judgement that fits him to write on public questions. In this small book he confines himself to Europe, and he leaves economic, social, and religious problems for the most part on one side. His subject is the political situation and the problems it presents. He sets himself to describe the problems and the chief suggestions for their solution rather than to set out his own plan, but he does not always keep silent about his opinions. He is not one of those who solve problems without understanding them. He deals with all the chief problems except civil wars — armistice, peace conference, frontiers, the conditions to be imposed on Germany, reparations, the future league of nations, war criminals, and minorities. He knows the facts and he selects and presents them with great skill. The only exception, perhaps, is Poland. Here the Treaty of Riga, to which he chiefly appeals, is only one of many factors in a very tangled situation. For instance, is it true or not that the population of the area in dispute between Russia and Poland, apart from Lublin, is predominately Russian? Again, it is not quite accurate to say that the Teutonic Knights 'colonized' East Prussia. They were called in to the help of a Slav king, whose memory survives in the name of Königsberg. It is useful to have the exact terms of the Atlantic Charter. It was comparatively easy to state its principles, for the 'rub' comes in applying them to the details of particular problems. Mr. Harris shows, both explicitly and implicitly, that it is impossible to do this perfectly. His last chapter is called 'Question Marks'. Here he asks 'What part is the United States going to play in Europe after the war?', 'And Russia?' 'And France?', 'And Germany?' He might have added 'And Britain?', for, while he is no Vansittartarian, he plainly fears that our humanitarianism may betray us again. Two questions emerge disturbingly from the whole discussion: 'How is Germany to be made to keep the terms of the peace treaty through a whole generation?' and 'Is there any place in the future for the sovereignty of small nations?' This is one of the best of the many books on post-war Europe.

Architecture and Personalities. By Sir Herbert Baker. (Country Life, 42s.)

Some years ago I asked a knowledgeable friend 'Who is the finest living British architect?' and he said 'Sir Herbert Baker'. Now Sir Herbert is an octogenarian and he has written an autobiography in which he expounds his architectural faith. It is not written, however, for professional architects, though no doubt they will read it, but for all who are interested in architecture. There are many plates that exemplify Sir Herbert's buildings; most of them are excellent, though sometimes an important detail is not clear enough. Sir Herbert's opportunities have been large and wide. He has built important public buildings in South Africa, East Africa, India, and England. His work has brought him into contact with many outstanding men — or, as he prefers to call them 'personalities'. Like Sir Herbert himself, the chief of these have been 'imperialists', in the good sense — for instance, Rhodes (Sir Herbert's hero), Kipling, T. E. Lawrence, and Smuts. He has many interesting sidelights on these and others — e.g. he tells of the masons of a church carving a rebus of his name on a stone or two, while he 'turns a blind eye'; and of Rhodes's refusal to allow the use even of 'ready-made or imported' nails in his buildings; and of Lord Hailey's meditating on India's problems by Nicholson's grave. Our author's own architectural preferences are plain enough — he likes the Ionic column, the lintel, the round arch, the dome, and the apse. For the most part Gothic is to seek in his book. He claims to have solved the acoustic problem of the dome. At Delhi he followed the Renaissance builders of Southern Europe, so far as he followed any particular style. From Eastern architecture he borrowed, for instance, the Asoka column of Buddhism, and the *chattri* of Islam, but not the *sikra* or *vimana* of Hinduism. Doubtless both the Hindu and Jain styles are too ornate for his taste.

But, while Sir Herbert often borrows, he never mimics. Again, since he is a convinced idealist, he is a devotee of symbolism — sometimes of too erudite symbolism for the inexpert eye. Here he borrows, for instance, from the spirit of ancient Egypt, and gives us, through one of his sculptors, such a spring-bok as never was 'in reality' yet is verily a living symbol of South Africa. For the rest, Sir Herbert is a lover of nature, a man of true culture (with rather too great a fondness for quoting poets), and a loyal collaborator (in an art that demands much collaboration). In his account of the new buildings at the Bank he has high praise for the contractors, whose name is 'Holloway'. The author refers briefly and dispassionately to his differences with his old friend Sir Edwin Lutyens at Delhi and passes an encomium on his great rival. This book will prove engaging to anyone who has any interest in our present architecture, which, both in ways that Sir Herbert approves and in ways that he disapproves, seems at long last to be something more than a series of echoes. And Sir Herbert himself is very far from being an uninteresting 'personality'.

BOOKLETS AND PAMPHLETS

It would be interesting to inquire when and why the number of pamphlets has waxed and when and why it has waned in the last three centuries. To-day it has waxed indeed — not least in multitudes of series of pamphlets. The wonder is that so many of them are so good. We have received further issues of four series by the Epworth Press. Two are in *The World-Parish Broadcast* series (6d. each), one entitled *March Breast Forward*, by Dr. W. F. Howard, the President of the Methodist Conference, and one *The Healing of His Seamless Dress*, by Lionel A. Dingley, a Christian doctor. Both give the Order of Service. The President's is a virile 'call to arms', and its companion a word of true cheer to the sick. Both 'get there'. Next there is an addition to the 'Pilot Books', *The Boy at the Cross-Roads* (4d.). It is written by Douglas P. Blatherwick, who shows leaders in the Boys' Brigade, the Boy Scouts and so on 'How to bring a boy to Christ'. The writer is one who has done it. Third, in *Memories of Home* (1s. 6d.) Dr. Leslie F. Church has selected a number of passages, both in poetry and prose, with pictures, to be sent to a lad in the Forces or any distant friend. Dr. Church has a rare and consummate way of putting his finger on just the right quotation — whether it be about cricket or England or home or prayer — yet never on the hackneyed quotation. No wonder his little booklets, in their handy pocket-cases, have sold by the thousand. Last, there is Margaret Harwood's *For Remembrance* (1s.) in the Epworth Series of Pageants and Plays. There are two scenes, one in Mary's house at Nazareth when Jesus has just left it, and a longer scene in the house of Salome in Jerusalem at the time of the Crucifixion. Except for John, who speaks one sentence, all the 'characters' are women. Reverence rules throughout. The Mother of Jesus is rightly presented as 'an ordinary woman'.

Two of the series of 'Forward Books' (Independent Press, 2s. each) are reviewed earlier in this issue. Of *The Church and Democracy* it is enough to say that it is by Daniel T. Jenkins. It begins from the general admission of historians nowadays that the tap-root of English democracy was the Dissenting church meeting, and proceeds to plead for the right kind of democracy both in Church and State. . . . In a series entitled 'Religion in a Changing World' the 'Unitarians state their faith'. The first three numbers are *Changing Moral Standards*, by Raymond V. Holt; *C. S. Lewis and Some Modern Theologians*, by E. George Lee; and *Religion and the Scientists*, by Leslie Belton (Lindsey Press, 6d. each). Mr. Lee's 'other theologians' are Dr. Whale and Canon Hodgson, and his pamphlet is an attack upon their accounts of the doctrine of the Trinity. Orthodox Christians will find much to agree with in Mr. Holt's book, and little to disagree with in Mr. Belton's. . . . We may mention finally Mr. J. F. Horrabin's *Atlas of Post-War Problems*, with explanatory notes, in the famous 'Penguin

Series' (9d.). If one pores over it a little, it does more to illuminate the tangled tasks of the peace than many larger books.

Apart from series we have three pamphlets which, each in its own way, meet urgent needs. H. C. Dent's *The Education Act, 1944* (University of London Press, 1s. 9d.) is a detailed explanation, in everyday language, of the provisions of the Act, its possibilities, and its problems. As the writer says, 'To make' this revolutionary Act 'a real success, the full co-operation of every citizen will be required'—and, most of all, of parents. But to co-operate they must first understand. Here they may learn all about it. . . . Who shall say anything to those who have suffered through war? Those who have themselves suffered through it. Most others fumble feebly here. In *Facing Suffering* (S.C.M., 9d.) there are 'three personal messages'—one from a soldier who lay in hospital in the last war, one from the widow of a captain in the Merchant Navy, who perished in this war, and one from the father of an only son who fell at Dunkirk. They all say that in such sorrows God is not bankrupt. . . . We are learning to-day that all Christians agree about many things. In *Christ and Our Enemies*, by Stephen Hobhouse (S.P.C.K., 9d.), pacifist and non-pacifist agree about the meaning and range of Christian forgiveness, for there is an introduction by Archbishop Temple. The people who lightly assume that they know what forgiveness is are just the people who should read this searching study of what Christ meant by it. . . . What Geoffrey Hoyland says is always well worth reading. His *Tyranny of Mathematics* (S.C.M., 1s. 6d.) challenges effectively the common current assumption that science is omniscient, and claims as effectively a place for poetry in a well-ordered life and a dominant place for religion. There is here wide knowledge, consummate clarity, and pertinent humour. This is one of the best of 'tracts for the times'.

ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS

The following contractions are used: *E.T.* for *The Expository Times* (T. & T. Clark, 1s.); *H.T.V.* for the *Harvard Theological Review* (Harvard University Press, Milford, \$1); *M.W.* for *The Moslem World* (Hartford Seminary, via Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 2s.); *P.* for *The Presbyter* (J. Clarke, 3d.); *S.P.* for *Studies in Philology* (University of North Carolina Press, \$1.25). Where the title of an article does not sufficiently indicate its subject, the latter is prefixed in brackets.

'Aramaic? Did Jesus Speak', by R. O. P. Taylor (*E.T.*, Jan.); 'Armenian Account of Islam, Part I, An', by K. Izants (*M.W.*, Jan.); 'Athenaeus XIV', 639 f., by F. M. Heichelheim (*H.T.V.*, Oct.); (Dostoevsky) 'What is a Christian Novel?', by M. and A. N. Prior (*P.*, Dec.); (Eastern Church) 'The Orthodox Idea of a Church Community', by G. Every (*P.*, Dec.); 'Education, Christianity and', by W. Fraser Mitchell (*E.T.*, Feb.); 'Eucharist, The Social Meaning of the', by Kenneth Grayston (*P.*, Sept. and Nov.); (Evangelism) 'The Churches and the People', by Norman H. Snaith (*E.T.*, Feb.); 'Gamaliel's Speech and Caligula's Statue', by J. Ward Swain (*H.T.V.*, Oct.); 'History, R. Niebuhr's Philosophy of', by N. P. Jacobson (*H.T.V.*, Oct.); Ikhwan al-Saza and Christ, The', by L. Levonian (*M.W.*, Jan.); 'Islam in the Netherlands East Indies, Government and', by W. J. A. Kernkamp (*M.W.*, Jan.); 'Leo III, Correspondence between 'Umar II and', by A. Jeffrey (*H.T.V.*, Oct.); '"Morality" Fragment, "Good Order", A', by G. L. Frost and A. Nash (*S.P.*, Oct.); 'New Order, Apologetic in the', by R. J. Wedderspoon (*E.T.*, Jan.); 'Poetry in England, 1684-1717, Theories of Pastoral', by J. E. Congleton (*S.P.*, Oct.); (Shelley) 'Kubla Khan, Queen Mab and Alastor', by J. W. Archer (*S.P.*, Oct.); 'Theological Survey of War-time Britain, A', by A. Miller (*P.*, Dec.); 'Verecundia in Ibero-Romance, The Development of', by Y. Malkiel (*S.P.*, Oct.).

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